DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

MASTER OF ARTS-POLITICAL SCIENCES

SEMESTER -IV

PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

ELECTIVE 406

BLOCK-1

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

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FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavours.

PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

BLOCK-1

BLOCK-2

BLOCK 1: PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Introduction to the Block

Unit 1 deals with Sources of Conflict & Insecurity. Various theories have been formulated to explain the cause of international conflicts, the process and the cycle they go through as they go through as they progress to war and finally some of the approaches to resolve them.

Unit 2 deals with Theories of Threat and Approaches: Economic, Political and Cultural. Despite rises in immigration and attempts to manage immigration, anti-immigrant threat and prejudice remains a major concern at the individual and societal levels, and often surfaces as a key political, economic, and social issue.

Unit 3 deals with War Economy and its impact on Development. A war economy or wartime economy is the set of contingencies undertaken by a modern state to mobilize its economy for war production.

Unit 4 deals with Peace Movement: An overview. Maintenance of domestic and international peace is imperative today. The two World Wars have taken the toll of humanity.

Unit 5 deals with Theories of Peace and Conflict. Conflict, therefore is a dynamic and changeable process and the process which seeks to alter conflict must be equally dynamic and changeable. Conflict transformation also asserts that some conflicts are better off being transformed, rather than being resolved.

Unit 6 deals with Conflict Analysis: Structure and Processes. The concept of 'Conflict' continues to be an elusive one in spite of efforts by peaceresearchers and social scientists to clarify it.

Unit 7 deals with Conflict Cycles and Mapping. The components in bold describe the tasks for organizations and staff which include: Preventing incidents by controlling the environment and procedures. De-escalating conflict by bringing down their emotional content, and coping with the aftermath of conflict including further dealings with the person(s) involved.

UNIT 1: SOURCES OF CONFLICT & INSECURITY

STRUCTURE

1.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- Human Nature as source of conflict
- The Nature of the State
- The Nature of the International System
- Conflict- Definition
- Insecurity-Definition and Scope

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Various theories have been formulated to explain the cause of international conflicts, the process and the cycle they go through as they go through as they progress to war and finally some of the approaches to resolve them. The normative conflict management approaches have been faced with influencing factors which determines the success or failure of the conflict management. Importantly is the rightness of intervention in conflictwhen a negotiated solution is possible, this appropriateness is

significantly a determinant of the conflict management suitability and viability.

According to Michael Nicholson(1992), in his book ―Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict‖ conflict is defined in terms of the needs, wants or the obligation of the parties involved and that it takes place between two conscious, though not necessarily rational, beings. Traditionally, the term "international conflict" referred to conflicts between different nation-states and conflicts between people and organizations in different nation-states. (International Conflict by Cate Malek Updated May 2013 by Heidi Burgess). However some scholarly articles posit that it is only normal to experience conflict locally or internationally due to the human nature. Michael Lund suggests that, in the years ahead crises and threats will grow more numerous, not less, and will pose significant threats to international peace and security and to the interest of many nations. This unit seeks to discuss of international conflict and insecurity on the basis of the theories to provide the basis of the causative factors, while looking at some of the holistic approaches that could be used to address these issues. The cause of conflict is context-specific, multi-causal and multi-dimensional and can result from a combination of the following factors:

1. Political and institutional factors: weak state institutions, elite power struggles and political exclusion, breakdown in social contract and corruption, identity politics.

2. Socioeconomic factors: inequality, exclusion and marginalisation, absence or weakening of social cohesion, poverty.

3. Resource and environmental factors: greed, scarcity of national resources often due to population growth leading to environmental insecurity, unjust resource exploitation.

The identification and understanding of conflict is crucial in determining the potential areas of interventions; formulation of measures and polies for conflict prevention, management, resolution and rehabilitation.

1.1.1 Political and institutional factors

Weak state institutions

Political institutions that are unable to manage differing group interests peacefully, to provide adequate guarantees of group protection, or to accommodate growing demands for political participation, can fracture societies. Mansfield et al argued that the international community should be realistic about the dangers of encouraging democratisation where the conditions are unripe. The risk of violence increases if democratic institutions are not in place when mass electoral politics are introduced.

Elite power struggles and political exclusion

Colonialism and liberation struggles in Africa, the Middle East and Asia have left various legacies, including divisive and militarised politics and fierce struggles for power and land. For example after the 1995 elections, President Henri Konan Bedie won and pushed for policies that promoted Ivorian Nationalism. (Parliament passed a law that barred anyone whose parents were not born in Ivory Coast from running for presidency. One of AlassaneOuttara parents was a Burkinabe.) The domination of access to state structures and resources by any one leader, group or political party to the exclusion of others exacerbates social divisions. Lindemann argues that the ability of post-colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa to maintain political stability depends on the ability of the ruling political parties to overcome the historical legacy of social fragmentation.

Breakdown in social contract and corruption

Chandhoke (2005) concludes that the outbreak of militancy has been caused by the failure of political institutions and organizations, and the violation of the social contract.How the state is managed is important to the emergence of conflict within a state i.e. public response to how public funds and revenue are utilized.

Identity politics

When Identityis mobilized in terms of; religion, ethnicity and culture provide a system of beliefs and practices that can unite adherents in a community, alter their perception of others and encourage them to take collective action in the name of their group. For example, Luckham et al (2006) shows the relationship of political relationship and violence his studies of political violence in of Bolivia, Peru, Tajikistan and Yemen.

1.1.2 Socioeconomic factors

The human needs theory also gets support from the so called ―Security Dilemma‖. formulated by Waltz in 1979 stating that because the ordering of the international system is anarchical rather 2 than Hierarchical, states will always seek survival through accumulation of military power, which is also the reason behind competition between states, such for superiority and the need to manage more resource base. Realism supports the presence and puts emphasis on the anarchic nature of not only the states but also the human beings, which has been viewed as the major cause of international conflict. According to Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson in their book causes of War (2010), anarchy in conjunction with uncertainty about intentions of other states, has enormous consequences that induces insecurity and a continuous competitions for power, which makes the international insecurity and international conflict.

Inequality, exclusion and marginalisation

Cederman(2013) argues that political and economic inequalities following group lines – horizontal inequalities – generate grievances that in turn can motivate civil war.

Poverty and conflict

Conflict and poverty are clearly linked - a disproportionate number of conflicts take place in poor countries. The direction of causality has been debated, however. Most research contends that poverty, in itself, is rarely a direct cause of conflict; yet it is evident that conflict exacerbates poverty. Goodhand (2001) stated that traditionally the concepts of chronic poverty and violent conflict have been treated as separate

spheres. It is argued that poverty and conflict are linked. Violent conflict is not a side issue and needs to be better understood in order to achieve development goals. Conflict tends to be enhanced and manifested especially in poor countries where other attributing factor are said to emanate to facilitate conflict.

1.1.3 Resource and environmental factors

Realism has undergone some change. The neo-classical views on realism theories look at the causative factors of international conflict from the material/ resource based point of view. They argue that material capabilities are the most important determinants of state strategies and give causal primacy to the system structure. They emphasize the need for state leaders to mobilize societal resources to convert them to power that can support the state. The strength and autonomy of any state in the society therefore is dependent on its ability to mobilize societal resources for the purposes of accumulating power. Failure of any given society to achieve this leads to weak states that are usually divided and less expansive. On the other hand, those that have mastered that ability have the ability to stay autonomous and also expand to accumulate more.

Greed and opportunity in war

Regardless of the beliefs, ideologies and grievances involved, all armed conflicts must be funded. Such funding often comes from illicit sources and activities. Berdal M. and Keen D.(1997)analyses the conflicts in African, Asian and Central American countries that the pursuit of ‗rational' economic goals by conflict participants is often a major factor behind the continuation of a war that otherwise seems illogical.

Resource exploitation

Aspinall (2007) argues that natural resource exploitation promoted conflict in Aceh, Indonesia only because it became entangled in wider processes of identity construction and was reinterpreted back to the population by ethnic political entrepreneurs in a way that legitimated violence. Rather than any intrinsic qualities of natural resource extraction, the key factor was the presence of an appropriate identity-

based collective action frame. This is more common indeveloping countries like Nigeria, Sierra Leoon, and DRC. (Lujala, 2010; Ikelegbe, 2006). An example is the conflict in the Niger-Delta area of Nigeria where the emergency of militancy is experienced

Environmental insecurity and resource scarcity

Environmental scarcities stem from environmental change and resource degradation; population pressure; and the unequal distribution of resources, such as land and water. The impact affects the capability of State to cope and resource availability that could help sustain live. (Smith et al, 2009; Homer-Dixon,1994: Barnett et al 2007).

1.2 HUMAN NATURE

We will learn that human conflicts are omnipresent and ubiquitous. They are present in every society, in every part of the world. We also learnt that there are many kinds, types, levels and manifestations of conflict. There is no single source for every conflict. There are as many sources of conflict as there are its types and levels. Conflicts may have more than one source or reason. Identifying and understanding the underlying sources and root causes of conflicts is a key to reducing their frequency and intensity, and eventually seeking a resolution. Since conflicts often bring destruction in their wake and are therefore costly affairs, sources of conflict are the natural foci for reforms and changes which will supposedly reduce or eliminate conflict. If the source of conflict is a psychological state called ‘tension’, tension reduction is an indicated strategy. If the source is ignorance, as is the case in some non-realistic conflicts, education will eliminate or minimise the ‘cause’ of such conflicts. A genuine and lasting solution to peace cannot be worked out unless one is familiar with the reasons and causes of different types of conflicts. Conflict resolution efforts will bear fruits only when the root causes of conflict are identified and the grievances of conflicting parties are addressed. Therefore, it is very important for us to know both the general and specific causes that result in conflicts. It must be recognised here that adequate research has not been done by scholars / theorists of peace and conflict studies on the causes, effects and international

implications of ethnic social and other forms of communal conflicts. Most scholars have focused their research on international armed conflicts or wars. This Unit will focus on the causes of conflicts, including armed conflicts and other non-armed conflicts. When we analyse the causes of conflicts, we are confronted with many questions: Is there a general theory of sources of conflict? Can there be a single cause for the origin and eruption of conflict? Or, are there multiple causes of conflicts? What are the general and specific sources of conflicts Aggressive Human Nature Many social psychologists and social scientists believe that human nature is basically responsible for the origin of conflicts. They assert that human beings have certain innate/inherent features, such as, aggressiveness, love / lust for power, position, and authority, love for war and so on. Sigmund Freud suggested that opposite instincts exist side by side in the unconscious mind of every human being, with no disharmony. Conflict occurs only when the overt, verbal, symbolic, or emotional responses required to fulfill one motive are incompatible with those required to fulfill another. When a person is motivated to engage in two or more mutually exclusive activities, a conflict situation arises. For example, in a monogamous society a man cannot marry two women at the same time, no matter how attractive they are to him. Thus it is clear that psychological concepts like, hostility, aggressive impulses, or antagonistic sentiments do bear on conflict. Rubenstein cites the biblical story of Cain and Abel to illustrate the psychological aspects of human nature. This biblical tale (narrated in Bible) is common in all three major religions of the Middle East – Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The story goes that Adam and Eve had two sons – Cain and Abel. One day God asks both of them to offer sacrifices to Him. Abel (who was a nomad and shepherd) sacrifices the firstborn of his flock of sheep, and God accepts it. Cain (who was involved in agriculture), the elder son, offers a sacrifice of farm produce, God spurns his offering. In consequence, Cain hates Abel. He had feelings of anger and jealousy against Abel and develops a personal animosity against him and one day he kills his brother. God punishes the killer by driving him from the soil (exiling him) and condemning him to wander the earth as a fugitive, but he protects him against vengeful men

by marking him with a sign. Cain settles in the 'land of Nod, east of Eden', where he becomes a founder of cities. This story tells about the many sources of conflict: non-recognition of Cain's sacrifice, sibling rivalry, vulnerable target (Abel was young and weak), frustration-aggression factor, and inequality (as Cain's offering was considered equally valid). Some scholars consider that conflict has the unconscious and the biological bases. They wonder if there are some innate, endemic qualities in societies – and human beings – which predispose them, more or less unconsciously, to engage in conflict. Presuming that according to Reynolds, Falger and Vine, 'nothing can move us to act in particular ways more strongly than those elements in our psyche that we are completely unaware of', socio-biologists have been investigating whether some aspects of the proclivity for conflict may be ingrained in 'the genetic code' (Jayram Saberwal, p.16).

Denial of Human Rights

Conflicts can involve disagreements about rights or denial of rights. These can include human rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or they can be more narrowly defined in national or state constitutions or laws. In all of these cases, the problem (or conflict resulting from the denial of rights) is not easily negotiable: people do not negotiate about their religious beliefs nor do they compromise their basic rights. They fight for them. There is always a human rights angle/dimension at the core of every conflict.

1.3 THE NATURE OF THE STATE

Socio-economic and Political Inequalities The links between economic inequality and conflicts have been confirmed since Aristotle's time. Aristotle wrote in Politics that 'inferiors [slaves] revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior'. He added further that 'Inequality is the mother of all revolutions'. James Madison in the Federalist characterised inequality in the distribution of property as the 'most common and durable' source of conflict. Frederick Engels had argued that political violence results when political structures are not synchronised with socio-economic conditions. 'Poverty anywhere is a

threat to prosperity everywhere', declared the constitution of ILO in 1919. All these statements candidly explain the intrinsic relationship between socioeconomic inequalities and conflict. Also, they establish that there is relationship between poverty and human rights. Poverty can be both a cause and a result of human rights denials. In other words, while the non-fulfillment of human rights often causes poverty, poverty in many cases is a cause of human rights violations. The realisation of all human rights and efforts to eliminate extreme poverty are mutually reinforcing. The protection of human rights is instrumental to the reduction of extreme poverty. All efforts to eliminate poverty must be based on human rights. In the present age of globalisation, poor people as well as the poor / underdeveloped nations are getting marginalised. It is true that global economic integration is creating opportunities for people around the world, but it is also leading to widening the gaps between the poorest and richest countries. Many of the poorest countries are marginalised from the growing opportunities of expanding international trade, investment and in the use of new technologies. Thus, in the contemporary times, globalisation is emerging as a major cause of conflict at various levelsintrastate and interstate. Due to globalisation, the gap between the rich and poor is widening and some people are reaping the harvest and becoming billionaires, whereas billions are not able to earn $2 dollars a day. In 1998, the UNDP said the assets of the world's 358 billionaires exceeded the combined annual incomes of countries with 45% of the world's population. In 1999, the sales of the world's top six firms, at $716 billion, exceeded the combined GDP of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The report of the UNDP for 2000 disclosed that the super-rich get richer. The combined wealth of the top 200 billionaires was $ 1,135 billion in 1999. Compare that with the combined incomes of $ 146 billion for the 582 million people in all the least developed countries (Cited in Vijapur, 2009, pp.77-78). The horizontal inequality (i.e. inequality among groups, in contrast to vertical inequality which measures inequality among individuals) is the fundamental source of organised conflict. When certain minority groups are denied of political and economic empowerment, they tend to engage in conflict with dominant or majority group which controls political power. If political

and economic space is provided to marginalised groups in the political system, such intergroup conflicts can be resolved. For example, political participation can occur at the level of the cabinet, the bureaucracy, the army and so on; economic empowerment comprises employment, land, livestock etc. The Naxalite movement in many states of India, since 1960s, is caused by huge socioeconomic disparities between land-owning feudal classes and poor peasants. It has been started by the ultra leftist / communist parties who believe in radical socio-economic transformation in society in which they seek to bring about through such extra-constitutional methods as using guns. They aim at establishing an egalitarian social system and redistribute the wealth / land proportionately among persons in society. Violence by naxal groups uses extremist means such as kidnapping the state officials, politicians, killing police and security personnel, etc. to achieve their goals.

1.4 THE NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Since the end of Second World War, most of the interstate conflicts were caused by Cold War between two Super Powers – the United States and the USSR. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Cold War came to an end. But this led to conflicts within the states. The former communist states of Soviet bloc experienced ethnic conflicts (Yugoslavia) and secession demands (Czechoslovakia, Chechnya etc.). There are analyses of the systemic sources of conflicts themselves. Setting aside the 'clash of civilizations' hypothesis of Huntington which predicts future conflict acr oss the fault lines between civilizations and, in particular, a geo-political struggle between 'the West and the rest', the main focus is on three interlinked trends: deep and enduring inequalities in the global distribution of wealth and economic power (as the rich developed countries, constituting 20 per cent of the world population, control and own 80 per cent of resources, whereas the 80 per cent poor from the developing world own and survive with 20 per cent of global wealth and resources); human-induced environmental constraints exacerbated by excessive energy consumption in the developed world and population

growth in the underdeveloped world, making it difficult for human well-being to be improved by conventional economic growth; and continuous militarisation of security relations, including the further proliferation of lethal weaponry (it may be noted that $176 billions-worth of weaponry was exported to the Third World between 1987 and 1991). As a result, 'the combination of wealth-poverty disparities and limits to growth is likely to lead to a crisis of unsatisfied expectations within an increasingly informed global majority of the disempowered'. The probable outcome of this, argues HomerDixon, will be three kinds of conflict: scarcity conflicts mainly at interstate level over oil, water, fish, land; group-identity conflict exacerbated by large-scale population movements; and relative deprivation conflicts mainly at domestic level as the gap between expectation and achievement widens (cited in Ramsbotham and others, p.90). With the demise of the second world after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the first and the third worlds are seen to be confronting each other all the more starkly.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Discuss the Human Nature for conflict.

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2. Discuss The Nature of the State for Conflict.

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3. Discuss the Nature of the International System.

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1.5 CONFLICT- DEFINITION

The identification and understanding of sources and causes of conflict is a key to reducing the occurrence of conflicts. If the sources and underlying causes are eliminated and grievances of conflicting parties are addressed, conflict resolution will be easier. There is no single source of conflicts. There are many sources of conflict. This Unit discusses two types of sources – general and specific sources. Under the rubric of general causes three important sources are discussed. They are: aggressive human nature; socio-economic and political inequalities; and denial of human rights. Under the specific sources we discuss the role of religion, ethnicity, race, caste and ideology in causing conflicts of these kinds. The Unit also discusses many theoretical perspectives on causes of conflict, such as frustrationaggression complex, relative deprivation theory, modernisation processes, and conflict as an inherent process of social change. The frameworks of scholars like Dollard, Lewin, Fanon, Coser, Marx, Sorel, Gandhi, Dahrendorf, Azar have been discussed. From their analyses we learn that most social scientists now accept the principle of multiple causality of conflict; hence there is no one basic source of conflict.

E.E. Schattschneider's "scope of conflict" concept describes why "it is the loser who calls for outside help" (Schattschneider, 16). Nice and Frederickson (1995) explain that the scope of conflict is "simply the size and extent of a conflict," which may involve various types and levels of private or public organizations (27). Generally, the loser in the battle will seek to expand the scope of conflict to new participants in order to gain the advantage. Thus, the scope of the conflict will expand since the loser will involve more and more people or organizations for his or her cause. In intergovernmental relations, contestants "seek the scope of conflict and the decision-making arena that are most likely to produce the desired policy decision… debates about federalism are often debates about policy in disguise" (26-27).

Disagreements over federalism are largely disagreements over public policy because it is policy that determines the ultimate loser once the scope of conflict has ceased to escalate. For example, Nice and Frederickson tell of a homeowner who complained of a noisy factory. The homeowner was not able to change the factory noise level, so the

homeowner involved the local government and won due to the public policy of a "noise ordinance" (26). The factory expanded the scope of conflict through the state legislature and won due to state public policy. The homeowner expanded the scope of conflict to the national government and won due to new and "stricter legislation" (27). Here, the outcome of the very conflict was determined by the recognized authority's enforcement of public policy. The loser continually expanded the scope of conflict until there was no higher public policy alternative.

Schattschneider also described issues that he believed privatized or socialized conflict. For example, issues that privatized conflict were "ideas concerning individualism, free private enterprise, localism, privacy, and economy of government" (7). Ideas that socialize conflict were: "Universal ideas in the culture, ideas concerning equality, consistency, equal protection of the laws, justice, liberty, freedom of movement, freedom of speech and association, and civil rights…" (7). Schattschneider was careful to explain that the scope of conflict may involve bystanders. For example, he said that the civil rights movement's scope was not just about southern Negroes' protests, "but also the rights of 'outsiders' to intervene" (8). In this way, participants may seek to involve everyone in the scope of conflict.

Conflict is a pervasive reality which resonates and occurs globally in diverse forms. UNDP (2014) noted that conflict and a sense of personal insecurity have pervasive adverse impacts on human development and leave billions of people living in precarious conditions. Conflicts have short and long term impacts which affect both conflicting and non-conflicting parties in different ways. This is most poignant at work, where workplace conflicts can escalate, inflict enormous harm on firms, employers, managers, employees, unions etc and pose a great threat to societal as well as national stability and progress. Hence, it becomes expedient for stakeholders at work to promptly and amicably settle conflicts whenever it erupts. It is against this backdrop that this paper calls for synergy between workplace parties and institution in developing accessible and transparent mechanisms for resolving workplace conflicts

in Nigeria, given the complexities of our economy and low industrial capacity utilization in private and public enterprises.

1.6 INSECURITY-DEFINITION AND SCOPE

1.6.1 Definition

Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be at the human rather than national level. Human security reveals a people-centred and multi-disciplinary understanding of security involves a number of research fields, including development studies, international relations, strategic studies, and human rights. The United Nations Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report is considered a milestone publication in the field of human security, with its argument that insuring "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" for all persons is the best path to tackle the problem of global insecurity.

Critics of the concept argue that its vagueness undermines its effectiveness, that it has become little more than a vehicle for activists wishing to promote certain causes, and that it does not help the research community understand what security means or help decision makers to formulate good policies. Alternatively, other scholars have argued that the concept of human security should be broadened to encompass military security: 'In other words, if this thing called ‘human security’ has the concept of ‘the human’ embedded at the heart of it, then let us address the question of the human condition directly. Thus understood, human security would no longer be the vague amorphous add-on to harder edged areas of security such as military security or state security.'

In order for human security to challenge global inequalities, there has to be cooperation between a country's foreign policy and its approach to global health. However, the interest of the state has continued to overshadow the interest of the people. For instance, Canada's foreign

policy, "three Ds", has been criticized for emphasizing defense more than development.

1.6.2 CAUSES OF INSECURITY

According to Oxford Research Group (ORG) there are perhaps four most important underlying drivers of insecurities:

a) Climate change;

b) Increasing competition over resources;

c) Global militarization;

d) Marginalisation across much of the majority world.

A Changing Climate The issue of global climate change has become prominent over recent decades, growing to be seen by many in the environmental movement as a problem of apocalyptic proportions (Lean, 2005). Climate change is a complex phenomenon, which will have multiple and non-linear effects on human security. It will have both direct and indirect impacts on the stability and security of states and communities particularly the Global South. Sea level rises and desertification are two processes for which climate change is a catalyst. Both are likely to affect regions that have not been heavy contributors to green-house gas emission levels; both are processes that will make some hitherto inhabited areas unfit for human habitation. This also increases the chances of conflicts of ‘the commons‘ due to migration.

COMPETITION OVER RESOURCES:

North-South Engagement Competition over energy resources increases the chances and facilitation of conflict between the West-consumer nations and the resource-rich nations in the south.

Energy

Our industrialised global economy is based on carbon – a resource that is increasingly scarce. A decreasing use of fossil fuels, such as coal and oil (both because they are more scarce, and because effects on the climate have been recognised), has the potential to reshape the global political economy, giving greater influence to those regions with a greater share of these resources, and forcing 'consumer' nations such as the United States to address their dependence on imports. Whilst this reliance may force 'consumer' nations into investment in the development of renewable energy sources, it may also be used as a justification for taking a greater interventionist interest in the political situations of resource-rich nations.. Many analysts suggest we have already seen these interests played out in the Persian Gulf (which contains 60% of the world's known oil reserves): for example, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya (the 2011 intervention in Libya has already caused convulsions in the international oil market: Kotsev, 2011).

Routes of Insecurity

This includes Drug and illegal arms trade and international transport lines among others. For example, the conflicts over the Panama Canal with respect to both drug/arms trade within the Panamanian and the conflict over the control or the Panama Canal between the US and the Panamanian government in the late 20th century.

The 'Oil Curse' This is particularly the case in Nigeria, where the Niger Delta region has been subject to internal tension over the past two decades– sometimes labelled fighting for freedom, sometimes as plain criminality (Nwozor, 2010: 32) – as a result of the exploitation of their oil reserves by large multi-national corporations and oil created an avenue for emergence of insurgent groups and a growing support for them among the youth since it facilitated their source of livelihood. Similarly in Gabon, an over-dependence on oil left no incentive to invest in other industries, wiping out diverse agriculture and industry interests, meaning that when the oil 'ran out', the country was left in an extremely vulnerable economic position (Bainomugisha et al, 2006: iv). The influence of natural resources revenue on conflict is not a new phenomenon. Prior to Sudan's CPA, the country had suffered decades of

civil war between the oil-rich South and the power base in the North, intensified by late 20th Century explosion in the export of oil. As with civil war in Liberia, the profits from this enhanced petroleum production were rumored to finance the conflict (Switzer, 2002). Other areas of competition that could lead to conflict include water and food arising from their insecurity.

Militarisation

The current priority of the dominant security actors is maintaining international security through the vigorous use of military force combined with the development of both nuclear and conventional weapons systems may be said to have contributed to the emergency of insecurity. The Post-Cold War nuclear development, emergency of increased number of world powers‘ military bases across the globe, Western operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the socalled ‘war on terror‘, responses to the ‘Arab uprisings’ in countries such as Libya and Syria, and 5 the current focus on extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa, have all raised difficult issues to be addressed. Such instances are a) Deep water military aggression: China and the Pacific - China‘s recent actions in the South China Sea and Himalayas have given rise to further—and at times violent— conflict over the region‘s natural resources. And b) the increased use of drones and its impact on increased conflict: by USA and its allies in Yemen Iraq Pakistan etc.; this has also influenced the de-monopolization by non-US allied states like Iran Suden and Syria and non-state actors like Hamas, Hezbolla and the Islamic State.

Marginalisation of the Majority

World Divisions between the rich industrialised North and the ‘majority world’ are a key and intensifying driver of global insecurity. While overall global wealth has increased, the benefits of this economic growth have not been equally shared. The rich-poor divide is growing, with a heavy concentration of growth in regions of North America and Europe in particular, and the ‘majority world’ of Asia, Africa and Latin America (UNDP, 2009: 35). Example is the rise of drug trafficking in the Afro-

Colombian communities of the Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó in the Urabá region. Also marginalization of the ―Mandera Triangle‖ in the Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia boerders by the their central government leading to their high vulnerable to periodic droughts and floods, high levels of poverty, long-term disruption to the traditional systems of livelihood, ongoing inter-clan conflicts and border tensions between states. Deepening oppression and political exclusion amongst communities in the South combine with poverty and discrimination to present an increasingly dynamic threat to national and international stability. Also poverty has played its role to marginalize as seen in issues of food insecurity among the poorer nations. For example, chronic food insecurity in Baluchistan (Pakistan) has 'aggravated the sense of marginalisation', encouraging the rise of insurgency groups The sense of increasing marginalisation is more keenly felt as improvements in education and modern technologies (amid radio, mobile phone, television and internet) allow those 'at the margins' to witness the wealth and opportunities of elites (both in the North and in their own Southern nations). This leads to an increased likelihood of radicalisation and emergency of political violence. Other areas linked to marginalization could be linked from health, Migration, radicalization (Talibanization, Islamophobia); climatic change and justice; resource-based; and political (Global South view on IMF, WB and SAPs; also intra-national political exclusion/oppression) aspect.Economic recessions leading to wealth disparities and subsequently violence are also evident in Liberia, East Timor and Sierra Leone.

VIABILITY AND IMPACT OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MEACHANISM

Thompson, R (1995) posits the realist believing the core hypothesis that a primary determinant of international outcomes, including both wars and the peaceful settlement of the crises and disputes, is the distribution of power in the international system.

One of the theories of managing international conflict is that of Consociationalism. This theory suggests two dimensions of institutional design that focus on power sharing and self-governance. The basis of the

argument is that the approaches in conflict management through treated separately in literature, they frequently coincide by design or otherwise. (Wolff 2009a). This theory seemed to work like in the case of Kenya after the post-election violence. The second theory analyesed here is the centripetalism theory of conflict management which stressed the centripetal approach aims to promote cooperation between the different groups in using an electoral system that encourages political representatives to find support outside of their own ethnic communities. (Horowitz, 1985; 1991; 1997; Reilly, 2001). Finally, there is the power dividing: multiple-majority approach that looks at conflict mitigation approach of looking at the citizens at the expense of the state; it states that when dealing with different conflicts, division of power on the classification of the majority and minority in the design of the government can be with many flaws. It is for this reason that the argument posits that by having multiple majorities within a common states helps to address several policy issues and makes it difficult for anyone majority to take the rights away from minorities. The role of Intergovernmental and Regional organizations in collective security expanded rapidly after the end of the cold war. The involvement of regional organizations in peacekeeping continued to expand during the first decade of this century. Action by NATO and the EU, as well as the OSCE and the AU, served to make this phenomenon all the more visible. This activity related not just to the peaceful settlement of disputes (good offices, mediation efforts) but also to coercive measures (sanctions and even military operations). A regional security complex has been defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns are so closely intertwined that their national securities cannot meaningfully be understood in isolation from one another (Buzan, 1991; Buzan and Waever, 2003). This includes a) African Union (AU): with regional complex comprising of Community of Sahel-Saharan States; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa; Southern African Development Community (SADC) in South Africa; Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa; and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Southern and Eastern

Africa (COMESA) in East Africa. b) European Union (EU): Europe also has a highly complex regional security architecture that includes, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),and Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the West European Union (WEU)(Malan, 1998); and c) among others like the Organization of American States (OAS).

Illustrative model to understand the international/regional/national Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism (CPMRM)

Conflict management mechanism is the tools/ applicable means through which increased security and stability are facilitated or enhanced; and reduce the escalation of conflicts if already in existence. Conflict managementcan be mechanized in two phases.

The first is the prevention of conflicts aimed at averting conflicts using Economic and Institutional Mechanism. This involves mechanisms likePreventative Diplomacy which includes Humanitarian Action; Peace-Keeping or Preventative Deployment; and Peace-Building (through the use of economics and policies). Secondly is the resolution of conflicts aimed at peace-making and reintegration and can be achieved using conventional 3rd Party Intervention Mechanism –Negotiation; Mediation; arbitration considered as soft approach or using Peace Enforcement –Adjudication; Military; Economicmechanisms.

Regional Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism (CPMRM)

Mechanisms for conflict management within Africa

The AU‘s Peace and Security Council (PSC), was established in late 2003 following the adoption of the PSC Protocol on 9 July 2002. This new development in turn has led to the emergence of an African Peace Security Architecture (APSA) empowered by Article 4(h) and (j) of Constituent Act of the African Union (CAAU) adopted on July 2002 in Durban, South Africa; and Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) in Sirte on February 2004. APSA is based on 5 pillars namely; The PSC; the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); the Panel of the Wise (PoW); the Peace Fund; and the African Standby Force (ASF) approved in 2004. The ASF is intended to be the mechanism by

which the AU intervenes militarily in African conflicts. PSC Article 11 provided for the setting up of a Panel of the Wise composed of five highly respected African personalities to serve for a term of 3 years. The Panel will act in an advisory capacity to the PSC and shall report to, and through the PSC to the Assembly. (AU, 2002) PSC Article 12 states that The CEWS shall consist of an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as "The Situation Room", with the observation and monitoring units of the regional mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room. (AU, 2002). The Articles 13 provided for the setting up of the ASF. Article 21 addressed the setting up of Peace Fund. The Peace Fund shall be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of Union, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources within Africa, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities. Voluntary contributions from outside the continent can also be accepted. The cost of peacekeeping operations to be embarked upon by the ASF is to be aidded by members based on the scale of their contributions to the regular AU budget. Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for any ASF operation, may be invited to bear the cost of their participation during the first 3 months, while the Union shall refund the expenses incurred by the TCCs within a maximum period of 6 months and thereafter proceed to finance the operations. Viability of conflict management within Africa With all these mechanisms in place, it has been acknowledged that the AU had managed to craft comprehensive security architecture to drive a continental peace agenda, something that the 8 OAU was unable to do for over 30 years. (Peter and Patrick, 2007). This step is greatly acknowledged by the United Nation. (UN, 2004) The crisis in Darfur, Sudan, underscores how little the West is prepared to do (Soderberg, 2007). Klingebiel argues that in structural terms, the AU offers a set of entirely new proactive conditions, in contrast to the OAU, marked by a largely unsatisfactory record in the field of peace and security, owing to the inhibiting principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the affairs of member states. The AU is now seen as constituting a realistic ‗African reform programme' designed to set new African political

accents, and at the same time to consciously seek support from abroad SADC has been the least African regional actor in the areas of preventative diplomacy and deployment. It is botched in the intervention in Lesotho (JakkieCilliers) and it failed peace keeping effort in Democratic Republic of Congo represent the only authentic SADC attempt to forestall conflict. On the other hand, ECOWAS‘s diplomatic and military missions in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau were arguably better. Jones (2003) reasons that the emergence of regional options for peace-keeping in Africa is not surprising, given that the continent has been one of the 2 sites of UN‘s greatest failures in the 1990s. Although there limitations to the use of the AU/REC CPMRM as seen in the case of the SouthSudan conflict of 2012 and the conflicts in Mali, and Ivory Coast in 2010 and 2011.

Mechanisms for conflict management within Association of South East Asian Nation

The mechanisms for conflict management are drawn from seven key ASEAN documents: the ‗ASEAN Declaration‘ (Bangkok Declaration) of 1967; the ‗Declaration of ASEAN Concord‘ of 1976; the ‗Treaty of Amity and Cooperation‘ (TAC) 1976; the ‗Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia‘ of 2001; the ‗Declaration of ASEAN Concord II‘ (Bali Concord II) 2003; the ‗ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action‘ of 2004; and the ‘Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations‘ (ASEAN Charter): adopted on November 20, 2007 During the first half of the 1960s deep conflicts erupted between Indonesia and Malaysia and between Malaysia and the Philippines, respectively. The existing regional Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) created in 1961 failed to contain the two conflict situations. According to Amer (1998, p. 41), earlier research suggests a high degree of success in managing conflicts between the original member-states of ASEAN. this is evedent since there were no dispute has led to such conflicts between the original member-states since 1967, until an increased tension between Malaysia and Singapore in 1998 which centred over three main issues namely, water, Malaysian workers‘ savings and railway land. The expansion of ASEAN membership in the 1990s brought additional disputes into the

Association, thus further complicating the task of managing them. Some of the regional disputes were solved while many still remain unsolved. However, in the 1990s Indonesia and Malaysia agreed to refer the sovereignty disputes over PulauSipadan and PulauLigitan to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and Malaysia and Singapore did likewise with regard to the sovereignty 9 dispute over PedraBranca/PulauBatuPuteh. This displays a willingness among some ASEAN members to seek international arbitration when bilateral efforts to resolve disputes are not sufficient to bring about a solution to the disputes. The bilateral efforts to manage and settle disputes can be facilitated and/or supported by the mechanisms for conflict management created by ASEAN.

Viability of conflict management within Association of South East Asian Nation ASEAN is not intended to formally act as a third-party mediator in the disputes involving its member-states unless it is ascribed to do so or unless asked to do so by the member state. Instead the Association is intended to serve as a vehicle to promote better relations among its member states. The fact that the High Council has yet to be activated and that no dispute has been brought to it indicates that regional mechanisms for dispute settlement are – after more than 40 years – not yet the preferred option when the member-states fail to reach a bilateral agreement in a dispute situation. ASEAN would be considerably enhanced if the member-states of ASEAN would more actively seek to utilise them when managing and settling disputes.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Conflict- Definition.

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2. Insecurity-Definition and Scope.

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1.7 LET US SUM UP

Various theories have been formulated to explain the cause of international conflicts, the process and the cycle they go through as they go through as they progress to war and finally some of the approaches to resolve them. From a theoretical point of view, all these proposals have their advantages and disadvantages specifically when looking at the areas of focus and also the techniques of addressing some of the issues raised. Though different methodologies may be applied in the management of the conflict starting from negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, UN Charter (VI: 33); other factors come into plays in the whole process that may determine the success of the theory as an approach and the techniques mentioned above. The right moment theory by William Zartman (1989) expounds on these shortfalls but also helps to explain how internal and international move toward resolution wars and to help mediators decide how to time their entry into such conflicts. Zartman specifies two conditions that are necessary, though not sufficient, for rational policy makers to be receptive to negotiation including a mutually hurting stalemate where both sides realize they are in a costly deadlock that they cannot escape by escalating the conflict and such a stalemate is especially motivating if augmented by a recent or impending catastrophe and secondly, a mutually perceived way out. Both sides foresee that ―a negotiated solution is possible‖ (Zartman, 2000, p. 229), that a formula can be found that is ―just and satisfactory to both parties (Zartman, 1989, p. 291). These two scenarios should be put in mind when reviewing the causes of international conflict and insecurity while reviewing the viability and suitability of the conflict management strategy.

1.8 KEY WORDS

Insecurity: uncertainty or anxiety about oneself; lack of confidence.

Conflict: A conflict is a clash of interest. The basis of conflict may vary but, it is always a part of society. Basis of conflict may be personal, racial, class, caste, political and international. Conflict in groups often follows a specific course.

1.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Discuss the Human Nature for conflict.
2. Discuss The Nature of the State for Conflict.
3. Discuss the Nature of the International System.
4. Conflict- Definition.
5. Insecurity-Definition and Scope.

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1.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 1.2
2. See Section 1.3
3. See Section 1.4

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 1.5
2. See Section 1.6

UNIT 2: THEORIES OF THREAT AND APPROACHES

STRUCTURE

2.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit we can able to know:

- To know about the Theories of Threat and Approaches
- To discuss the Original components of the theory
- To know about the Updated two-component theory
- To describe the Factors that influence levels of perceived threat
- To understand Research applications
- To know the Critique of the theory
- To discuss the impact of Economic, Political and Cultural

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Despite rises in immigration and attempts to manage immigration, anti-immigrant threat and prejudice remains a major concern at the individual and societal levels, and often surfaces as a key political, economic, and

social issue. Research shows anti-immigrant prejudice is widepread. One of the explanatory factors for widespread anti-immigrant attitudes is threat perception. Attitudes towards immigrants and immigration have become less positive amidst the outbreak of the current refugee crises in Europe. This can lead to many anti-immigration demonstrations and to anti-immigration sentiment. Many nonimmigrants worry about the economic burden immigrants pose to society and the potential danger immigrants represent to the dominant culture and society. Overall, research shows that believing people from other cultures are a threat to one's own culture and survival leads to prejudice and discrimination.

Stephan and Stephan's integrated threat theory (ITT) offers an explanation to these feelings of threat. ITT proposes that prejudice and negative attitudes towards immigrants and out-groups is explained by four types of threats: realistic threat, symbolic threat, negative stereotype, and intergroup anxiety. Realistic threats are to the physical well-being and the economic and political power of the in-group; symbolic threats arise due to cultural differences in values, morals, and worldview of the out-group; negative stereotypes arise from negative stereotypes the in-group has about the out-group; and intergroup anxiety refers to anxiety the in-group experiences in the process of interaction with members of the out-group, especially when both groups have had a history of antagonism.

2.2 THEORIES OF THREAT AND APPROACHES

Integrated threat theory, also known as **intergroup threat theory**[1] is a theory in psychology and sociology which attempts to describe the components of perceived threat that lead to prejudice between social groups. The theory applies to any social group that may feel threatened in some way, whether or not that social group is a majority or minority group in their society. This theory deals with perceived threat rather than actual threat. Perceived threat includes all of the threats that members of group believe they are experiencing, regardless of whether those threats actually exist. For example, people may feel their economic well-being is threatened by an outgroup stealing their jobs even if, in reality, the

outgroup has no effect on their job opportunities. Still, their perception that their job security is under threat can increase their levels of prejudice against the outgroup. Thus, even false alarms about threat still have “real consequence” for prejudice between groups.

When evangelicals are faced with perceived threats we tend to double down on doctrine, a significant aspect of our identity and boundaries. Two incidents related to Islam clearly illustrate this.

In a previous post I've explored integrated threat theory (ITT) in relation to evangelical attitudes toward those in other religions. I'll quote a section of my past discussion this to set the context:

"In the context of intergroup threat theory, an intergroup threat is experienced when members of one group perceive that another group is in a position to cause them harm." It should be noted that ITT "is a social psychological theory in that it is primarily concerned with perceptions of threat." As originally set forth, ITT was understood to manifest itself in two different types of perceived threat. The first is realistic threats, "which refer to the physical welfare or resources of the ingroup," and the second is "symbolic threats, which refer to the ingroup's system of meaning."

As I reflect on ITT in my research I think that evangelical responses to realistic and symbolic threats are the same. Whether we are responding to a physical threat to our lives and welfare, or a symbolic threat to our worldview, evangelicals tend to double down on doctrine as a significant element of group identity and boundaries. Two incidents illustrate this, and both are in relation to reactions to Islam.

The first example comes by way of Rev. David Benke. I've discussed his story in a previous post as well:

Not long after 9/11, on September 23, a memorial service was held in Yankee Stadium. The event brought together thousands of people. Emotions were still raw, and many were still waiting for word about the fate of their missing loved ones. The event included not only various politicians, but also clergy representing the major religious traditions in the area. One of those in attendance was Rev. David Benke, a minister in the Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod. Rising to the occasion of massive grief, Rev. Benke saw an opportunity to be pastoral, and in doing this he

led those in the stadium in prayer. You can watch a video clip of his prayer here. You might think that this was the end of things as the population of New York, and the rest of the nation continued to wrestle with the attacks and what life in the new normal of post-terrorism would mean. But things took an ugly turn for Rev. Benke. Because of his participation in the memorial service, taking the stage with leaders of other religious traditions, denominational leaders in Benke's church took exception to his actions, leveling charges over concerns of alleged heresy.

So the reaction of many evangelicals to the realistic threat of the 9/11 terror attacks, when a minister participated in an interfaith pastoral event in an attempt to function as a chaplain, was to emphasize doctrinal boundaries and make accusations of heresy due to alleged syncretism.

The second example comes by way of Larycia Hawkins, formerly a professor at Wheaton College. I won't go into too much depth here since I have a review of the Same God documentary film that tells her story coming out soon in Cultural Encounters journal where I discuss this and provide some commentary on what this means for evangelicals. But to summarize, Hawkins wanted to demonstrate solidarity with Muslim women, so she posted comments and a photo of herself wearing a hijab on Facebook that included remarks about Christians and Muslims worshiping the same God. A national controversy erupted, and eventually Hawkins lost her job when her doctrinal views were called into question.

The Hawkins case is an example of symbolic threat. Her views were seen as a compromise to pluralism, and again the charge of syncretism was leveled.

It is not my intention in this post to argue whether Benke's and Hawkins' actions were theologically appropriate or not. Instead, I want to draw attention to an interesting phenomenon. It would seem that whenever evangelicals are faced with a realistic or symbolic threat from Muslims, we double down on our doctrine. In this way we reaffirm our identity, and reinforce the boundaries between us and them. But we might ask ourselves whether this is a helpful reaction without at least including careful emotional and rational reflection.

The doctrine double down might make us feel safer, but it ultimately pushes others away. Are there better ways for evangelicals to react to perceived threats in a pluralistic world?

Fig 2.1: Integrated Threat Theory



We propose a Theory of Challenge and Threat States in Athletes (TCTSA) which is an amalgamation and extension of the biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat, the model of adaptive approaches to competition and the debilitative and facilitative competitive state anxiety model. In the TCTSA we posit that self-efficacy, perceptions of control, and achievement goals determine challenge or threat states in response to competition. Distinct patterns of neuroendocrine and cardiovascular responses are indicative of a challenge or threat state. Increases in epinephrine and cardiac activity, and a decrease in total peripheral vascular resistance (TPR) characterise a challenge state and increases in cortisol, smaller increases in cardiac activity and either no change or an increase in TPR characterise a threat state. Positive and negative emotions can occur in a challenge state while a threat state is associated with negative emotions only. Emotions are perceived as helpful to performance in a challenge state but not in a threat state. Challenge and threat states influence effort, attention, decision–making and physical functioning and accordingly sport performance. The TCTSA provides a framework for practitioners to

enhance performance, through developing a challenge state, and encourages researchers to explore the mechanisms underlying performance in competition.

2.3 ORIGINAL COMPONENTS OF THE THEORY

Integrated Threat Theory was first proposed by Walter G. Stephan and Cookie White Stephan (2000). The original theory had four components: realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes.



Fig 2.2 Theory of Challenge and Threat States in Sport (TCTSA) Á The Threat State.

Realistic threats

Realistic threats are threats that pose a danger to the in-group's well-being. These can include threats to physical safety or health, threats to economic and political power, and threats to the existence of the group. This component was originally developed as a part of realistic conflict theory by Donald T. Campbell (1965).

Symbolic threats

Symbolic threats arise where there is a perceived difference between the values and worldview of an ingroup and outgroup. The difference can make the ingroup feel that the outgroup poses a threat to their group

morals, standards, beliefs, and attitudes. These threats are thus strongly tied to a group's sense of identity. The category was derived from Gordon Allport's discussion of the relationship between one's values and one's identity. He proposed that, since values are important to who we are, we will reject other groups that disagree with our values.[4] It is also based on the research of Esses and colleagues (1993), who found that groups had more negative feelings towards an outgroup if that outgroup interfered with the in-group's customs.

Intergroup anxiety

Intergroup anxiety refers to the expectation that interacting with someone from a different group will be a negative experience. People with intergroup anxiety fear that they will feel uncomfortable, embarrassed, unsafe, or judged, either by members of the outgroup or by people of their own in-group. Before creating the Integrated Threat Theory framework, Stephan & Stephan had been conducting research on intergroup anxiety. The concept of intergroup anxiety also draws from Aversive Racism Theory, which argues that subconscious negative feelings about Black Americans are an important part of racism against them.

Negative stereotypes

Stereotypes are a strategy of simplifying a complex situation by relying on popular pre-set judgements. Integrated Threat Theory predicts that negative pre-set judgments about another group can lead to prejudice. This component of ITT draws from research that found that belief in negatively-rated stereotypical traits was linked to higher levels of prejudice against the stereotyped group. Stephan & Stephan (2000) acknowledged that some research has not found links between prejudice and general stereotypes. Thus, it seems that, while general stereotypes assume some positive things about other groups, only the negative aspects of stereotypes are relevant to prejudice.

Fig 2.3: Theory of Challenge and Threat States in Athletes (TCTSA) Á The Challenge State.



In the age of growing political correctness, the Western social psychology has started to use terms such as subtle discrimination (Quillian, 2008), benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 2002), barely perceptible racism (Aronson, 2012) and implicit prejudice (Oskamp & Schultz, 2005). Moreover, one of the main sources of anxiety toward an out-group is now believed to be not an irrational fear of the unknown, but rather the fear of presenting oneself in a negative light, that is, the desire to be seen as a non-prejudiced person (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). This means that while the blatant forms of hostility toward out-groups have weakened, the problem persists and has evolved to a degree that requires increasingly sophisticated measurement tools (Tetlock & Mitchell, 2008).

However, the Western social science developed particular interest in the problem at its explicit, even institutionalized, stage (Bogardus, 1925; Bogardus, 1938; Bogardus, 1958; Katz & Braly, 1935). In the United States, this happened in the 1920s, along with successive waves of non-protestant and Asian immigrants (Wark & Galliher, 2007), while in Europe (as well as in the United States) the interest in intergroup conflicts was especially intense in the mid-20th century, in the wake of the dictatorships, the World War II and especially the Holocaust which sparked enormous shock and academic curiosity to understand what stood behind massive manifestations of prejudice, discrimination and intergroup conflicts (Hogg, 2006). More than half a century later, a recent influx of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa to the Western world has brought the issues of intergroup conflicts and threats

to the attention of the public and governments (Foster, 2016) as the "refugee crisis" has been regarded as the largest-scale movement of people after the World War II (Smith, 2016). Moreover, it has been argued that the rhetoric used toward refugees is comparable with that used during the World War II (Tharoor, 2015). Thus, current events have become important incentives to resume studies in explicit prejudice and prejudice-related matters.

Whether prejudice is blatant or subtle depends heavily on the context. In the United States, for example, racial prejudice is highly condemned and equality is taught in schools (Boukari & Goura, 2012), while in Georgia, both the results of various nation-wide survey polls and real-time cases of homophobic, xenophobic and religious discrimination are to be qualified as the manifestation of explicit prejudice (Ramiah, Hewstone, Dovidio, & Penner, 2010). For example, the vast majority of the population surveyed thinks that people of other religious denominations should not enjoy the same rights as the Orthodox majority in Georgia (Sumbadze, 2012); media studies reveal the evidence of hate speech in national newspapers (United Nations Development Programme Georgia, 2013). The incident of May 17, 2013 in Tbilisi, Georgia can serve as an example of real-time discriminatory incidents, when a peaceful rally dedicated to the international day against homophobia was confronted by thousands of protestors opposing gay rights, who were allowed to break through the police cordon. Such attitudes and even discriminatory behaviors are widely supported, which validates Pettigrew's idea about one of the antecedents of prejudice – conformity (Pettigrew, 1958).

Prejudice is a psychological construct that can account for such negative attitudes and therefore, can be defined as "a hostile or negative attitude toward a distinguishable group on the basis of generalizations derived from faulty or incomplete information" (Aronson, 2012, p. 299).

For several decades, scholars have studied sources of prejudice including broad factors such as political, socio-economic (Greeley & Sheatsley, 1971) and socio-cultural contexts, the historical background and certain personality traits (Allport, 1954; Stephan, 2008) like social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism and empathy (Dovidio et al., 2010; Javakhishvili, Beruashvili, & Kldiashvili, 2007; Laythe, Finkel, &

Kirkpatrick, 2001; McFarland, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Stephan, 2008). Thus, it is difficult to attribute prejudice to a single factor or a single set of factors.

However, as Brewer (2007) argues, "the fact that individuals value, favor, and conform to their own membership groups (in-groups) over groups to which they do not belong (out-groups) is among the most well-established phenomena in social psychology" (p. 729). This phenomenon is the basis of Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). SIT posits that in-group members tend to look for negative aspects in out-groups, thereby improving their self-esteem. This, for its part, can lead to intergroup hostility and prejudice toward out-groups. In line with this reasoning, the Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT, [Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009]) suggests that people are prone to anticipating threat from an out-group, which in turn fosters prejudice (e.g., Morrison et al., 2009; Myers, Abrams, Rosenthal, & Christian, 2013; Stephan et al., 2005).

The importance of threat and fear with regard to intergroup relations and prejudice has been pointed out by many authors (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954; Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966; Smith, 1993) even before the development of ITT– a theory supported by a meta-analytical study of 95 samples (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006) demonstrating that perceptions of threat indeed trigger prejudice.

ITT authors (Stephan et al., 2009) stress that the theory is concerned with perceived rather than actual threats, as "perceived threats have real consequences, regardless of whether or not the perceptions of threat are accurate" (Stephan et al., 2009, p. 45). The study of attitudes toward immigrants in Germany, for example, found that the actual proportion of immigrants did not predict negative attitudes toward them, but the perceived proportion of immigrants did (Semyonov, Raijman, Tov, & Schmidt 2004). However, studies (e.g., Quillian, 1995) and historical experience (Aronson, 2012) also suggest that actual threats – poor economy, a large portion of minorities or immigrants – enhance negative attitudes toward out-groups which, according to Riek et al. (2006) means

that national problems, including economic hardships, are ascribed to threat-inducing out-groups.

ITT distinguishes two types of perceived threats: realistic and symbolic threats. Perceived realistic threat, the concept that has its roots in the Realistic Group Conflict Theory (e.g. Sherif, 1966), is a threat to the actual – political, economic or physical – well-being (land, security, health, wealth, employment) of a group, while perceived symbolic threat is concerned with a group's values, traditions, ideology, morals, and is expected to be more prominent when an in-group believes that their cultural values and traits are different from those of an out-group (Zárate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan 2004).

Whether perception of symbolic or realistic threat becomes salient depends upon the threat-invoking out-group (Stephan et al., 2009). Economically powerful out-groups or people with diseases might elicit realistic threats (Stephan et al., 2005), while socially marginalized out-groups, such as homosexuals (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993) and sects (Stephan et al., 2009), engender symbolic threats.

However, drawing a clear line between symbolic and realistic threats may be problematic in certain cases (Riek et al., 2006) as they may overlap. For example, symbolic threat posed by a religious out-group might involve realistic threat as well or evolve into the latter (Riek et al., 2006). The present study tries to address this issue by experimentally manipulating symbolic and realistic threats. Another reason to explore threats through experimental manipulation is the questionable validity of the threat instrument that has been used in most of the studies (e.g., Aberson & Gaffney, 2008; Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Myers et al., 2013; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinéz, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998; Stephan et al., 2002). Specifically, threats have often been measured by questionnaires including 12 (e.g., Stephan et al., 2002) or fewer (e.g., Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018) items such as "Blacks have more economic power than they deserve in this country" (in the case of realistic threat) and "Blacks and whites have different family values" (in the case of symbolic threat) (Stephan et al., 2002). These items raise questions regarding validity since they might be measuring prejudice already present in person rather than threat perceptions.

The need to experimentally study symbolic and realistic threats has also been emphasized by Riek, Mania, and Gaertner (2006) in their thorough review of studies on intergroup threats and negative attitudes, where the authors argue about certain methodological limitations: "One is the lack of experimental studies, especially in the domains of realistic and symbolic threats" (Riek et al., 2006, p. 346).

While it has been well established that perceived threats shape negative attitudes (e.g., Stephan et al., 2005), studies do not provide uniform results regarding associations between prejudice and demographic variables such as gender and the level of religiosity. A number of researchers (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; McFarland, 2010; Parrillo & Donoghue, 2005) argue that males, as compared to females, are more prone to being prejudiced. However, the evidence is not consistent (see Herek, 2002; Hughes & Tuch, 2003). The findings also reveal associations between being religious and holding prejudices (e.g., Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010; Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Hello, 2002; Ugurlu, 2013), which can be either positive (e.g., Allport & Kramer, 1946; Hall et al., 2010) or negative (e.g., Laythe et al., 2001). Thus, further research is needed to better comprehend the role of gender and religiosity in prejudice.

At the same time, studies show cross-cultural differences in factors contributing to prejudice. For example, while race was identified as an important source of social distances among American students, religion and the employment status was found to contribute to negative attitudes in Greek and Japanese students, respectively (Triandis, Loh, & Levin, 1966). The study of the social distances of Georgian, German and Japanese students (Javakhishvili, Schneider, Makashvili, & Kochlashvili, 2012) found no significant effects of gender and religiosity on social distance scores in any of the three samples.

Considering the real-life relevance of threats (e.g., Quillian, 1995), the aim of the current study is to show that threat-evoking contexts elicit prejudice.

Drawing upon ITT, we test the effects of both, symbolic and realistic threats on prejudice and by manipulating the two threatening situations through exposing the participants to information about fictitious out-

groups, we examine whether they have different effects as compared to the situation where threat is absent (control condition).

Furthermore, we explore the demographic variables that have been shown to be associated with prejudice. These variables include the participants' gender and the level of religiosity. Expecting that both factors are related to prejudice, their interactions with threats are also tested to examine whether any of the two moderates the relation between threats and prejudice and whether the interaction is different for realistic and symbolic threats.

Given that symbolic threats are related to traditions, customs and values (Stephan et al., 2009), we assume that the interaction effect between religiousness and this type of threat will be stronger than for the realistic threat.

2.4 UPDATED TWO-COMPONENT THEORY

In 2002, Stephan and Renfro proposed an updated version of the theory which reduced the four components to two basic types: realistic and symbolic threats. The categories of negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety were removed from the basic framework of the theory because they were found to be better understood as subtypes of threat. They can lead to either realistic or symbolic threats rather than standing as their own separate categories. For example, intergroup anxiety can be based on expectations of physical danger, a realistic threat, as well as on expectations of damage to one's identity, a symbolic threat.

Experimental Support

Since ITT makes a causal claim that perceived threat causes prejudice, studies using an experimental design are necessary. Some researchers have taken on this task to experimentally manipulate types of realistic and perceived threat in order to examine if they cause prejudice. For example, Esses and colleagues (1998) and Esses and colleagues (2001) carried out research studies in which they manipulated the research participants' understanding of economic threat posed by immigrants. Esses and colleagues (1998) had Canadian undergraduate student

participants read one of two editorials that were written for the study. One editorial discussed a new group of immigrants with no mention of the job market while the other editorial discussed the same group and emphasized their success in finding jobs despite the scarcity of jobs in Canada. They then studied the effects of perception of economic threat, a type of realistic threat, on attitudes about immigrants and reported willingness to help immigrants. Results showed that participants that read the editorial that emphasized competition had less favorable attitudes towards immigrants and were less likely to approve of programs to empower immigrants.

Esses and colleagues (2001) carried out similar experiments with very similar editorials. Their results showed that participants that read articles that emphasized the tough job market had more negative attitudes towards the immigrants, were less supportive of their immigration into Canada, and were less supportive of programs to empower immigrants. The data from these research studies provide some support for the causal influence of realistic threat on prejudice against immigrants.

The causal influence of symbolic threat on prejudice was partially explored in a study by Branscombe & Wann (1994), who focused on perceived threat to in-group identity in particular. The participants, undergraduate females from the U.S., answered questionnaires about their levels of pride in their American identity at the beginning of the study. They then manipulated the participants' perceived threat to in-group identity using video clips, which either showed an American or a Russian boxer beating the other in a match. After seeing one version of the video, participants completed a questionnaire that measured their desire to distance themselves from the outgroup, in this case, Russians. The results of this study showed that increased perception of threat to in-group identity raises a desire to distance oneself from the out-group. This provides some experimental evidence that perception of threat to in-group identity may causes greater prejudice towards out-groups. However, further experimental research is necessary in order to more firmly and widely establish the causal role of realistic and symbolic threats in prejudice.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. How do you know about the Theories of Threat and Approaches?

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2. Discuss the Original components of the theory.

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3. How do you know about the Updated two-component theory?

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2.5 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE LEVELS OF PERCEIVED THREAT

In international security, there are many cases of inter-group conflict where violence persists and conflict-oriented policies dominate at the expense of a more mutually beneficial allocation of societal goods. What are the barriers to successful negotiation in such scenarios, and why are conflict management policies difficult to achieve? Most studies of conflict focus on high-level political, economic, or sociological causes, however, psychological influences on decision-making, such as threat and personal motivation, play a large role in impeding conflict resolution or negotiation. In this paper, we analyze the psychological dynamics of threat perception and vested interests on the persistence or desistence of conflict. Threat perception can cause sudden and dramatic shifts in opinion and political choices, an effect which can be further amplified by media reporting. Leaders with a vested personal interest in continued conflict-"spoilers"-can manipulate this phenomenon to derail a peace process. We present a dynamic game theoretic framework of parallel inter-group negotiation and conflict models that incorporates this

feedback between threat perception, motivations, leadership decisions, and the success of negotiations, explicitly representing the psychological components of conflict. A prototype implementation is used in empirical simulations to identify cases of conflict persistence and desistence.

The prevalence of inter-group conflict throughout the world over the past century has been widely examined from a broad range of substantive perspectives. An extensive empirical literature exists, which examines the political, structural and economic factors associated with the incidence, character and duration of conflict between groups within a political entity and across political entities. Some investigators have incorporated a variety of these substantive perspectives into game-theoretic frameworks. This line of theoretical and empirical research has yielded insights into some of the factors associated with the incidence and persistence of inter-group conflict (see for example). Despite this extensive body of work, however, uncertainty exists concerning of the factors that account for the persistence of inter-group conflicts in situations that are clearly at odds with the well being of the respective groups general populations that are in conflict. Several reasons may help account for current gaps in our understanding the incidence and persistence of inter-group conflicts. For the most part, existing research on the incidence and persistence of inter-group conflicts has most often focused on the economic, structural/political factors and historical factors as the underlining reasons for the persistence of inter-group conflicts. Among the factors that have received less attention in terms of their potential role inner-group conflicts are the psychological dynamics associated with changes in the political attitudes of the populations of groups in conflict and also those of their leaders as well as factors relating to the perceived success of conflict related strategy. This is perhaps not surprising, in that research over the last five decades on public opinion and beliefs has fairly consistently found that political attitudes and support for public policies are stable over time and appear resistant to many environmental events. More recently however, research has begun to identify circumstances under which the public or segments of the public dramatically and abruptly alters their attitudes and opinions. Some research focusing on human cognition has identified, in at

least some contexts a somewhat automatic quality of many political choices and decisions. Research has also shown that physiologically relevant traits, such as feelings of disgust and fear, have been found to be related to political attitudes and political beliefs and ”can be predicted by observing brain activation patterns in response to unanticipated events”. These reactions are postulated to be linked with survival mechanisms that illicit abrupt defensive bodily responses to perceived threats. Unlike most political, structural and economic factors associated with inter-group conflict, which may account for the relative stability found in much public opinion research, psychological factors are potentially far more volatile and, as a result, potentially more likely to produce abrupt impacts on public perceptions within fairly brief time spans. Re-search at the social psychological level has found that public attitudes may be especially susceptible to change under conditions of threat from outside groups that affect individuals' sense of mortality or their mortality salience. Under such conditions, perception of threat may have significant effects on public attitudes, support for public policies, tolerance of dissent, and support for political leaders. Huddy found that as perceived threat increased, there was heightened support for a wide range of domestic and international government actions to combat the threat of terrorism, including overseas military action, a curtailment of civil liberties, and increased surveillance .Supporting these findings, recent analysis by Pierce et al of Palestinian public opinion and Palestinian casualties arising from conflict with Israel found that support for military operations against Israel was highly correlated with the level of Palestinian conflict-related casualties. This research found that support for military operations against Israel among Palestinians doubled from 35.7% in a May 1999 survey to 72.1% in a December2000 survey, following the start of the Second Intifada in late September 2000, Appendix Figure). Importantly, the sharp increase in support for public support for military action was associated with a dramatic rise in Palestinian casualties immediately following the Second Intifada. This research also found, in a time series analysis, that the level of Israeli conflict-related causalities and rocket attacks on Israeli was negatively related to support for the peace process among Israeli citizens.

Factors that influence levels of perceived threat

Several factors can lead to increased or decreased levels of group perceived threat.

Power Dynamics

The updated ITT theory draws from the findings of contact hypothesis, which claims that it is important to have equality between groups. Power dynamics between two groups are shown to have an influence on how the groups relate to and perceive each other. High-power groups are more likely to influence and threaten other groups. Low-power groups are often vulnerable to the influence and threats of other groups. Thus, low-power groups tend to be on alert and perceive more threats than high power groups do. Corenblum & Stephan (2001) found, for example, that Native Canadians felt more threatened by White Canadians than White Canadians felt about them. [14] However, when high-power groups do perceive threat from another group, they "will react more strongly" than low-power groups. This is likely because they have more to lose if the threat is real and have more resources that allow them to counter to such threats. Two groups of relatively equal power status can be especially sensitive to feeling threatened if they are in competition with each other for resources, such as jobs.

Identity

Stephan & Renfro (2016) predicted that, the more important group membership is to ingroup members' sense of personal identity, the more likely those people will feel threatened by and uncomfortable when interacting with other groups. According to this prediction, people with strong in-group identification are likely to be more focused on differences between the groups, thus giving them more motivation to hold negative stereotypes of other groups so that they can believe that their group is the best.

Culture

There may be a link between the personal importance of group membership and the larger culture in which the groups live. Collectivistic

cultures, for example, place a greater emphasis on the importance of group membership compared to individualistic cultures. Culture can also influence perceived threat between groups through the culture's level of uncertainty avoidance. Hofstede & Bond (1984) define uncertainty avoidance as "the degree to which people feel threatened by ambiguous situations, and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these." Stephan & Renfro (2002) thus suggest that cultures which hold norms and laws as very important are likely to perceive threat from "unfamiliar groups." Further research on these topics can better inform the role of culture in intergroup relationships.

2.6 RESEARCH APPLICATIONS

The Integrated Threat Theory has been used in research on various social groups, including immigrants, Muslims, tourists, and more.

Immigrants

Multiple studies on inter-group relations have focused on immigrants. For example, Ward and Masgoret (2006) built upon ITT in combination with the Instrumentive Model of Group Conflict to test a model of attitudes toward immigrants, using participants from New Zealand. These participants filled out questionnaires that measured Multicultural Ideology, Intergroup Anxiety, Contact with Immigrants, Perceived Intergroup Threat, and Attitudes toward Immigrants. The results supported the model, suggesting that increased contact with immigrants and multicultural ideology are related to lower levels of perceived threat from immigrants, which is in turn directly related to more positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Croucher (2013) used the ITT framework to explore reasons that dominant groups in France, Germany, and Great Britain sometimes resist Muslim immigrants' efforts to assimilate. The data was collected through questionnaires, which included measures for symbolic threats, realistic threats, stereotypes, perception of immigrants' motivation to assimilate, and multigroup ethnic identity. The results supported the theory that the more that the dominant groups felt threatened by the immigrants, the less they thought that the immigrants wanted to assimilate into their country.

Similarly, Rohmann, Piontkowski, and van Randenborgh (2008) used the ITT framework to examine the relationship between perceived threat and a dominant group's expectation of an immigrant group's attitude about acculturation. Their research included two studies, one in which German participants were asked about their expectations of French and Turkish immigrants in Germany and another in which German participants were asked about their expectations of two fictitious groups, based on paragraph-long descriptions. Results from both studies suggest that levels of perceived threat are higher if dominant groups expect that an immigrant group has different attitudes about acculturation than the dominant group does.

Muslims

Tausch, Hewstone, and Roy (2009) examined Muslim relations with Hindus in India. ITT was incorporated into their research in order to examine which factors are important in perceived threat between the minority Muslim and majority Hindu groups of India. Their data was collected through a survey given to both Muslim and Hindu students at the same university, which measured contact quantity, contact quality, perceived relative status of the two groups, realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, preference for social distance, and in-group bias. Results showed that symbolic threat was important for Hindus' levels of perceived threat while realistic threat was important for Muslims' levels of perceived threat.

Gonzalez and colleagues (2008) carried out similar research in the Netherlands, examining the prejudice of Dutch youth, who are members of the majority, against the Muslim minority in the country. Their data was collected through a questionnaire given to high schoolers in different cities, which measured support for multicultural ideologies, frequency of contact with Muslims, in-group identification, realistic economic threat, symbolic threats, stereotypes, and prejudicial attitudes towards Muslims. Results showed that prejudicial attitudes were related to higher perception of symbolic threats and more belief in stereotypes.

Uenal (2016) applied the ITT framework to better understand factors involved in the presence of Islamophobic conspiracy stereotypes in

Europe. The data was collected through an online survey given to German university students which measured ambiguity intolerance, belief in a clash of civilizations, realistic threats, symbolic threats, and levels of education. Ambiguity intolerance was found to be related to increased conspiracy stereotypes through increased perceptions of symbolic threat. Belief in a clash of civilizations was found to be related to higher levels of realistic and symbolic threat and higher levels of belief in conspiracy stereotypes. Higher education levels showed the opposite trends, as it was related to lower levels of perceived threat and lower levels of belief in conspiracy stereotypes.

Tourists

Tourism can bring different groups into contact and has thus been the subject of some research on inter-group relations using ITT. For example, Ward and Berno (2011) used ITT and contact hypothesis as theoretical backgrounds for predicting attitudes about tourism in Fiji and New Zealand. They collected data through surveys, which included measures of perceived impact of tourism, contact with tourists, the four aspects of the original ITT, and attitudes towards tourists. Following the expectations of ITT, the data showed that lower levels of perceived realistic threat, symbolic threat, and intergroup anxiety, and more positive stereotypes were useful predictors of positives attitudes about tourism. Monterubio (2016) applied ITT in studying negative attitudes towards spring break tourists in Cancun, Mexico. Data was collected through interviews with Cancun residents, which included questions about the social impact of spring break and attitudes towards spring breakers. Transcripts of these interviews were then analyzed for themes, including the four components of the original ITT. The results suggested that realistic threats and intergroup anxiety were relevant aspects of prejudice against spring break tourists, largely because of the influence of their behavior.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Describe the Factors that influence levels of perceived threat.

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2. How do you understand Research applications?

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2.7 CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY

Stephan & Renfro (2002) updated ITT into the two-factor model and admitted that "ultimately, the model is circular." The theory states that perceived threat leads to prejudice but the outcomes of that prejudice itself can also lead into increased perceived threat.

Anxiety/Uncertainty Management Theory counters the way that ITT conceptualizes anxiety as harmful for relationships between social groups. Instead, it understands anxiety as helpful for leading to more effective communication between groups.

2.8 ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL

Check Your Progress 3

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. How do you know the Critique of the theory?

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2. Discuss the impact of Economic, Political and Cultural impact on threat.

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2.9 LET US SUM UP

In the context of intergroup threat theory, an intergroup threat is experienced when members of one group perceive that another group is in a position to cause them harm. We refer to a concern about physical harm or a loss of resources as realistic threat, and to a concern about the integrity or validity of the ingroup's meaning system as symbolic threat. The primary reason intergroup threats are important is because their effects on intergroup relations are largely destructive. Even when a threat from an outgroup leads to nonhostile behavioral responses (e.g, negotiation, compromise, deterrence), the cognitive and affective responses to threat are likely to be negative. In this chapter we explore the nature of the intergroup threats people experience, why and when people feel threatened by other groups, and how they respond to them. We also review some of the research that has been done to test this and related theories of threat, as well as formulate some hypotheses to stimulate future research.

2.10 KEY WORDS

Integrated threat theory: Integrated threat theory, also known as intergroup threat theory is a theory in psychology and sociology which attempts to describe the components of perceived threat that lead to prejudice between social groups.

Prejudice: Prejudice is an affective feeling towards a person based on their perceived group membership. The word is often used to refer to a preconceived, usually unfavourable, evaluation of another person based

In group/out group: In sociology and social psychology, an in-group is a social group to which a person psychologically identifies as being a member. By contrast, an out-group is a social group with which an individual does not identify.

Intergroup anxiety: Intergroup anxiety is the social phenomenon identified by Walter and Cookie Stephan in 1985 that describes the ambiguous feelings of discomfort or anxiety when interacting with members of other groups

Immigration: the action of coming to live permanently in a foreign country.

Intergroup communication: Intergroup communication proposes that when individuals interact with each other, it is most often their salient social memberships and not their individual characteristics that shape the communication.

2.11 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. How do you know about the Theories of Threat and Approaches?
2. Discuss the Original components of the theory
3. How do you know about the Updated two-component theory?
4. Describe the Factors that influence levels of perceived threat
5. How do you understand Research applications?
6. How do you know the Critique of the theory?
7. Discuss the impact of Economic, Political and Cultural impact on threat.

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2.13 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 2.2
2. See Section 2.3
3. See Section 2.4

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 2.5
2. See Section 2.6

Check Your Progress 3

1. See Section 2.7
2. See Section 2.8

UNIT 3: WAR ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT

STRUCTURE

3.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know the Militarism and the Society;
- To discuss the Economic Cost of Defensive and Offensive Arms Race;
- To discuss the Strategic Thinking and Implication on Economy;
- To know the Managerial War and Peace Making Network in Various Schools of Thoughts.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

A war economy or wartime economy is the set of contingencies undertaken by a modern state to mobilize its economy for war production. Philippe Le Billon describes a war economy as a "system of producing, mobilizing and allocating resources to sustain the violence." Some measures taken include the increasing of Taylor rates as well as the introduction of resource allocation programs. Needless to say, every country approaches the reconfiguration of its economy in a different way.

Many states increase the degree of planning in their economies during wars; in many cases this extends to rationing, and in some cases to conscription for civil defenses, such as the Women's Land Army and Bevin Boys in the United Kingdom during World War II.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated if the Axis powers won, then "we would have to convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war economy."

During total war situations, certain buildings and positions are often seen as important targets by combatants. The Union blockade, Union General William Tecumseh Sherman's March to the Sea during the American Civil War, and the strategic bombing of enemy cities and factories during World War II are all examples of total war.

Concerning the side of aggregate demand, this concept has been linked to the concept of "military Keynesianism", in which the government's military budget stabilizes business cycles and fluctuations and/or is used to fight recessions.

On the supply side, it has been observed that wars sometimes have the effect of accelerating progress of technology to such an extent that an economy is greatly strengthened after the war, especially if it has avoided the war-related destruction. This was the case, for example, with the United States in World War I and World War II. Some economists (such as Seymour Melman) argue, however, that the wasteful nature of much of military spending eventually can hurt technological progress.

War is often used as a last ditch effort to prevent deteriorating economic conditions or currency crises, particularly by expanding services and employment in the military, and by simultaneously depopulating segments of the population to free up resources and restore the economic and social order.

What Is a War Economy?

War economy is the organization of a country's production capacity and distribution during a time of conflict. A war economy must make substantial adjustments to its consumer production to accommodate defense production needs. In a war economy, governments must choose how to allocate their country’s resources very carefully in order to

achieve military victory while also meeting vital domestic consumer demands.

- A war economy takes place when a country is at war and it affects its capacity to produce and distribute goods.
- Governments in a war economy must decide how to allocate resources to account for its defense needs.
- War economies generally use tax dollars for defense spending

How a War Economy Works

War economy refers to an economy of a country at war. A war economy prioritizes the production of goods and services that support war efforts, while also seeking to strengthen the economy as a whole. During times of conflict, governments may take measures to prioritize defense and national security expenditures, including rationing, in which the government controls the distribution of goods and services, as well as resource allocation. In times of war, each country approaches the reconfiguration of its economy in a different way and some governments may prioritize particular forms of spending over others.

For a country with a war economy, tax dollars are primarily used on defense. Likewise, if the country is borrowing large amounts of money, those funds may go mostly toward maintaining the military and meeting national security needs. Conversely, in countries without such conflict, tax revenue and borrowed money may go more directly toward infrastructure and domestic programs, such as education.

Special Considerations

War economies often exist out of necessity when a country feels it needs to make national defense a priority. War economies often demonstrate more industrial, technological and medical advancements because they are in competition and therefore under pressure to create better defense products at a cheaper cost. However, because of that focus, countries with war economies may also experience a decline in domestic development and production.

Example of a War Economy

All of the major members of both the Axis and Allied powers had war economies during World War II. These included countries such as the United States, Japan, and Germany. America's economic strength was a vital pillar that allowed the Allies to receive the money and equipment needed to defeat the Axis powers.

The U.S. government transitioned to a war economy after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, raising taxes and issuing war bonds to help fund the war effort. The War Production Board (WPB) was formed to allocate resources to the war effort, including copper, rubber, and oil; award defense contracts to civilian corporate interests, and incentivize military production among civilian business owners. Famously, women around the United States participated in the war economy by military production jobs and other positions previously filled by men, many of whom had joined the military.

Because wars can sometimes have the effect of accelerating technological and medical progress, a country's economy can be greatly strengthened after the war, as was the case with the U.S. after both World War I and World War II. Some economists argue, however, that the wasteful nature of military spending ultimately hinders technological and economic advancement.

3.2 MILITARISM AND THE SOCIETY

Militarism is the belief or the desire of a government or a people that a state should maintain a strong military capability and to use it aggressively to expand national interests and/or values. Militarism has been a significant element of the imperialist or expansionist ideologies of several nations throughout history. Prominent examples include the Ancient Assyrian Empire, the Greek city state of Sparta, the Roman Empire, the Aztec nation, the Kingdom of Prussia, the Habsburg/Habsburg-Lorraine Monarchies, the Ottoman Empire, the Empire of Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Nazi Germany, the Italian Empire during the rule of Benito Mussolini, the German Empire, the British Empire, and the First French Empire under Napoleon.

The roots of German militarism can be found in 18th- and 19th-century Prussia and the subsequent unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. However, Hans Rosenberg sees its origin already in the Teutonic Order and its colonization of Prussia during the late middle ages, when mercenaries from the Holy Roman Empire were granted lands by the Order and gradually formed a new landed militarist Prussian nobility, from which the Junker nobility would later evolve.

During the 17th-century reign of the "Great Elector" Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, Brandenburg-Prussia increased its military to 40,000 men and began an effective military administration overseen by the General War Commissariat. In order to bolster his power both in interior and foreign matters, so-called Soldatenkönig ("soldier king") Frederick William I of Prussia started his large-scale military reforms in 1713, thus beginning the country's tradition of a high military budget by increasing the annual military spending to 73% of the entire annual budget of Prussia. By the time of his death in 1740, the Prussian Army had grown into a standing army of 83,000 men, one of the largest in Europe, at a time when the entire Prussian populace made up 2.5 million people. Prussian military writer Georg Henirich von Berenhorst would later write in hindsight that ever since the reign of the soldier king, Prussia always remained "not a country with an army, but an army with a country" (a quote often misattributed to Voltaire and Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau). From the 1740s up until the 1760s, Frederick the Great would use the country's impressive military forces built up by his predecessors in a long succession of wars of aggression that effectively elevated Prussia from a small to a large power in Europe.

After Napoleon Bonaparte conquered Prussia in 1806, one of the conditions of peace was that Prussia should reduce its army to no more than 42,000 men. In order that the country should not again be so easily conquered, the King of Prussia enrolled the permitted number of men for one year, trained and then dismissed that group, and enrolled another of the same size, and so on. Thus, in the course of ten years, he was able to gather an army of 420,000 men who had at least one year of military training. The officers of the army were drawn almost entirely from among the land-owning nobility. The result was that there was gradually

built up a large class of professional officers on the one hand, and a much larger class, the rank and file of the army, on the other. These enlisted men had become conditioned to obey implicitly all the commands of the officers, creating a class-based culture of deference.

This system led to several consequences. Since the officer class also furnished most of the officials for the civil administration of the country, the interests of the army came to be considered as identical to the interests of the country as a whole. A second result was that the governing class desired to continue a system which gave them so much power over the common people, contributing to the continuing influence of the Junker noble classes.

Militarism in the Third Reich

Militarism in Germany continued after World War I and the fall of the German monarchy in the German Revolution of 1918–19, in spite of Allied attempts to crush German militarism by means of the Treaty of Versailles, as the Allies saw Prussian and German militarism as one of the major causes of the Great War. During the period of the Weimar Republic (1918–1933), the 1920 Kapp Putsch, an attempted coup d'état against the republican government, was launched by disaffected members of the armed forces. After this event, some of the more radical militarists and nationalists were submerged in grief and despair into the NSDAP party of Adolf Hitler, while more moderate elements of militarism declined and remained affiliated with the German National People's Party (DNVP) instead.

Throughout its entire 14-year existence, the Weimar Republic remained under threat of militaristic nationalism, as many Germans felt the Treaty of Versailles humiliated their militaristic culture. The Weimar years saw large-scale right-wing militarist and paramilitary mass organizations such as the Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten as well as illegal underground militias such as the Freikorps and the Black Reichswehr. Formed as early as 1920, out of the latter two soon rose the Sturmabteilung (SA), the paramilitary branch of the Nazi party. All of these were responsible for the political violence of so-called Feme murders and an overall atmosphere of lingering civil war during the Weimar period. Already

during the Weimar era, mathematician and political writer Emil Julius Gumbel published in-depth analyses of the militarist paramilitary violence characterizing German public life as well as the state's lenient to sympathetic reaction to it if the violence was committed by the political Right.

The Third Reich that followed the Weimar Republic was a strongly militarist state; after its fall in 1945, militarism in German culture was dramatically reduced as a backlash against the Nazi period, and the Allied Control Council and later the Allied High Commission oversaw a program of attempted fundamental re-education of the German people at large in order to put a stop to German militarism once and for all.

The Federal Republic of Germany today maintains a large, modern military and has one of the highest defence budgets in the world, although the defence budget accounts for less than 1.5 percent of Germany's GDP, is lower than e.g., that of France or Great Britain, and does not meet the 2 percent goal,[further explanation needed] like most other NATO members.

India

Military parade in India

The rise of militarism in India dates back to the British Raj with the establishment of several Indian independence movement organizations such as the Indian National Army led by Subhas Chandra Bose. The Indian National Army (INA) played a crucial role in pressuring the British Raj after it occupied the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with the help of Imperial Japan, but the movement lost momentum due to lack of support by the Indian National Congress, the Battle of Imphal, and Bose's sudden death.

After India gained independence in 1947, tensions with neighboring Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute and other issues led the Indian government to emphasize military preparedness (see also the political integration of India). After the Sino-Indian War in 1962, India dramatically expanded its military prowess which helped India emerge victorious during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. India became third Asian country in the world to possess nuclear weapons, culminating in

the tests of 1998. The Kashmiri insurgency and recent events including the Kargil War against Pakistan, assured that the Indian government remained committed to military expansion.

In recent years the government has increased the military expenditure across all branches and embarked on a rapid modernization programme.

Interventionism: An Economic Analysis

By Ludwig von Mises. Foreword by Bettina Bien Greaves. Foundation for Economic Education, 1997. Unpublished, Originally Written 1940.

Note: Footnotes have been omitted from this version. For the original text, please visit the Foundation for Economic Education here.

VI. WAR ECONOMY

1. War and the Market Economy

Democracy is the corollary of the market economy in domestic affairs; peace is its corollary in foreign policy. The market economy means peaceful cooperation and peaceful exchange of goods and services. It cannot persist when wholesale killing is the order of the day.

The incompatibility of war with the market economy and civilization has not been fully recognized because the progressing development of the market economy has altered the original character of war itself. It has gradually turned the total war of ancient times into the soldiers' war of modern times.

Total war is a horde on the move to fight and to loot. The whole tribe, the whole people moves; no one—not even a woman or a child—remains at home unless he has to fulfill duties there essential for the war. The mobilization is total and the people are always ready to go to war. Everyone is a warrior or serves the warriors. Army and nation, army and state, are identical. No difference is made between combatants and noncombatants. The war aim is to annihilate the entire enemy nation. Total war is not terminated by a peace treaty but by a total victory and a total defeat. The defeated—men, women, children—are exterminated; it means clemency if they are merely reduced to slavery. Only the victorious nation survives.

In the soldiers' war, on the other hand, the army does the fighting while the citizens who are not in the armed services pursue their normal lives. The citizens pay the costs of warfare; they pay for the maintenance and equipment of the army, but otherwise they remain outside of the war events themselves. It may happen that the war actions raze their houses, devastate their land, and destroy their other property; but this, too, is part of the war costs which they have to bear. It may also happen that they are looted and incidentally killed by the warriors—even by those of their "own" army. But these are events which are not inherent in warfare as such; they hinder rather than help the operations of the army leaders and are not tolerated if those in command have full control over their troops. The warring state which has formed, equipped, and maintained the army considers looting by the soldiers an offense; they were hired to fight, not to loot on their own. The state wants to keep civil life as usual because it wants to preserve the tax-paying ability of its citizens; conquered territories are regarded as its own domain. The system of the market economy is to be maintained during the war to serve the requirements of warfare.

The evolution which led from the total war to the soldiers' war should have completely eliminated wars. It was an evolution whose final aim could only be eternal peace between the civilized nations. The liberals of the nineteenth century were fully aware of this fact. They considered war a remnant of a dark age which was doomed, just as were institutions of days gone by—slavery, tyranny, intolerance, superstition. They firmly believed that the future would be blessed by eternal peace.

Things have taken a different course. The development which was to bring the pacification of the world has gone into reverse. This complete reversal cannot be understood as an isolated fact. We witness today the rise of an ideology which consciously negates everything that has come to be considered as culture. The "bourgeois" values are to be revalued. The institutions of the "bourgeoisie" are to be replaced by those of the proletariat. And, in like vein, the "bourgeois" ideal of eternal peace is to be displaced by the glorification of force. The French political thinker Georges Sorel, apostle of trade unions and violence, was the godfather of both Bolshevism and Fascism.

It makes little difference that the nationalists want war between nations and that the Marxists want war between classes, i.e., civil war. What is decisive is the fact that both preach the war of annihilation, total war. It is also important if the various anti-democratic groups work in cooperation, as at present, or if they happen to be fighting each other. In either event, they are virtually always allied when it comes to attacking Western civilization.

2. Total War and War Socialism

Were we to consider as states the hordes of barbarians who descended upon the Roman Empire from the east, we would have to say that they formed total states. The horde was dominated by the political principle which the Nazis now call the Führer principle. Only the will of Attila or Alaric counted. The individual Huns or Goths had no rights and no sphere of private existence. All men, women, and children were simply units in their ruler's army or in its supply service; they had to obey unconditionally.

It would be an error to assume that these hordes were socialistically organized. Socialism is a system of social production which is based on public ownership of the means of production. These hordes did not have socialist production. Insofar as they did not live on looting the conquered but had to provide for their needs by their own work, the individual families produced with their own resources and on their own account. The ruler did not concern himself with such matters; the individual men and women were on their own. There was no planning and no socialism. The distribution of loot is not socialism.

Market economy and total war are incompatible. In the soldiers' war only the soldiers fight; for the great majority war is only a passing suffering of evil, not an active pursuit. While the armies are combating each other, the citizens, farmers, and workers try to carry on their normal activities.

The first step which led from the soldiers' war back to total war was the introduction of compulsory military service. It gradually did away with the difference between soldiers and citizens. The war was no longer to be only a matter of mercenaries; it was to include everyone who had the

necessary physical ability. The slogan “a nation in arms” at first expressed only a program which could not be realized completely for financial reasons. Only part of the able-bodied male population received military training and were placed in the army services. But once this road is entered upon it is not possible to stop at halfway measures. Eventually the mobilization of the army was bound to absorb even the men indispensable to production at home who had the responsibility of feeding and equipping the combatants. It was found necessary to differentiate between essential and nonessential occupations. The men in occupations essential for supplying the army had to be exempted from induction into the combat troops. For this reason disposition of the available manpower was placed in the hands of the military leaders. Compulsory military service proposes putting everyone in the army who is able-bodied; only the ailing, the physically unfit, the old, the women, and the children are exempted. But when it is realized that a part of the able-bodied must be used on the industrial front for work which may be performed by the old and the young, the less fit and the women, then there is no reason to differentiate in compulsory service between the able-bodied and the physically unfit. Compulsory military service thus leads to compulsory labor service of all citizens who are able to work, male and female. The supreme commander exercises power over the entire nation, he replaces the work of the able-bodied by the work of less fit draftees, and places as many able-bodied at the front as he can spare at home without endangering the supplies of the army. The supreme commander then decides what is to be produced and how. He also decides how the products are to be used. Mobilization has become total; the nation and the state have been transformed into an army; war socialism has replaced the market economy.

It is irrelevant in this connection whether or not the former entrepreneurs are given a privileged position in this system of war socialism. They may be called managers and have higher positions in the factories, all of which now serve the army. They may receive larger rations than those who formerly were only clerks or laborers. But they are no longer entrepreneurs. They are shop managers who are being told what and how

to produce, where and at what prices to purchase the means of production, and to whom and at what prices to sell the products.

If peace is regarded as a mere truce during which the nation has to arm itself for the coming war, it is necessary in peacetime to put production on a war footing just as much as to prepare and organize the army. It would be illogical then to delay the total mobilization until the outbreak of hostilities. The only difference between war and peace in this respect is that in time of peace a number of men, who during the war will be used in the front line, are still employed on the home front. The transition from peace conditions to war conditions is then merely the moving of those men from the home front into the army.

It is apparent that in the final analysis war and the market economy are incompatible. The market economy could only develop because industrialism had pushed militarism into the background and because it made the total war "degenerate" into the soldiers' war.

We do not need to discuss the question whether socialism necessarily leads to total war. For the subject matter with which we are here concerned such an analysis is not required. It may suffice to state that the aggressors cannot wage total war without introducing socialism.

3. Market Economy and National Defense

Today the world is divided into two camps. The totalitarian hordes are attacking the nations which seek to maintain the market economy and democracy; they are bent on destroying the "decadent" Western civilization, and to replace it by a new order.

It is believed that this aggression forces the attacked to adjust their social system to the requirements of this total war, that is to give up the market economy for socialism, and democracy for dictatorship. Despairingly one group says: "War inevitably leads to socialism and dictatorship. While we are attempting to defend democracy and to repel the attack of the enemy, we ourselves are accepting his economic order and political system." In the United States this argument is the main support for isolation. The isolationists believe that freedom can only be preserved by nonparticipation in the war.

Exultingly the “progressives” express the same opinion. They welcome the struggle against Hitler because they are convinced that the war must bring socialism. They want American participation in the war to defeat Hitler and to introduce his system in the United States.

Is this necessarily true? Must a nation defending itself against the aggression of totalitarian countries itself become totalitarian? Is a state, which enjoyed democracy and the social system of a market economy, unable to fight a totalitarian and socialist enemy successfully?

It is widely believed that the experience of the present war proves that the socialist production is in a better position to supply arms and other war material than is a market economy. The German army has an enormous superiority in every type of equipment that a fighting army requires. The armies of France and of the British Empire, which had at their disposal the resources of the whole world, entered the conflict poorly armed and equipped and they have been unable to overcome this inferiority. These facts are undeniable, but we have to interpret them correctly.

Even at the time when the Nazis came to power the German Reich was by far better prepared for a new war than the English and French experts assumed. Since 1933 the Reich has concentrated all its efforts on preparation for war. Hitler has transformed the Reich into an armed camp. War production was expanded to the limit. The production of goods for private consumption was cut to the minimum. Hitler openly prepared for a war of annihilation against France and England. The English and the French stood by as if it did not concern them at all.

During those critical years which preceded the outbreak of the second World War, there were in Europe outside of the totalitarian countries only two parties: the anti-communists and the anti-fascists. These are not names which were given to them by others or by their opponents; the parties themselves adopted these designations.

The anti-fascists—in England primarily the Labour Party, in France mainly the front populaire—used strong language against the Nazis. But they opposed every improvement in the armament of their own countries; in every proposal to expand the armed forces they suspected fascism. They were relying on the Soviet army, of whose strength, superior

equipment, and invincibility they were convinced. What seemed to them necessary was an alliance with the Soviets. In order to win Stalin's favor, they argued, it was necessary to pursue an internal policy leaning towards Communism.

The anti-communists—the English Conservatives and the French "Right"—saw in Hitler the Siegfried who would destroy the dragon Communism. Consequently, they took a sympathetic view of Nazism. They branded as a "Jewish" lie the assertion that Hitler was planning war to annihilate France and the British Empire and aspiring to a complete domination of Europe.

The result of this policy was that England and France tumbled into the war unprepared. But still it was not too late to make good these omissions. The eight months that elapsed between the outbreak of the war and the German offensive of May 1940 would have sufficed to secure the equipment for the Allied forces which would have enabled them successfully to defend the French eastern frontier. They could have and should have utilized the powers of their industries. That they failed to do so cannot be blamed on capitalism.

One of the most popular anti-capitalist legends wants us to believe that the machinations of the munitions industry have brought about the resurgence of the war spirit. Modern imperialism and total war supposedly are the results of the war propaganda carried on by writers hired by the munitions makers. The first World War is thought to have started because Krupp, Schneider-Creuzot, DuPont, and J. P. Morgan wanted big profits. In order to avoid the recurrence of such a catastrophe, it is believed necessary to prevent the munitions industry from making profits.

On the basis of such reasoning the Blum government nationalized the French armament industry When the war broke out and it became imperative to place the productive power of all French plants into the service of the rearmament effort, the French authorities considered it more important to block war profits than to win the war. From September 1939 until June 1940, France in actuality did not fight the war against the Nazis, but in fact it fought a war against war profiteering. In this one respect, they were successful.

In England, too, the government was concerned primarily with preventing war profiteering, rather than with the procurement of the best possible equipment for the armed forces. For example, the 100 percent war profits tax might be cited. Even more disastrous for the Allies was the fact that in the United States, too, steps were taken to block war profits and still stronger measures of this sort were announced. This was the reason why American industry had contributed but a small part of what assistance it might have given to England and France.

The anti-capitalist says, "This is precisely the point. Business is unpatriotic. The rest of us are told to leave our families and to give up our jobs; we are placed in the army and have to risk our lives. The capitalists, however, demand their profits even in time of war. They ought to be forced to work unselfishly for the country, if we are forced to fight for it." Such arguments shift the problem into the sphere of ethics. This, however, is not a matter of ethics but of expediency.

Those who detest war on moral grounds because they consider the killing and maiming of people as inhumane, should attempt to replace the ideology, which leads to war, by an ideology which would secure permanent peace. However, if a peaceful nation is attacked and has to defend itself, only one thing counts: the defense must be organized as quickly and as efficiently as possible; the soldiers must be given the best weapons and equipment. This can only be accomplished if the working of the market economy is not interfered with. The munitions industry, which made large profits, equipped and provisioned the armies so well in the past that they were able to win. It was due to the experiences in actual combat in the nineteenth century that the production of armament directly by the governments was largely discontinued. At no other time has the efficiency and productive capacity of the entrepreneurs been proved more effectively than during the first World War. It is only envy and unthinking resentment that cause people to fight against the profits of the entrepreneurs, whose efficiency makes possible the winning of the war.

When the capitalist nations in time of war give up the industrial superiority which their economic system provides them, their power to resist and their chances to win are considerably reduced. That some

incidental consequences of warfare are regarded as unjust can readily be understood. The fact that entrepreneurs get rich on armament production is but one of many unsatisfactory and unjust conditions which war creates. But the soldiers risk their lives and health. That they die unknown and without reward in the front line, while the army leaders and staff remain safe and secure to win glory and to further their careers, is "unjust" too. The demand to eliminate war profits is not any more reasonable than the demand that the army leaders, their staff, the surgeons, and the men on the home front should do their work under the privations and dangers to which the fighting soldier is exposed. It is not the war profits of the entrepreneurs that are objectionable. War itself is objectionable!

These views on war profits also disclose many errors about the nature of the market economy. All those enterprises, which in peace-time already had all the necessary equipment to produce armaments and other war supplies, work from the first day of the war on government orders. But even working at full capacity, these plants can only produce a small part of the war needs. It is a question, therefore, of devoting plants to war production which previously did not produce armaments, and of actually building new factories. Both require considerable new investments. Whether or not these investments will pay, depends not only on the prices realized on the first contracts but also on those contracts fulfilled during the war. Should the war end before these investments can be fully written off out of gross earnings, the owners will not only fail to realize profits, but they will even suffer capital losses. The popular argument in favor of a profitless armaments industry overlooks among other things the fact that the enterprises, which have to embark on production in a field hitherto underdeveloped by them, must obtain the capital needed from banks or in the capital market. They cannot secure it if its intended use raises no expectation of profits but only the risk of losses. How can a conscientious entrepreneur persuade a banker or a capitalist to lend him money if he himself cannot see any prospect of a profitable return on his investment? In the market economy, where the debtor has the responsibility for the repayment of the loan, there is no room for transactions which do not compensate for the risk of loss by the prospect

of a gain. It is only the expectation of profit which enables an entrepreneur to promise payment of interest and repayment of principal. By eliminating the hope of profit one makes impossible the functioning of the entire system of entrepreneurship.

What is demanded of industry then is this. Give up the line in which you producers have worked successfully up to now. Do not think of the loss of your regular customers and of the depreciation of your idle equipment. Invest new capital in a line with which you are not familiar. But bear in mind, we shall pay prices which will not make it possible for you to charge off the new investment in a short time. Should you nevertheless make profits, we will tax them away. Besides, we shall publicly expose you as "merchants of death."

In war, too, there is only the choice between the market economy and socialism. The third alternative, interventionism, is not even possible in war. At the outbreak of the present war it may have been possible to nationalize the whole of industry, but there is no doubt that this would have led to a complete failure. If one did not want to adopt that method, the market economy should have been accepted with all its implications. Had the market method been chosen, the Hitler onslaught would have been stopped on the eastern borders of France. The defeat of France and the destruction of English cities was the first price paid for the interventionist suppression of war profits.

As long as the war was in progress, there should have been no place for a discussion of measures against war profits. After victory was won and a world order established in which new aggression did not have to be feared, there still would have been ample time to confiscate war profits. At any rate, before the war is over and the investments are written off, it is impossible to ascertain whether an enterprise has actually realized war profits or not.

3.3 THE ECONOMIC COST OF DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE

Putting aside the very real human cost, war has also serious economic costs – loss of buildings, infrastructure, a decline in the working

population, uncertainty, rise in debt and disruption to normal economic activity. Yet, from some perspectives war can also be beneficial in terms of creating demand, employment, innovation and profits for business. To a large extent, it depends on whether the war takes place in your country or another.



Costs of war

War and inflation

In many circumstances, war can lead to inflation – which leads to loss of people's savings, rise in uncertainty and loss of confidence in the financial system. For example, in the US civil war, the Confederacy struggled financially to meet the cost of the war. Therefore, they started printing money to pay soldiers salaries. But, as they printed money, the value of money soon declined. High inflation hits middle-income savers the most as they see the value of their savings wiped out.

Hyperinflation is often a result when the war ends. For example, with a devastated economy, in 1946, Hungary and Austria experienced the highest rates of hyperinflation on record.

War and National debt

During war we often see a rapid rise in public sector debt. The government is willing to borrow a lot more than usual because – there is patriotic support for the war effort.

Both the First and Second World Wars were very costly for the UK. In both cases, the national debt rose very sharply. In the post-war period,

debt continued to rise due to reconstruction and the creation of the welfare state.



UK national debt rose to 150% at the end of World War Two – but then rose to 240% by the early 1950s. (However, this level of national debt was not a problem for the long period of economic expansion post World War.)

The UK relied on loans from the US during the Second World War and took many decades to pay them off.

For the US, which was not involved for the first two years, the rise in national debt was not as pronounced. The US profited from selling arms and equipment to the UK during the early years (though on generous lend-lease terms)



The financial cost of war

Although war can provide a temporary boost to domestic demand, it is important to bear in mind the cost of war. In particular the opportunity cost of military spending, the human cost of lost lives, the cost of rebuilding after the devastation of war. Also, it depends on the kind of war, how prolonged it was, where and how it is fought.

Cost of civil war

Civil war can have a devastating impact on the economic development of countries. Countries experiencing civil war will see a collapse in tourism, foreign investment and domestic investment. It can lead to shorter life-expectancy and lost GDP. A report entitled "Africa's missing billions" (Oxfam, 2007) estimates the cost of war in Africa has been equal to the amount of international aid. A country like the "Democratic Republic of Congo" has experienced a particularly difficult war, which besides causing the deaths of about 4 million people, has cost it £9bn, or 29% of its gross domestic product.

The report also notes that ongoing war and increased availability of weapons can lead to increase in rates of armed violence and organised crime.

Figure 1: Cumulative GDP loss for Burundi



This is an example of the projected loss of GDP for Burundi during the civil war. It is calculated by an estimated pre-war trend of GDP and actual GDP. It shows that a decade of conflict is a major cause of falling GDP.

But, also it is worse than graph shows because, during war, a large percentage of GDP is spent on destructive military hardware. The decline in health services and education are likely to be even greater.

The aftermath of War?

War invariably leads a legacy of debt and an army of demobilised soldiers. After the Second World War, the debt was not a constraint to growth and we had one of the longest periods of economic expansions on record. (Post-War Britain)

However, the aftermath of war is not always so positive. The UK struggled after the end of The Napoleonic war and after the end of the First World War. In the 1920s, the UK struggled with a long period of unemployment – returning soldiers found very poor employment prospects. Yet, after the Second World War, the US and Europe experienced full employment.

The German economy was ravaged by the aftermath of the First World War and the demand for reparation payments. Struggling to meet reparation payments, Germany resorted to printing money – leading to hyperinflation. The discord around the German hyperinflation of the 1920s sowed the seeds for political extremism and future wars.

However, after the Second World War, the Allies didn't make the same mistake. The US gave a generous aid to Western Europe – helping the rebuilding process and leading to the economic miracle of Europe, and Germany in particular.

The opportunity cost of war

It is worth briefly mentioning the opportunity cost of war. If a government spends an extra $300bn on military spending, that is $300bn that could have been spent in building hospitals and schools. According to a report by the Watson Institute (reported by Reuters), the cost of the Iraq War was $2 trillion. This $2 trillion could equally have been spent on more constructive development projects.

Psychological costs

It is possible to estimate economic costs of war – cost of military, e.t.c. However, it is harder to estimate the psychological costs of war – the pain of death, suffering, fear and disability. A conflict can leave soldiers and civilians traumatised for the rest of their lives. In recent years, post-traumatic stress syndrome is more widely accepted, but putting a cost on how war negatively affects those involved, is difficult to do.

Economic benefits of wars

Just briefly war can have potential economic benefits.

- Full employment
- Higher economic growth
- Increased rate of innovation as the government invests in new technology, e.g. development of radar/jet engine in the Second World War could be used for peaceful purposes.
- Change in social attitudes. For example, women entering labour market after First World war.

Domestic demand and unemployment

In the 1930s, J.M. Keynes advocated government borrowing and government spending to reduce the mass unemployment of the great depression. However, it was only the onset of the Second World War, where there was the political impetus to pursue sufficient spending. In both UK and US, the economy soon reached full employment – often with shortages in key areas as men joined the army.

Graph showing sharp fall in unemployment at the start of the First World War.

In fact, one side effect of the First and Second World War was the growth in female employment. In 1914-18, women took on jobs, previously the sole reserve of men; this helped to change cultural attitudes and gain women the vote, shortly after the end of the First World War.

Possible unemployment

However, at the end of major wars, there is the danger that returning soldiers may struggle to find employment. After the end of the First World War, there was a major economic slump, and returning soldiers struggled to find jobs which had been replaced during the war.



A sharp rise in unemployment after the end of the First World War. The Versailles Treaty which demanded reparations from Germany did not help as it contributed to lower trade

1960s economic boom

In the 1950s and 1960s, the US was involved in major conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia. Military spending took an increasing share of GDP and was partly responsible for strong domestic demand and high rates of economic growth. Companies involved in the manufacture of arms saw a rise in demand and profit.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. How do you know the Militarism and the Society?

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2. Discuss the Economic Cost of Defensive and Offensive Arms Race.

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3.4 STRATEGIC THINKING AND IMPLICATION ON ECONOMY

"Our government has kept us in a perpetual state of fear—kept us in a continuous stampede of patriotic fervor—with the cry of grave national emergency. Always there has been some terrible evil at home or some monstrous foreign power that was going to gobble us up if we did not blindly rally behind it by furnishing the exorbitant funds demanded. Yet, in retrospect, these disasters seem never to have happened, seem never to have been quite real."

—**General Douglas MacArthur**

For four decades the government of the United States waged the Cold War. Doing so brought about massive changes in the allocation of resources, with effects on many dimensions of the nation's economic performance. Despite all that has been written by economists, historians, political scientists, and others about the Cold War economy, economic historians have given little attention to it as such. Most textbooks devote scant if any space to discussing it. Now that it can be viewed as a distinct phase of U.S. economic history, an analytical survey is in order.

In the first part of the paper I present such a survey in the form of a statistical anatomy accompanied by a brief narrative of related political and military events. I deal with the magnitudes of defense spending, both absolutely and relative to national product, and the trends and cycles of those magnitudes. Next, I examine opportunity costs, identifying how changes in the military share of national product were related to changes

in the private share or the government nonmilitary share, both from year to year and over the course of distinct periods of military buildup and cutback. Finally, I consider how the Cold War economy's performance looks when we reconsider the measurement of national product along lines that I, among others, consider more defensible than the orthodox ones.

In the second part of the paper I turn more explicitly to issues of political economy. The Cold War economy derived from resource allocation by government. But in the context of American political institutions, the government's actions cannot be fully understood apart from the public's preferences and the politics that connected the rulers and the ruled. Post-World War II American military affairs—preparation for as well as actual involvement in war—gave rise to characteristic political processes. In analyzing those processes I focus on information and ideology. Who knew what, and who believed what, about national defense requirements and capabilities? How was the existing information used in the political processes that determined the broad societal allocation of resources? How stable were public preferences, and what made them change as they did? How were conflicts between the national security elite and the public resolved?

A STATISTICAL ANATOMY OF THE COLD WAR ECONOMY

Terms of Reference

To inquire into how the costs of Cold War military activities were distributed between the private sector and the government nonmilitary sector, I extend the familiar guns-versus-butter metaphor slightly, dividing the gross national product into three exhaustive classes: government military purchases, denoted by G-M; all government—federal, state, and local—nonmilitary purchases, denoted by G-NM; and all private purchases, whether for consumption or investment (or net exports), denoted by P.[3] This categorization permits us to view the societal opportunity costs of military purchases very broadly. The military purchases include only newly produced final goods and services as designated under the "national defense" heading in the national

income and product accounts. Hence, at the beginning of the analysis I am examining the division of the entire national flow of output as conventionally measured.

To provide empirical terms of reference for the analysis, I consider periods of military mobilization to be defined by a rapid uninterrupted multiyear increase of real military outlays, and periods of demobilization by a substantial uninterrupted multiyear decrease of real military outlays. In the United States after 1948 three mobilizations occurred, during 1950-53, 1965-68, and 1978-87, each followed by a demobilization.

An increase of the share of G-M in GNP can occur at the expense of either the share of P or the share of G-NM or of both. For expositional convenience let us employ the usual terms, calling G-M "guns" and P "butter." G-NM will be called "roads." A distinction may be drawn between "butter-sacrificing" mobilizations, when the P share declines, and "roads-sacrificing" mobilizations, when the G-NM share declines. Demobilizations may be viewed in parallel terms as "butter-enhancing" or "roads-enhancing."

Military Spending: Magnitudes and Shares

World War II cast an enormous shadow over the years that followed in the United States. In addition to the immense economic consequences, the war's institutional and Constitutional legacies loomed very large.[4] The ideological effects were tremendous. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, in their massive survey of public opinion data, describe World War II as "the most pervasive single influence on public opinion" in the entire period since the mid-1930s. Among other things, it "transformed American public opinion concerning virtually all aspects of foreign affairs."[5] In the dominant view that emerged from the war, "isolationism" and "appeasement" were completely discredited. Within the federal government the president gained power and discretion, especially in foreign affairs—people would later speak of an "imperial presidency." In these respects important groundwork was laid for a greatly expanded American role in world affairs. But in the latter half of 1945 and throughout 1946 the rapid demobilization of the awesome

wartime military machine raised doubts as to whether the United States would possess the means to achieve its newly embraced global goals.

Culminating the demobilization, real military spending hit its postwar low in calendar year 1947 at $10 billion in current dollars, equivalent to about $45 billion in 1982 dollars, or 4.3 percent of GNP. (Henceforth unless otherwise indicated, all dollar amounts are expressed in 1982 purchasing power.)[6] But in 1947 relations with the Soviet Union were deteriorating, especially in the eyes of the President and officials at the Department of State and the newly created Department of Defense.[7] Already Winston Churchill had warned that an iron curtain was descending between Soviet-controlled Europe and the West. For the people on Main Street, however, other concerns had priority. "Though the polls showed growing awareness of Soviet aggressiveness, most Americans were still not ready to undertake the dangerous, expensive job of opposing Russia. . . . The Republicans had gained control of Congress in November [1946] by promising a return to normalcy, not an assumption of Britain's empire."[8] To convince the public, and thereby Congress, of the need for additional defense spending to implement the proclaimed Truman Doctrine of containing communist expansion around the world, the administration needed a more visible crisis. The confrontations over Greece and Turkey, which had flared up in 1947, could not carry the full burden of justification required.

Events came to the administration's rescue when the communists took over the Czechoslovakian government early in 1948. Also, Lieutenant General Lucius Clay, military governor of the U.S. Zone in Germany, helped to create a war scare by sending a telegram, which was subsequently publicized, warning that war between the United States and the Soviet Union might occur "with dramatic suddenness." In March President Truman called for a supplemental defense approporiation of more than $3 billion (current dollars), which Congress quickly approved.[9] Hoping for a rally-'round-the-flag response from the citizenry as he sought reelection, Truman gave a major speech that stressed the danger of war with the Soviets. He denounced their "ruthless action" and their "clear design" to dominate Europe.

With these events the Cold War had definitely begun. Congress approved defense appropriations for fiscal year 1949 about 20 percent higher than those for fiscal year 1948. The Berlin crisis than began in mid-1948, the communist conquest of China, the Soviet nuclear test, and the formation of NATO in 1949, and the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950 ensured that the superpower rivalry and confrontation that came to be known as the Cold War—a state of chronic national emergency and sustained military readiness without precedent in American history—would remain the dominant reality of U.S. foreign and defense affairs for the next four decades, ending only with the breakup of the East Bloc and then the Soviet Union itself in 1990 and 1991.

Notwithstanding the sharp jump in real military purchases in calendar year 1949, the first rapid multiyear mobilization of the Cold War era did not begin until after the outbreak of the Korean War (Figure 1). Previously administration officials had encountered stiff resistance from Congress to their pleas for a substantial buildup along the lines laid out in NSC-68, a landmark document of April 1950. The authors of this internal government report took a Manichaean view of America's rivalry with the Soviet Union, espoused a permanent role for the United States as world policeman, and envisioned U.S. military expenditures amounting to perhaps 20 percent of GNP.[12] But congressional acceptance of the recommended measures seemed highly unlikely in the absence of a crisis. In 1950 "the fear that [the North Korean] invasion was just the first step in a broad offensive by the Soviets proved highly useful when it came to persuading Congress to increase the defense budget." As Secretary of State Dean Acheson said afterwards, "Korea saved us." The buildup reached its peak in 1953, when the stalemated belligerents in Korea agreed to a truce.

The ensuing demobilization lasted just two years, leaving annual defense outlays during the next decade nearly three times higher than they had been in the late 1940s (Figure 1). During the period 1947-1950 real annual military spending never exceeded $60 billion; after 1952 it never fell below $143 billion and usually was substantially higher (the average for 1956-1965 was $168). Samuel Huntington, a leading student of U.S. defense policy, speculated that "without the war, the increase probably

would have been about the size of that of 1948-1949," that is, 20 percent instead of nearly 200 percent.



FIG. 1. Real military outlays (billions of 1982 dollars), 1948–1989.

During the period 1955-1965 U.S. military policy underwent substantial recasting. First the Eisenhower administration's New Look put major emphasis on massive nuclear retaliation by the Strategic Air Command's long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles; then the Kennedy administration's plan tilted toward flexible nuclear response, counterinsurgency, and forces tailored to limited wars. But these shifts had only minor impacts on overall defense spending, which fluctuated within a range of $143-163 billion. A much-vaunted buildup after JFK took office raised spending by 11 percent between 1960 and 1962, but the decline during the next three years brought the real spending of 1965 below the amount spent in 1957. Because the Kennedy buildup was so brief, so small, and so transient, I do not regard it as belonging in the same category with the three mobilizations identified above.

After 1965 the Vietnam War buildup carried real defense purchases to a mobilization peak in 1968, up by more than one-third. The ensuing demobilization is harder to date with certainty. I put its completion at 1971, when the military share of GNP had fallen below the premobilization share of 1965 (Figure 2). After holding its own in 1972, however, the amount of real military spending continued downward until it hit bottom in 1976. (The G-M share of GNP hit bottom in 1978.) Despite this resumption of the decline that first began after 1968, it would be unwarranted to describe the decline between 1972 and 1976 as

part of the Vietnam War demobilization as such.[15] Although this latter phase of decline certainly reflected, in part, disillusionments and convictions engendered by the Vietnam experience, it applied more to the military establishment in general, especially the procurement accounts, than to forces in or supporting military action in Southeast Asia.[16] In January 1973, with only 30,000 U.S. military personnel remaining in Vietnam, the Nixon administration terminated the draft, and the Paris Peace Agreement provided for the withdrawal of all remaining U.S. forces from Vietnam.[17] The bulk of the military retrenchment during 1972-1976 reflected public and congressional revulsion against militarism and the Cold War, as evidenced by such events as the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973 and the National Emergencies Act in 1976, rather than savings associated with the reduction and eventual cessation of U.S. engagement in the Vietnam War.



FIG. 2. Government military (dark bars) and nonmilitary (light bars) shares of GNP, 1948-1989.

Finally, after 1978 the Carter-Reagan buildup is obvious in the spending data (Figure 1). Between 1978 and 1980, real military outlays increased by $15.7 billion, or 10.4 percent; between 1980 and 1987, by $84.4 billion, or 50.7 percent. For the entire nine-year buildup, annual outlays went up by $100.1 billion, or 66.4 percent. (Recall that these figures are expressed in 1982 dollars.) Not being associated with a major shooting war, this vast military spending surge had no precedent in American history.

Before proceeding, one should note two important points. First, I have computed the data on real military spending by deflating nominal-dollar

defense purchases by the GNP deflator. (All data are for calendar, not fiscal, years.) While this procedure does not permit one to claim that the resulting real spending series accurately portrays the growth of real defense "quantity"—whatever that might mean—it does permit one to approximate the opportunity cost of military spending in terms of real nonmilitary output forgone.[18] Second, the military spending being analyzed here is for purchasing newly produced goods and services, including foreign military assistance. This component of the national income and product accounts is not the same as budgetary outlays of the Department of Defense, which include substantial sums for transfer payments such as military retirement pay and purchases of land. Also, some defense purchases originate in other federal departments, for example, the Energy Department (previously the Atomic Energy Commission), which purchases goods and services to produce nuclear reactors and warheads for the armed forces.

For the entire Cold War period, 1948-1989, real military purchases cumulated to a total of $7,051 billion—equivalent to nearly $10 trillion in 1992 dollars—averaging $168 billion per year. There was, obviously, substantial fluctuation: the standard deviation was $44.6 billion. The trend was slightly upward. A trend equation fitted to the data reveals a tendency for defense purchases to increase by $2.6 billion per year on the average.

From 1948 to 1989, real GNP increased at an average rate of 3.1 percent per year. (This rate and others given in this paragraph were computed from a linear regression of the logarithm of the variable on time.) Average growth rates of the component shares of real GNP were as follows: real private spending, 3.0 per year; real government nonmilitary spending, 4.5 percent per year; and real military spending, 1.9 percent per year. Thus, while private spending, by far the largest component of GNP, almost maintained its share of the total, the share of G-NM tended to increase while the share of G-M tended to diminish.

By focusing on the long-term trends of the shares, however, one overlooks the abrupt changes early in the period: the share of G-M jumped from 5.0 in 1950 to 13.1 percent in 1952 and 13.2 percent in 1953, after which a gradual downward trend is clear (Figure 2); the

private share, in contrast, fell from 86.5 percent in 1950 to 77.7 percent in 1953, recovered to 81.5 in 1955 (a private share never again reached), then leveled off for the long term at about 80 percent. In short, one finds that the composition of real output, as conventionally measured, underwent a permanent once-for-all shift in the early 1950s, when the private share lost about six percentage points at the expense of, first, an abrupt increase of the government military share, and then a gradual long-term increase of the government (federal, state, and local) nonmilitary share, which trended upward until the mid-1970s, then leveled off at about 14 percent (Figure 2).

Table 1 shows that one's description of GNP shares during the Cold War in some respects depends heavily on whether or not one includes the years 1948-1950 in the long period. With those three years excluded, the private share shows no long-term tendency to decline, and its standard deviation is much smaller; the military share falls significantly faster, with the annual figures deviating much less from the trend line. For description of long-term changes of the G-NM share, in contrast, it matters little whether one includes or excludes the years 1948-1950. As a stylized description of the Cold War shares, one comes close to the truth as follows: P share = 80 percent; G-M share = 7.6 percent; G-NM share = 12.4 percent.

TABLE 1

GNP Share Characteristics for Two Long Periods

	1948-1989	1951-1989
Private share		
Mean	0.803	0.798
Standard deviation	0.020	0.010
Trend change per decade	-0.006	0.001
R^2 of trend equation	0.121	0.007
Government military share		
Mean	0.075	0.077

Standard deviation	0.022	0.022
Trend change per decade	-0.010	-0.016
R^2 of trend equation	0.332	0.733
Government nonmilitary share		
Mean	0.122	0.125
Standard deviation	0.022	0.021
Trend change per decade	0.016	0.016
R^2 of trend equation	0.780	0.736

If one begins in 1948, the long-term tendency was for the G-NM share to gain at the expense of both the private share and the military share, with the military share absorbing almost two-thirds of the shift. (Because the three shares exhaust the entire GNP, their trend rates of change must add to zero, which—except for rounding error—they do in Table 1.) Excluding the years 1948-1950 from the long term, one finds that the long-term tendency was for the G-NM share to gain exclusively at the expense of the military share, as the private share remained approximately constant over the long period 1951-1989. Thus, if the United States during the Cold War was simultaneously a warfare state and a welfare state, it is clear that the welfare part expanded much more robustly than the warfare part after the initial military surge of the early 1950s.

Given the overarching trends, one may proceed to ask whether increases of the G-M share during military mobilizations occurred at the expense of G-NM or P shares. The answer is clear. There was no systematic tendency at all for the G-NM share to fall when the G-M share rose during mobilizations. In fact, during military buildups the government nonmilitary share of GNP was more likely to rise than to fall. The G-NM share was higher in 1953 than it had been in 1950, and higher in 1968 than it had been in 1965. During the Carter-Reagan buildup the G-NM share fluctuated in a narrow band, sometimes rising and sometimes falling, but the share at the end (13.88 percent in 1987) was nearly the same as it had been before the buildup began (14.06 percent in 1978). A

regression of the annual changes of the G-NM share on the annual changes of the G-M share has a slope coefficient that does not differ significantly from zero (t = 0.355) and an R^2 of just 0.003, which shows that the annual changes of the two variables bore no contemporaneous linear relationship to one another.

The behavior of the private share was quite different. Changes in the G-M and P shares were almost exactly offsetting. A trade-off equation fitted to the annual changes during 1948-1989 has a tight fit (R^2 = 0.814) and shows that the implicit cost of a one-percentage-point increase in the military share was a reduction of one percentage point in the private share: the regression slope coefficient is -1.004 with a standard error of 0.077; hence one cannot reject the hypothesis that the slope equals one at any customary level of Type I error. (Deletion of the years 1948-1950 from the data set has no effect on this conclusion.) Figure 3 plainly shows the two offsetting changes to be deviations from a horizontal line representing a zero sum of the two changes. In short, during the Cold War the private sector alone bore the full cost of annual increases in the military share of total output as conventionally defined.



FIG. 3. Change of military and private shares of GNP, 1949–1989.

In the metaphors explained above, one may describe the buildup of 1950-1953 as completely butter-sacrificing and the demobilization of 1953-1955 as completely butter-enhancing. But because the magnitude of the military upswing greatly exceeded that of the subsequent retrenchment,

over the full cycle of 1950-1955 the net change of the private share was -5.1 percentage points. The buildup of 1965-1968 was also completely butter-sacrificing. The ensuing demobilization was 50 percent butter-enhancing if considered complete in 1971, and 59 percent butter-enhancing if considered complete in 1976. Over the complete cycle of 1965-1971 the net change of the private share was -1.4 percentage points; over the period 1965-1976 it was -0.4 percentage points. The Carter-Reagan buildup of 1978-1987 was 89 percent butter-sacrificing: the private share fell by 1.5 percentage points while the military share rose by 1.7 percentage points. During the Reagan portion of the buildup alone, from 1980 to 1987, the mobilization was 76 percent butter-sacrificing, as the private share fell by one percentage point while the military share rose by 1.3 percentage points. The post-1987 demobilization has continued into the early 1990s, so its ultimate character remains to be seen.

Cold War Economy: Unconventionally Viewed

To this point my analysis has proceeded by making use of the conventional categories of the national income and product accounts. I now take a different tack. In the conventional accounting framework the government's spending for national defense enters fully into GNP. The soundness of this accounting practice can be, and often has been, questioned. The challenges apply in some cases to the accounting treatment of all government spending; in other cases, to defense spending in particular. Some critics would deduct all government spending from GNP, others only a portion; likewise for defense spending alone. Whether or not one accepts the arguments of the critics, it is worthwhile to consider the grounds of the arguments and to assess how our view of the economy's performance would be changed by adopting alternative accounting conventions. Among the several bases for rejecting the usual accounting conventions, the following may be noted.

First, because the prices paid for defense goods and services generally are not—in some cases cannot be—determined within a competitive market framework, all such prices are suspect. What do they mean? Is there any reason to suppose that they approximate consumers' marginal

rates of substitution or producers' marginal costs? If not, why should the actual prices paid be regarded as appropriate weights for the purpose of aggregating physically incommensurable goods and services? The prices paid for conscripted soldiers' services are only the most incontestible example of a wide class of prices that deviate from competitive equilibrium levels. For many items procured the government and the supplier compose a bilateral monopoly, and the prices reflect only the relative bargaining power of the transactors—not to speak of the supplier's political pull.

Second, even if the pricing problem be disregarded, defense purchases measure input not output. Obviously, what people value is national security, not the mere devotion of resources to the ostensible production of national security. Because no one knows the production function for national security, and because under certain conditions (e.g., arms races) more military spending may be associated with less rather than more security, one may not suppose even that the relation between spending and security is necessarily monotonic; far less may one assume what the specific form of the function might be. Moreover, how one might aggregate individuals' valuations of security to arrive at a societal value for national security is probematic in theory as well as practice.

Third, defense output, even if it were measurable, ought to be regarded as an intermediate rather than a final good, and on this basis excluded from GNP. As James Tobin and William Nordhaus put it, extending an argument embraced earlier by Simon Kuznets, defense is a "necessary regrettable," not a source of final utility to anyone. If there were no external threat, all defense spending could be eliminated and no one would be the worse. To the extent that defense spending serves to preserve the social and economic framework within which nondefense production can go forward, its value is already incorporated in the market prices of civilian goods.

Finally, following lines of argument familiar in public choice theory (bureaucratic behavior à la Niskanen and rent-seeking à la Tullock), one may argue that political and bureaucratic allocation of resources tends toward the dissipation of net value for all services provided by the government. Hence, at the margin the observed defense spending

amounts to transfer payments rather than payments for net additions to the real national product. Students of the politics of maintaining obsolete military bases and other defense boondoggles have demonstrated that at least a substantial portion of defense spending makes no genuine net contribution to national security.

The preceding arguments, although not widely accepted within the mainstream economics profession, are scarcely the wild-eyed notions of crackpots. At least three Noble laureates in economic science (Kuznets, Tobin, and Buchanan) are on record as proponents of some or all of the preceding arguments, and many other respectable economists also have subscribed to them. Especially weighty is the position of Simon Kuznets in opposition to the now-standard way of treating defense spending in the national product accounts, because Kuznets was the acknowledged leader in the original development of the accounts. Except for World War II, which he treated as a unique event, Kuznets always insisted on using a "peacetime concept" of GNP.

For assessing the long-run trend of real GNP during the Cold War, it matters little whether one examines conventional real GNP or real GNP*, the latter being real GNP minus all defense spending. The two series exhibit a similar upward tendency. Between 1948 and 1989, real GNP grew at an average rate of 3.10 percent per year, real GNP* at an average rate of 3.21 percent per year. (Again, growth rates are obtained from linear regressions of log output on time.) On the basis of this difference, one has little to choose, as the growth rate of orthodox total output and that of civilian output alone differed by just 0.11 percent per year.

Notwithstanding the similarities of their long-run trends, the two series moved quite differently in particular years and, on one occasion, over the course of a conventionally demarcated business cycle. Comparing the annual percentage growth rates of real GNP and real GNP*, one finds that they differed by one percentage point or more in six years, and in several other years they differed by enough to make a substantial difference in, say, the predictive performance of a macro model fitted to them. A linear regression of the growth rate of real GNP* on the growth rate of real GNP accounts for less than 80 percent of the variance ($R2 = 0.796$) and has a standard error of estimate of 1.2 percentage points. So,

how one defines GNP can make an important difference in one's understanding of the patterns of real output fluctuations in the postwar era. Empirical macroeconomists appear to be oblivious to this issue.

As Figure 4 shows, the differences tended to diminish with the passage of time. The early 1950s witnessed the greatest deviations between the growth rate of orthodox real GNP and that of civilian real GNP. The differences were considerably smaller from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, then even smaller between 1974 and 1989. To some extent, the diminution reflected the diminishing share of military spending in GNP (Figure 2 above).



FIG. 4. Difference between growth rates of real GNP and real GNP*, 1949–1989.

For the early 1950s the choice of an output concept makes a major difference in the description of the business cycle (Figure 5). The conventional concept gives rise to a description that shows an expansion from 1950 through 1953, a mild recession in 1954, and a strong recovery in 1955. Real GNP*, in contrast, shows a much slower pace of expansion in 1951 and virtually no growth in 1952. The year 1953 looks the same for both measures, but 1954 does not. Moving from real GNP to real GNP* transforms 1954 from a mild recession to a weak expansion—a minus 1.3 percent change becomes a plus 1.0 percent change. Both series show strong recovery in 1955, with civilian growth outpacing that of GNP including the military component.



FIG. 5. Growth rates of real GNP (dark bars) and real GNP* (light bars).

One may not wish to accept GNP* as a replacement for conventional GNP.[28] But the point remains. Whether or not one wishes to exclude defense spending from the measure of total output, one must recognize that some years look good or bad merely because of variations in defense spending—a type of spending with a very tenuous relation to the well-being of consumers, investors, and the beneficiaries of governmentally purchased civilian goods and services. The year 1951 was far better for guns than it was for butter or roads. The year 1952 saw only minuscule growth of road output and actual decline of butter output; the year 1954, a bad one for guns, brought slight improvements in the rates of output of both roads and butter. What we call these differences matters little, so long as we are clear. But appreciating the existence of the differences is important for understanding and evaluating the actual performance of the economy during the Cold War.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COLD WAR

The foregoing evidence and analysis raise a variety of questions about the political economy of the Cold War, only a few of which can be considered here. I shall focus on issues related to ideology, information, and the conflict between governing elites and the public.

Consider first the profile of resource allocation to the military during the Cold War. One might ask: (1) What accounts for the unprecedentedly enormous base spending level, that is, the level when the nation was not

involved in shooting war? (2) What accounts for the deviations from that base, that is, for the buildups? Until the late 1970s the answers seem fairly transparent. The high base level of spending resulted from the Cold War ideology of global anti-communism and the foreign policy doctrines and military commitments that flowed from that ideology. The spending deviations were associated with the extraordinary costs of engagement in two major shooting wars in Asia. The Carter-Reagan buildup is a different matter. Set in motion by a unique combination of external events, astute partisan political action and information management, kept in motion by executive determination and bureaucratic tenacity, it bore little resemblance to the two preceding buildups.[30]

During the "normal" years of the post-Korean War period, 1955-1965 and the post-Vietnam War period, 1972-1978, when neither substantial mobilization nor demobilization was occurring, real defense spending fluctuated within a range of $144-166 billion. This contrasted with the $48-60 billion range of the years 1948-1950. One may conclude that the establishment of the full-fledged Cold War regime caused real defense spending almost to treble. Shooting wars entailed marginal expenditures of another $20-60 billion per year. Even without the periodic buildups, the "normal" expense of a military establishment requiring $150 billion per year for forty years would have cumulated to $6 trillion (1982 dollars). This staggering sum is equivalent to the entire GNP of the United States in the two-year period 1977-l978.

From 1948 to the late 1960s the dominant Cold War ideology and a bipartisan consensus on defense and foreign policy, focused on global containment of Communism and deterrence of a Soviet attack on Western Europe or the United States, gave support to the unprecedented allocation of resources to the "peacetime" military establishment. Having weakened somewhat under the strains of the Vietnam War controversy and its political aftermath, both the ideology and the consensus persisted, subject to a good deal of fraternal squabbling, notably within Congress. President Reagan's rhetorical hostility toward the Soviet Union's "evil empire" and the generally hawkish stance of his administration, especially during Reagan's first term, gave renewed luster to the tarnished Cold War ideology. Despite the public's waning

enthusiasm for foreign military adventures after the near-hysteria of 1980, events such as the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the Soviet downing of Korean Airlines flight 007 in 1983 were "carefully managed and interpreted by the [Reagan] administration" and "proved crucial, at least long enough to save the weapons buildup."

The ideological milieu was important, indeed essential, in maintaining high levels of resource allocation to defense, but it was not sufficient. Ordinary citizens, almost none of whom had any direct contact with conditions or evidence bearing on national security, easily came to suspect that the nation's security did not really require such vast expenditures and that military interests, especially the uniformed services and the big weapons contractors, were using bogus threats as a pretext for siphoning off the taxpayers' money. Countless political cartoons, featuring bloated generals bedecked with rows of medals, promoted precisely such an attitude. Citizens did not need to be natural cynics. The problem of creeping skepticism was inherent in the remoteness of the subject from their immediate experience. In addition, as Huntington remarked, "The longer a given level of military force is apparently adequate for deterrence, the greater is the temptation to assume that a slightly lower level might be equally adequate."

Frequent newspaper and television reports of waste, fraud, mismanagement, and bribery fostered the public's tendency, absent a crisis, to doubt what the defense authorities said. Popular books explained how the military-industrial-congressional complex formed an "iron triangle," exploiting the taxpayers, distorting defense policies, and blocking progress toward multilateral arms reductions.[35] As Gordon Adams explained, because no one knew the production function for national security, it was "difficult to correlate military expenditure levels to distinct improvements in national security. Citizens [could] only spend and hope." But "the indeterminate nature of the need to spend," along with the underlying Cold War ideology, created a potential for political leaders periodically to arouse the slumbering apprehensions of the public.[36]

The tendency of chronic background threat to lose its efficacy in supporting high levels of military spending could be offset by episodic

crises. In a perceived crisis, public opinion became volatile. Many people suspended their reason, critical faculties, and long-term judgments, reacting emotionally and with heightened deference to political leaders. As Senator Arthur Vandenberg observed when Truman was first attempting to persuade the public to support a policy of containment in 1947, gaining such support required that national leaders "scare hell out of the American people." Sometimes the outside world presented an inviting opportunity to take advantage of a crisis, as when the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel in 1950 or when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1979. But usually the world did not supply such clear-cut cases, and the national security managers had to take matters into their own hands.

During the Cold War the authorities alerted the public to a series of ominous "gaps." Just after World War II, U.S. leaders exaggerated Soviet force levels and offensive capabilities. Of the fearsome 175 Soviet divisions, a third were undermanned and another third were ill-equipped militia. Then came a bomber gap in the mid-1950s and a missile gap between 1958 and 1961, followed within a few years by an antimissile gap and a first-strike missile gap. All were revealed in due course to have been false alarms. Meanwhile the American people received an almost wholly fictitious account of an incident in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, which stampeded Congress into giving its blessing to what soon became a major war. Subsequent gaps were alleged with regard to bombers (again), thermonuclear megatonnage, antisubmarine capabilities, and missile throw weights. An influential group of Republican hawks, calling themselves the Committee on the Present Danger, declared the 1970s to have been a "decade of neglect" that opened a dangerous "window of vulnerability." According to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, speaking in 1987, an "enormous gap" had "emerged since 1970 between the level of Soviet defense activities and our own," though fortunately the Reagan administration had "managed to close much of this gap."[42] Still, as the Cold War passed through its waning years, government spokemen were warning that the country faced a Star Wars gap that could be closed only by spending vast amounts of money.

Although not every gap scare led directly to a corresponding U.S. response, the drumbeat succession of such episodes helped to sustain an atmosphere of tension, distrust, and insecurity that fostered the maintenance of an enormous ongoing arms program. Claims about gaps placed the burden of argument on relatively ill-informed opponents of military spending. Among the general public, mood substituted for information—a situation that well suited the purposes of the defense establishment.

Throughout the Cold War the national security elite—the president, the National Security Council (NSC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a few other military leaders, a few congressional leaders, high officials of the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), plus the heads of other intelligence organizations, various aides, arms contractors, scientists, and consultants, altogether a small group of persons among whom only the president and the vice-president held elective office—possessed a close hold on critical defense-related information. This situation sprang from origins in the National Security Act of 1947, which created the NSC and the CIA and "set in motion a cult of secrecy, a far more pervasive system of classifying information than had ever existed previously, and a growing executive determination to withhold sensitive information from the public and from Congress."[44] An NSC member once declared, "Policy decisions of the National Security Council are not a fit subject for public discussion."[45]

The need for a certain amount of secrecy was obvious to everybody, but many people suspected that, as Sidney Lens observed, "mostly, secrecy [was] used against the people of the United States."[46] Not only strategic decision making was kept secret. A substantial portion of the spending for weapons development, intelligence gathering, and covert operations was financed from a "black budget" that by the late 1980s amounted to more than $30 billion per year, entirely shielded from congressional and public debate. As Harvey Sapolsky noted, "what no one knows, no one can criticize."

\In view of their exclusive possession of critical information and their perceived need to "sell" their preferred policies to the public, the national security elite did not shrink from dissembling. As J. Russel Wiggins put

it, “Our government repeatedly resorts to lies in crises, where lies seem to serve its interests best.” This easily documented observation, which may shock some citizens even in our own, less gullible times, does not surprise political scientists. Lance Bennett has observed that “Information about public issues is an inherently political commodity. It is concealed, revealed, leaked, released, classified, declassified, jargonized, simplified, and packaged symbolically according to the political interests of those ubiquitous ‘informed sources’ who have a stake in the outcome of the issue in question.”[49] Manipulation of information is central to what modern governing elites do. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, himself no stranger to the inner sanctums of government power, observed that “knowledge is power, and the ability to define what others take to be knowledge is the greatest power.”\

The national security elite’s close hold on critical information would not have been particularly noteworthy if the interests of the elite and the interests of the public had corresponded closely. But nothing in the workings of U.S. political institutions ensured that a close correspondence would always exist, and abundant historical evidence shows that it frequently did not. Plainly, leaders of the defense elite had interests of their own—personal, political, institutional, material, and ideological—interests that they could serve through strategic retention, dissemination, or misrepresentation of the information to which they alone had access.

hey did not hesitate to exploit the advantages of their privileged access to information. The Iran-Contra affair and the Pentagon briberies and influence-peddling brought to light during the late 1980s were only the latest of a long series of actions shielded by self-serving mendacity. “The entire sequence of decisions concerning the production and use of atomic weaponry,” for example, took place “without any genuine public debate, and the facts needed to engage in that debate intelligently [were] officially hidden, distorted, and even lied about.”[52] Beginning in World War II the government operated a complex of facilities for manufacturing nuclear materials and weapons. These operations caused a variety of radioactive and other toxic contaminations of the surrounding air, water, and soil, yet the managers of the facilities repeatedly

misrepresented and lied about the hazards to citizens living nearby. In at least one case of huge significance—the so-called "green run" at Hanford, Washington, in 1949—the operators deliberately released a large quantity of nuclear materials, including some 7,780 curies of iodine 131, onto the unwitting residents of the surrounding area as part of an experiment.

Nothing in what I have just said means that the national security elite could do anything they wished. If they could have, retrenchments of the military establishment would not have occurred after the buildups. Certainly the steep decline of 1968-1976, especially its later phase, which defense interests stoutly opposed, would not have been so steep. The fact that the allocation of resources to defense did sometimes fall, and fall substantially, refutes radical arguments that allege the exercise of hegemony by the national security establishment.[54] Although one must appreciate the tremendous political resources possessed by the defense elite, it is possible—and not unusual—to overestimate its strength. It lost some political battles, too. That is why during the late 1980s, notwithstanding the preceding buildup, the defense share of GNP never exceeded 7 percent (Figure 2 above). Defense interests had the political savvy to appreciate that proposals or actions widely perceived as excessively grasping and strategically unjustified would be imprudent and counterproductive. More important, however, were the domestic factors that constrained the defense managers in spite of their unique control of information and their consequent ability to mold, rather than respond to, public opinion.

The biggest problem for defense authorities intent on exploiting ideology, controlling information, and molding public opinion arose from that proverbially inevitable duo: death and taxes. Those were the most evident forms taken by the costs of extensive commitments of resources to military purposes. Of the two, death was the more important. John Mueller fitted statistical models to public opinion data gathered during the Korean and Vietnam wars and found that, in both cases, "every time American casualties increased by a factor of 10, support for the war dropped by about 15 percentage points." Robert Smith reported

public opinion data showing that "complaints about taxes were high during the two limited wars and increased as the wars progressed."

As Smith's data illustrate, opportunity costs constantly constrained military activities throughout the Cold War. In the crisis of 1948 and immediately afterward Truman resisted recommendations for a huge increase in military spending facilitated by either increasing taxes or imposing economic controls because "he was convinced that these courses were not economically or politically feasible." In the wake of the Soviets' Sputnik success, Eisenhower opposed the Gaither Committee's recommendation for a big buildup because he had "a nagging fear that the American people would balk at paying the bill." Given this abiding popular resistance, it was only to be expected that, as Hugh Mosley noted, the Johnson administration "was reluctant to resort to increased taxes to finance the [Vietnam] war for fear of losing public support for its policy of military escalation."[60] Nixon was said to have "realized that for economic reasons (the war was simply costing too much) and for the sake of domestic peace and tranquility he had to cut back on the American commitment to Vietnam"; the retrenchment was "forced on [him] by public opinion." Jacques Gansler observed that during the 1970s "the will of the people, who were fed up with the war in Vietnam, was to devote all available resources toward improving the peacetime life of the nation." Yet at the same time rising real marginal tax rates inspired tax revolts, limiting the capacity of governments to supply more nonmilitary goods. Something had to give. Of the political factions struggling over the three grand categories of GNP, the pro-military faction proved the weakest, at least until 1979.

When the national security elite lacked persuasive rationales to present to the public, they could only draw on the pool of patriotism. But that was not a bottomless reservoir, and without replenishment from sources that the public could understand and support, it tended to run dry.[63] When it did, public opinion could not be effectively controlled by the authorities. As the opinion balance became strongly negative, it worked its way through political processes, reaching both Congress and the administration, to affect the allocation of resources to the military.

Figure 6, which is based on 193 comparable nationally representative surveys in which people were asked whether they would prefer that defense spending be increased, decreased, or kept the same, shows a summary variable, opinion balance, defined as the percentage of respondents wanting an increase minus the percentage wanting a decrease. Despite the gaps in the record, the figure shows clearly the positive (but sometimes just barely positive) support for increased spending in the 1950s and 1960s (through 1967), the strong preference for reduced spending at least from 1968 until the late 1970s, the strong support for increased spending from 1979 through 1981, and the substantial balance in favor of reduced spending thereafter.



FIG. 6. Public opinion balance on defense spending, 1949–1989.

Political histories also provide evidence that the wartime administrations reacted, with variable lags, to swings of public opinion. The Korean War made President Truman increasingly unpopular as it dragged on.[66] Eisenhower gained election to the presidency in 1952 largely on the strength of his promise to end the war, a promise he hastened to keep.[67] Johnson declined to seek reelection in 1968 because of mounting opposition to his war policy.[68] The Nixon administration devoted itself to winding down American participation in the fighting, ending the draft, and eventually withdrawing all U.S. forces from Vietnam, for which it was rewarded with a landslide reelection in 1972.[69] At the very peak of the Reagan buildup, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger complained that "new weapons can be developed by our adversaries . . . much more rapidly because [in the USSR] there are no funding restraints

imposed by public opinion."[70] Ultimately, not even the national security elite could control public opinion, which responded to the heightened opportunity costs of defense programs and actual warfare just as a rational consumer would move toward the northwest along a demand curve.[71]

CONCLUSION

The Cold War era witnessed a new relation of military activity to the political economy of the United States. Before World War II the allocation of resources to military purposes remained at token levels, typically no more than one percent of GNP, except during actual warfare, which occurred infrequently. Wartime and peacetime were distinct, and during peacetime—that is, nearly all the time—the societal opportunity cost of "guns" was nearly nil. The old regime ended in 1939. The massive mobilization of the early 1940s drove the military share of GNP to more than 41 percent at its peak in 1943-44.[72] Despite an enormous demobilization after 1944, the military sector in 1947, at the postwar trough, still accounted for 4.3 percent of GNP, three times the 1939 share. Following the Korean War, military purchases reached an unprecedented level for "peacetime" and, while fluctuating, remained at or above this elevated level ever afterward. During the period 1948-1989 military purchases cumulated to more than $7 trillion (1982 dollars), averaging about $168 billion annually, or 7.5 percent of GNP. The trend tilted slightly upward for absolute real spending, slightly downward for spending as a share of GNP. Increases in the military share of GNP during the Korean and Vietnam wars came entirely at the expense of the private share. The government nonmilitary share increased during the first two post-World War II military buildups and remained approximately constant during the third. Examining GNP*, defined as GNP minus all defense spending, one finds that this measure of national product often moved differently from conventional GNP. The largest discrepancies occurred during the early 1950s. These discrepancies suggest the desirability of reassessing the business cycle in its relation to economic well-being during those years. After the mid-1950s the difference between the growth rates of GNP and GNP* tended to diminish, becoming nearly negligible during the 1980s.

The high base level of defense spending during the Cold War resulted from the dominant ideology of global anti-communism, which called forth various foreign policy doctrines (e.g., the Truman Doctrine, massive retaliation, the Reagan Doctrine) and military commitments (e.g., NATO, bilateral defense treaties, U.S. military "advisers" in Latin America). The ideology alone, however, was an insufficient prop, and episodic crises played an essential part in maintaining public support for vast military expenditures. The national security elite warned of one "gap" after another, most of which turned out to be exaggerated or nonexistent. Given the secrecy in which much defense-related information was held, it was inevitable that the national security elite would use its unique access to information to promote its own interests, which were sometimes in conflict with public preferences. There were limits, however, and in the political struggles military interests sometimes lost. The authorities could not always effectively mislead the citizenry, especially when many deaths and increasing taxes (including unanticipated inflation) were involved. But the constraints on policymakers, being subject to informational and ideological displacement and responsive to perceived crisis, were themselves elastic and manipulable.

3.5 MANAGERIAL WAR AND PEACE MAKING NETWORK IN VARIOUS SCHOOLS OF THOUGHTS

Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is founded on the condition that each side's offensive weaponry surpasses the defensive capability of the other. Deterrence is thought by some to be stable so long as populations and industry remain vulnerable to the destructive capacity of the other side. If one subscribes to MAD, then it must follow that any movement to reduce vulnerability or enhance offensive capacity heightens the risk of war. Accordingly civil defense could play a dual role. Under ideal circumstances it might reduce casualties, but if thought to be too effective it could also destabilize the arms race, and under certain conditions heighten the potential for misinterpreting intentions.

It is well known that the Soviet Union has invested considerable effort to develop an effective civil defense system. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) notes that there is sufficient blast-resistant shelter space for the Soviet leadership at all levels (Weinstein, 1981). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assumes that the Soviet Union would not launch a preemptive strike without first protecting its own citizens (or at least reducing the number of anticipated casualties to tolerable levels), by evacuating the larger cities and population centers proximate to major industrial plants. It is estimated that it would take from 3 to 5 days to complete the process. Such large-scale population movements would be readily detected by U.S. intelligence sources interpreted as a warning of an impending nuclear strike. One response to this message, albeit an unlikely one, would be for the U.S. to launch a first strike directed at the highly vulnerable evacuees. A second, which was favored for some time by FEMA, would take advantage of the lead time afforded by the observed movements to relocate 145 million of our own citizens.

This so-called crisis relocation strategy has been roundly criticized for its lack of realism and the fact that only meager resources were devoted to its preplanning. Despite the apparent lack of support at the federal level for crisis relocation, unplanned evacuations may still be an important factor in determining the number and types of casualties that might be sustained as a direct result of war or indirectly as a product of the evacuation itself. It is interesting to note that the debate over crisis relocation presumes that evacuations are orchestrated primarily by FEMA. However, a spontaneous flight from areas thought to be targeted cannot be precluded, in the event of a sudden escalation in tension between the world's superpowers. It is highly unlikely, for example, that Soviet population movements, of the scale indicated above, would escape the attention of the news media. The question which then must be answered is how will U.S. citizens react? This is an area where lessons learned as a result of studying societal response to natural hazards and warnings, particularly earthquake prediction, may provide insights.

How people in general and people with disaster response roles respond to information about impending catastrophe has been the target of research

for three decades. The findings have been summarized (cf. Mileti, 1975; Williams, 1964) and suggest several principles that would affect the vulnerability of medical and health care systems to nuclear war.

People respond to situations of impending danger on the basis of their situationally defined perceptions of risk, and what they then believe to be appropriate response to those perceptions. Even without official government evacuation plans or sanctioned warnings of an impending nuclear exchange, news regarding related events could lead some people to perceive risk and evacuate to areas thought to be safe. Persons who are responsible for providing postimpact aid, such as health care professionals, might be motivated to evacuate personnel and supporting materiel in order to preserve their ability to provide assistance after the attack (cf. Mileti et al., 1981). Given Abrams' (1984) estimates of medical requirements, it is doubtful whether such behavior would alter the outcome.

The Direct And Immediate Impact Of War

The immediate effects of nuclear war, the completeness of the devastation it brings, and the detailed accounting of the expected human suffering have all been the subject of numerous studies. We begin with a war scenario which provides the basis for estimating the demands placed on the medical system, and sets the parameters for determining the direct and indirect economic impacts. The results are then reexamined in the context of what is known about organizational behavior and transformation.

Damage To Cities

Other papers in this volume have touched on many of the direct effects of a limited nuclear war. In order to avoid repetition we will briefly describe the scenario which is used as a point of departure for the issues raised in this paper. The following calculations are based on the Federal Emergency Management Agency's CRP-2B scenario which assumes that the United States is exposed to 6,559 megatons (Mt) of nuclear explosives targeted primarily at military installations and 250 centers of population exceeding 50,000.

In the absence of warning and any subsequent evacuation, about 125 million people would be caught within the 2-psi circles (geographic areas which sustain a blast overpressure of 2 pounds per square inch); nearly 58 million would be inside the 15-psi region (Haaland et al., 1976; p. 20). In preparing the scenario, defense planners anticipated the delivery of 843 1-Mt warheads. It is estimated that each ground burst would leave a crater 1,000 feet (about 305 m) in diameter and 200 feet (about 61 m) deep. All structures from the point of detonation to a distance of 0.6 miles (about 1 km) would be leveled. Within the band between 1.7 and 2.7 miles (about 2.7 and 4.3 km) (5 psi) only skeletal remains of commercial and residential multistory structures would be observed. The 2-psi circle, characterized by moderately damaged structures (cracked load-bearing walls, windowless, contents blown into the streets), would reach 4.7 miles (about 7.6 km) (Office of Technology Assessment, 1979; pp. 27-31).

Damage to Electronic Systems: Effects of Electromagnetic Pulse

In contrast to the effects of blast and fire, the electromagnetic pulses (EMP), generated as a result of airbursts, leave no visible signs. Nonetheless, in theory such pulses could be highly damaging to microcircuitry. Because of the partial test ban treaty (1963) and the highly sensitive nature of EMP to national security, there is little hard evidence to conclude just how much damage might be incurred. However, recent military interest in new communications technology, such as the $10 billion MILSTAR project, to protect against the effects of EMP suggests how serious the problem may prove to be. Although much of what is known about EMP either is classified as secret information or is highly speculative, the danger the phenomenon poses is very real. Telecommunications networks, information processing equipment, and highly sophisticated medical technology would be vulnerable and could be irreparably harmed by such a blast.1 The problems this pulse poses for electronic equipment are twofold. Electrical power grids would pick up the EMP and transmit a transient spike in voltage to equipment drawing power at the time of the detonation. The rapid rise in voltage would damage microprocessors in a

way similar to that resulting from lightning strikes. However, the rise in voltage would be typically 100 times faster, thereby rendering common surge protectors ineffective. Second, the electronic component itself could pick up the pulse and generate internally induced currents. The result could produce physical damage to the equipment.

High-altitude bursts (above 21 kin) produce EMP, which could blanket hundreds of thousands of square kilometers (Office of Technology Assessment, 1979; p. 22). A high-yield weapon detonated 200 miles (about 322 km) above Kansas would generate a pulse which would affect the entire country plus parts of Canada and Mexico. Furthermore, the entire region would be blacked out simultaneously, since the radiation produced by the explosion travels at the speed of light (p. 519). The economic and social ramifications of disrupting a highly developed electronic network would be staggering. Not a single facet of the economy would escape the effects of an interruption to the normal flow of communications, data retrieval, and the accompanying capacity to process vast amounts of information. Concern about the potential effects of EMP is new, and as a result little is yet known about the social and economic consequences which might be triggered.

Most large corporations have taken at least minimal steps to prepare disaster plans permitting them to carry on data processing functions in the event of sabotage or fire. Such plans normally involve securing the rights to utilize an alternative facility (e.g., sharing systems) and duplicating records on magnetic tape. Of course, this strategy will succeed only if the backup system is spared, an assumption which may be appropriate in the event of fire but less so given a nuclear exchange. Few corporations and governmental agencies, however, have actually taken steps to protect sensitive data processing equipment. These exceptions appear to be concentrated primarily in the financial sector and are prompted by considerations of liability as much as concern about social and economic impacts.2 Such protection is likely to fail, however, even in cases where an extreme amount of caution is exercised. For example, the Federal Reserve System, charged with the important task of tracking and controlling the nation's money supply, maintains a bombproof backup facility. However, this is the strongest link in the

network. Few other banks or their corporate clients can boast of such a capability. Hence, despite the fact that the Federal Reserve's computers would most likely survive the war, little data would be available for them to process. The viability of the nation's electronic funds transfer and recordkeeping system turns on the degree of protection afforded by all its participants.

The sensitivity of the nation's credit system to computer failure was demonstrated recently when Paul Volcker, Federal Reserve Board Chairman, revealed that "something in the nature of a computer glitch" left the Bank of New York $30 billion overdrawn (November 20, 1985). To quell fears, the Fed was forced to make an unprecedented loan of $22.6 billion to the New York bank, the interest on which amounted to more than $5 million per day. The loan, according to Volcker, was made amid "increasing evidence of potential problems at other institutions around the country," all part of the computer network involved in the purchase and sales of government securities. This is, of course, a rather mild event in contrast to the prospects of disruption due to a nuclear exchange. It does, however, underscore the sensitivity of these financial systems, inviting speculation as to how economic recovery might proceed in the event of a total collapse.

Direct Consequences for Medical Care

Abrams (1984), in pulling together a plausible set of projections regarding the direct effects of such an attack, provides a sobering view of the situation. Abrams' calculations are based on the assumption that the attack is sudden, leaving the victims no time to take protective actions. Furthermore, the need for health care assistance is based on preattack medical procedures. Beginning with the fact that 73 percent of the nation' s populace resides in areas assumed to be attacked, along with 80 percent of the country's medical supplies, it quickly becomes evident that the need for care would far outpace the medical resources which survive the attack. However, it is the extent of the imbalance which is so startling. He concludes that of the 93 million survivors, 32 million would require medical care.3

It is difficult to imagine how the estimated 48,000 physicians surviving the attack could cope with a workload which would tax 1.3 million (Abrams, 1984; p. 657). How long medical care organizations could continue to function effectively under such conditions is open to question. There is, however, a body of research regarding the sociology of organizations which suggests that cohesiveness and the will to carry on in such an overwhelmingly stressful environment would be a limiting factor in delivering care.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Discuss the Strategic Thinking and Implication on Economy.

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2. How do you know the Managerial War and Peace Making Network in Various Schools of Thoughts?

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3.6 LET US SUM UP

To date, international policy efforts to address the economic dimensions of intra-state conflict have largely focused on curtailing resource flows to combatants through global control regimes. Yet, the creation of robust regulatory frameworks addressing the global traffic of resources that make armed conflict feasible is a long-term objective. While important for structural conflict prevention, this approach offers comparatively few practical insights for confronting the immediate challenges of transforming war-ravaged countries, in particular those where lengthy conflict has distorted political and economic relationships in favor of the entrepreneurs of violence. Recent years have seen the end of conflict or major hostilities in Sierra Leone, Angola, Afghanistan, Liberia, the

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sudan, all conflicts in which violent struggles over natural resource wealth have figured prominently. Yet, there is still a lack of understanding as to whether and how the violent and illicit exploitation of natural resources and the pervasive criminalization of economic life during conflict create distinctive obstacles for designing and mediating peace processes and developing and implementing programs for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. Against this background, the International Peace Academy sponsored a conference at Wilton Park on "Transforming War Economies: Challenges for Peacemaking and Peacebuilding" on 27-29 October 2003. The conference expanded on the collaborative research efforts of the IPA's Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (EACW) program and drew on operational lessons learned by practitioners from Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and the DRC. By bringing together experts from academia, the UN system, governments, and civil society, the conference sought to discern the main legacies of war economies and their operational challenges for conflict resolution, and to identify strategic priorities for policy-makers engaged in peacemaking and peacebuilding. This report synthesizes the main themes arising from the panel presentations and ensuing discussions. It does not necessarily represent a consensus view. Presentations and comments made during the conference were not for attribution.

Recent academic and policy research has produced important new insights on the economic dimensions of contemporary civil wars.2 Most importantly, studies have pointed to a subset of civil wars that have become increasingly self-financing, as both rebels and governments, faced with a post-Cold War decline in superpower support, have sought alternative sources of revenue to sustain their military campaigns. Often centered on the predatory exploitation of lucrative natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, or narcotics, or the capture of trade networks, diaspora remittances, and informal economies, the resultant 'war economies' have become intricately linked with regional and global trade and finance networks, both licit and illicit . The extent to which these dynamics have qualitatively distinct legacies for conflict resolution and peacemaking remains an ongoing question of policy research. Preliminary analysis

suggests, however, that the political economy of armed conflict may, for various reasons, influence the effectiveness of policy tools such as targeted sanctions, third-party mediation of peace processes, and programs for demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Combatant self-financing may lead to a mutation in the character and duration of conflict, as economic considerations, while not the sole or even primary cause of conflict, become more important to some combatants than political factors. Quite apart from the petty criminality that typically accompanies warfare, contemporary conflicts have become systemically criminalized, as insurgent groups and rogue regimes engage in illegal economic activities either directly or through links with transnational criminal networks. The war economies fuelling conflict also thrive on linkages with neighboring states, informal trading networks, regional kin and ethnic groups, arms traffickers and mercenaries, as well as legally operating commercial entities, each of which may have a vested interest in the prolongation of conflict and instability. 3 Access to lucrative resources and smuggling networks may prolong conflict, as weaker parties can avoid 'hurting stalemates' by generating finances necessary to continue hostilities. Particularly where armed groups depend on lootable resources, such as alluvial diamonds, drugs, or coltan, there is a greater risk that conflict will be lengthened by the consequent fragmentation and fractionalization of combatant groups, as internal discipline and cohesion is undermined.4

3.7 KEY WORDS

Militarism: Militarism is the belief or the desire of a government or a people that a state should maintain a strong military capability and to use it aggressively to expand national interests and/or values.

Defensive: used or intended to defend or protect.

Offensive: causing someone to feel resentful, upset, or annoyed.

3.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. How do you know the Militarism and the Society?
2. Discuss the Economic Cost of Defensive and Offensive Arms Race.
3. Discuss the Strategic Thinking and Implication on Economy;
4. How do you know the Managerial War and Peace Making Network in Various Schools of Thoughts?

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3.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 3.2
2. See Section 3.3

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 3.4
2. See Section 3.5

UNIT 4: PEACE MOVEMENT: AN OVERVIEW

STRUCTURE

4.0 OBJECTIVES

This Unit would enable you to know:

- Comprehend the Concept of Peace Movements
- Trace the history and role of Peace Movements across Nations
- Strengthen the ethos of peace, negating the recourse to violence in both domestic and international milieu.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

"Peace is indispensable for the very survival of mankind".

Maintenance of domestic and international peace is imperative today. The two World Wars have taken the toll of humanity. Ensuring a genuine and stable peace is the major challenge facing the nation states today. However, since the end of the Cold War, efforts to establish a World without Arms and Armed Conflict have in-fact failed. There have been numerous intra-state and inter-state conflicts across states. The most affected being the states in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The long drawn conflict in West Asia, between Israel and the States backing the Palestinian(s); the India-Pakistan conflict have resulted in perennial tension and uncertainty pervading not only within the affected states, region but also the international arena. It is in this light that the establishment of Peace and Peace Movements attain relevance and significance. There have been several Peace Movements in different parts of the world, yet a world sans conflict is still a far cry. Though the United Nations (UN) has, to an extent, played a major role in fore-stalling another world war the several conflicts waged/still raging in different countries/regions, manifest the lack of a sincere effort by Nations to abjure violence. It is in these circumstances that the role of Peace Movements across nations becomes very important today.

4.2 WHAT IS A PEACE MOVEMENT?

A Peace Movement is a social movement that seeks to achieve ideals such as the ending of a particular war/conflict (or all wars/conflicts), minimise inter-human violence in a particular place or type of situation,

often linked to the goal of achieving world peace. The means to achieve these ends include advocacy of pacifism, non-violent resistance, diplomacy, and boycott, moral persuasion, supporting anti-war political candidates, demonstrations and forming / using National Political Lobbying groups to create legislation. The Political Cooperative is an example of an organisation that seeks to merge all Peace Movement organisations and green set ups, which may have some diverse goals, but all of whom have the common goal of peace and human(e) sustainability. Some refer to the global loose affiliation of activists and political interests as having a shared purpose and this constituting a single movement the peace movement encompassing the anti-war movement. Viewed in this light, the two are often indistinguishable and constitute a loose, reactive event-driven collaboration between groups with motivations as diverse as humanism, nationalism, environmentalism, anti-racism, anti-sexism, decentralisation, hospitality, ideology, theology and fear.

4.3 THE DUALITY OF PEACE CONCEPT

The concept of peace has two connotations- negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace is defined as not only the absence of organised violence between such major human groups as nations, but also between racial and ethnic groups because of the magnitude that can be reached by internal wars. Positive peace is defined as a pattern of cooperation and integration between major human groups. Absence of violence should not be confused with absence of conflict. Violence may occur without conflict and conflict may be resolved by means of non-violent mechanisms. The distinction between these two types of peace gives to a four fold classification of relations between two nations.

a) War which is organised group violence;

b) Negative peace, where there is no violence but no other form of interaction either, and where the best characterisation is peaceful coexistence;

c) Positive peace where there is some cooperation with occasional outbreaks of violence and unqualified peace;

d) Unqualified peace, where absence of violence is combined with a pattern of cooperation.

The concept of peace as non-war is neither theoretically nor practically interesting, for example, in describing the relationship that obtains between Norway and Nepal; it can often be explained in terms of a low level of inter-action resulting from geographical distance and thus will hardly be identified by many as ideal relations worth striving for. For peace, like health, has both cognitive and evaluative components; it designates a state of system of Nations, but this state is so highly valued that institutions are built around it to protect and promote it. It is the concept of Positive Peace that is worth exploring, especially since negative peace is a condition, sin-qua-non; and the two concepts of peace may be empirically related, even though they are logically independent. In the absence of solid empirical research and a coherent peace theory, the concept of peace can be explicated by means of examining peace thinking. Just as there is no lack of attention paid to war, so there is no scarcity of peace plans and an extensive typology would be needed to do justice to most of the latter. Peace is a problem of social organisation and the theory of peace and war will hopefully someday, subsumed under the general theory of social organisation.

4.4 DIVERSITY OF IDEALS

There is much confusion over what peace is or should be which results in a plurality of movements seeking diverse ideals of peace. Particularly, anti- war movements have often ill-defined goals. It is often not clear whether a movement or a particular protest is against war in general, as in pacifism, or against one side's participation in a war (but not the others). Indeed some observers feel that this lack of clarity has represented a key part of the propaganda strategy of those seeking victory as in the Vietnam War. Global protests against the US invasion of Iraq in early 2003 are an example of a more specific short-term and loosely affiliated single-issue movement with relatively scattered

ideological priorities, ranging from absolutist pacifism to Islamism and anti- Americanism. Nonetheless, some of those who are involved in several such short-term movements and build up trust relationships with others within them do tend to eventually join more global or longterm movements. In direct contrast, some elements of the global peace movement seek to guarantee health security by ending war and assuring what they see as basic human rights including the right of all people to have access to air, water, food, shelter and health care. Large cadres of activists seek social justice in the form of equal protection under the law and equal opportunity under the law for groups that have previously been disenfranchised. The movement is primarily characterised by a belief that humans should not wage war on each other or engage in violent ethnic conflicts over language, race or natural resources or ethical conflict over religion or ideology. Long term opponents of war preparations are primarily characterised by a belief that military power is not the equivalent of justice. The movement tends to oppose the proliferation of dangerous technologies and weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons and biological warfare. Moreover, many object to the export of weapons including hand –held machine guns and grenades by leading economic nations to lesser developed nations. Some like SIPRI, have voiced special concern that artificial intelligence, molecular engineering, genetics and proteomics have even more vast destructive potential. Thus there is not only an inter-section between Peace Movement and Neo-Luddites or primitivism, but also with the more mainstream technology critics viz as the Green Parties, Green Peace and the Ecology Movement they are part of. It is one of several movements that led to the formation of the Green Party political associations in several democratic countries near the end of the 20th Century. The Peace Movement has a very strong base in some countries, Green Parties, such as in Germany, perhaps reflecting that country's negative experiences with militarism in the 20th Century.

4.5 HISTORY OF PEACE MOVEMENTS BY REGION

The history will begin with the countries that suffered during World War II and which effectively began the post-war period in a position of submission and wrote peace into their constitutions. Next will be the English-speaking States of the world and the arguments more familiar to the English speaking reader, which inter-sect with the current events most strongly, and are the current focus of the peace movements world-wide.

4.5.1 Germany

Green Parties and related political associations were formed in many democratic countries near the end of the 20th century. The peace movement has a very strong influence in some countries' Green Parties' viz., Germany. These sometimes have exercised decisive influence over policy, during 2002, the German Greens influenced German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, by their control of the German Foreign Ministry under Joshka Fishher (a green and the single most popular politician in Germany at that time), to limit his involvement in the war on terrorism and eventually to unite with French President Jacques Chirac, whose opposition in the UN Security Council was decisive in limiting support for the US plan to invade Iraq.

4.5.2 Israel

The Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflict have existed since mid-nineteenth century creation of Zionism; however since the 1948 formation of the state of Israel by the Allied Powers led by the US and the UK, the West Asian region has been in turmoil. After the formation of Israel, the non-Jewish population who were living there since a few centuriespost the exodus of the Jews to different parts of the world, have been ejected and rendered homeless. Infact the Palestinians have become refugees living on the periphery of Israel and on the banks of the river Jordan for long. The struggle of the Palestinian people that witnessed decades of violence and suffering has ultimately led to the establishment of the Palestine State. However, the belligerent stance of Israel, its occupation of Palestinian and other Arab lands, its regular establishment of Settlements in occupied Palestine has rendered the region sans stable

peace. It is significant to note that not-withstanding this policy of the Israeli state, peace movements and efforts to establish peace in the region have been essayed even by organisations based in Israel. Infact the Palestinian issue is so critical that securing stable peace and the establishment of the Rule of Law, equity and justice for the Palestinians is mandatory for regional/international peace and stability.

4.5.2.1 Peace Now

The mainstream peace movement in Israel is Peace Now (Shalom Akshav), whose supporters tend to vote for the Labour Party or Mere. Peace Now was founded in the aftermath of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, when many people felt that the chance for peace might be missed. PM Begin, acknowledged that the Peace Now rally in Tel Aviv at the eve of his departure for the Camp David Summit with Presidents Sadat and Carter- drawing a crowd of 1,00000 the largest peace rally in Israel until then- had a part in his decision to withdraw from Sinai and dismantle Israeli settlements there. Peace Now supported Begin for a time and hailed him as a peace-maker, but turned against him when withdrawal from Sinai was accompanied by an accelerated campaign of land confiscation and settlement building in the West Bank. During the war against Lebanon in 1982, Peace Now, under the aegis of the Committee Against the Lebanon War, held large protests, which drew several Peace Now grassroots activists. Also, Peace Now members who had been drafted-for the war- called the movement leadership from the front line, giving eye witness testimonies on the false-hood of government propaganda on the conduct of the war. This resulted in Peace Now changing its position and launching an intensive campaign against the war. The Sabra and Shatila massacre in September 1982, precipitated an unprecedented week of protest demonstrations throughout Israel, dozens of demonstrators being dispersed with tear gas and hauled to detention in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. It culminated with Peace Now's 4,00000 rally in Tel Aviv, the largest gathering of any kind in Israel's history up to then, which ultimately led to the establishment of the Kahan Judicial Commissioin of Inquiry whose half a year of deliberations led to the impeachment of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon for indirect

responsibility for the massacre. Peace Now is an advocate for a negotiated peace with the Palestinians. Originally this was worded vaguely; with no definition of the Palestinians are who represents them. Peace Now joined the dialogue with the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO), started by such groups as the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace and the Hadash Communist Party. Only in 1988, did Peace Now accept that the PLO is the body regarded by the Palestinians themselves as their representative. During the first Intifada, Peace Now held numerous protests and rallies to protest the army's cruelty and call for a negotiated withdrawal from the occupied territories. At that time, Peace Now strongly targeted then Defence Minister Yitzak Rabin for his rigid stance against the Palestinian protesters. However, after Rabin became Prime Minister, he signed the Oslo Agreement, shook hands with Yasser Arafat (Palestinian Leader) on the White House Lawn, Peace Now strongly supported him and mobilised public support for him against the settlers increasing vicious attacks. Peace Now had a central role in the 4th November 1995 rally after which Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, an extreme-right wing militant. Since then the annual Rabin memorial rallies, held every year at the beginning of November, have become the main event of the Israeli Peace Movement, drawing crowds in the tens or hundreds of thousands. While officially organised by the Rabin Family Foundation-Peace Now's presence in these annual rallies is always conspicuous. Now a days, Peace Now is particularly known for its relentless struggle against the expansion of illegal settlement outposts on the West Bank. Dror Etkes, head of Peace Now's Settlement Watch is highly regarded for his meticulous work and on one occasion was invited to testify before a US Congressional Committee at Washington DC.

4.5.2.2 Gush Shalom and the Israeli Council for Israeli Palestinian Peace(ICIPP)

Gush Shalom, the Israeli Peace Bloc, is a radical movement to the left of Peace Now. In its present name and structure, Gush Shalom grew out of the Jewish Arab Committee against Deportations, which protested the deportation without trial of 415 Palestinian Islamic activists to Lebanon

in December 1992, and erected a protest tent in front of the Prime Minister's Office, for two months until the government consented to let the deportees return. Members then decided to continue as a general peace movement with a programme strongly opposing the occupation and advocating the creation of an independent Palestine side by side with Israel in its pre-1967 borders (The Green Line) and with an undivided Jerusalem serving as the capital of both states. While existing under the name Gush Shalom only since 1972, this movement is in fact the lineal descendant of various groups, movements and action committees which espoused much the same programme since 1967, and which occupied the same space on the political scene. In particular, Gush Shalom is the descendant of the Israeli Council for Israeli Palestinian Peace (ICIPP) which was founded in 1975. The ICIPP founder included a group of dissidents from the Israeli establishment, among them was Major General Mattiyahu Peled, who was member of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff during the 1967 Six-Day War and after being discharged from the army in 1969, turned increasingly in the direction of peace. The major achievement of the ICIPP was the openings of dialogue with the PLO, with the aim of making Israelis understand the need of talking and reaching a peace deal with the Palestinian Terrorists and conversely making Palestinians aware of the need to talk to and eventually reach deal with The Zionist Enemy. Infact after the signing of the Oslo Agreement in September 1993, meetings with the PLO became not only legal but also official government policy. Members of Gush Shalom (into which the ICIPP merged), who came to meet Yasser Arafat found themselves rubbing shoulders with senior Israeli government officials. Another Gush Shalom campaign involves the boycott of settlement products, with a detailed list of industrial and agricultural products maintained on the Gush Shalom website, with the public in Israel and abroad called upon not to consume such products- since the proceeds go to strengthen the settlements which are the main obstacle to peace in West Asia. Unlike Peace Now, Gush Shalom persistently supports Conscientious Objectors and those who refuse to render military service to the occupation. At present, Gush Shalom activists are mainly involved in daily struggle at the Palestinian West Bank villages which

have their land confiscated by the separation barrier, erected ostensibly to stop suicide bombers and actually to implement the de-facto annexation of large tracts of land to Israel and to make them available for settlement expansion. Gush activists are to be found, together with those of other Israeli movements like Ta'Yush and Anarchists against the Wall, joining the Palestinian villagers of Bil'in in the weekly non-violent protest marches held to protest confiscation of more than half of the village lands. Although Gush Shalom earned itself respect among peace-seeking Israelis as well as in the US and Europe, it is regarded by mainstream Israelis as a purely pro-Palestinian movement. This is not surprising given the enormous campaign waged against the movement in the Israeli media, with Gush Shalom's own voice hardly being given an opportunity to be heard. Gush Shalom's position was and remains that all people have the right to self-determination and to oppose foreign rule and occupation, and that the Palestinians have this right no less than Israelis, had it when they launched an uprising against British Colonial rule between 1945- 1947, and the Americans exercised it between 1775 and 1781. That in no way gives the right to attack the civilian population of the oppressor nation, and such attacks deserve all condemnation. Both sides to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as long as it has not been resolved, must adhere to that rule, and avoid harming civilians. (It is less known, either in Israel or internationally, that the number of Palestinian children killed in IDF attacks and raids since 2000 are three times the number of Israeli children killed in Palestinian suicide bombings).

4.5.3 Canada

Canada has a diverse peace movement, with coalitions and networks in many cities, towns and regions. The largest cross-country umbrella coalition is the Canadian Peace Alliance (CPA) whose 140 member groups include large city-based coalitions, small grassroots groups, national and local unions, faith, environmental, and student groups, with a combined membership over Four Million Canadians. The Canadian Peace Alliance has been a leading voice, along with its member groups opposing the The War on Terror. In particular, the CPA opposes Canada's complicity in what it views as misguided and destructive US

Foreign Policy. Canada has also been home to a growing movement of Palestinian solidarity, marked by increasing number of grassroots Jewish groups opposed to Israel's policies, in many cases likening them to Apartheid War Crimes, and Ethnic Cleansing. The Canadian Peace Congress (1949- 1990) was a leading organiser in the peace movement for many years particularly when it was under the leadership of James Gareth Endicott who was its President until 1971.

4.5.4 United Kingdom (UK)

The National Peace Council (NPC) was founded in 1908 after the 17th Universal Peace Congress in London (July/August 1908). It brought together representatives of a considerable number of national voluntary organisations with a common interest in peace, disarmament and international and race relations. The primary function of the NPC was to provide opportunities for consultation and joint activities between its affiliated members, to help create an informed public opinion on the issues of the day and to convey to the government of the day the views of the substantial section of British life represented by its affiliated membership. The NPC folded in 2000 to be replaced in 2001 by the Network for Peace, which was set up to continue the networking role of NPC. Post World War-II, Peace Movement efforts in the UK were initially focused on the dissolution of the British Empire and the rejection of imperialism by the US and the USSR. The antinuclear movement sought to opt out of the Cold War and rejected such ideas Britain's Little Independent Nuclear Deterrent (BLIND) in part on the grounds that BLIND was in contradiction even with Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Anti-nuclear campaigning in the early 1950's was at first focused on the small Direct action Committee (DAC) who organised the first Aldermaston Marches in 1958. The DAC were later to merge into the much larger Committee of 100 (Committee for Nuclear DisarmamentCND). The formation of CND tapped widespread popular fear and opposition to nuclear weapons following the development of the first hydrogen bomb, and in the late 1950s and early 1960s anti-nuclear marches attracted large followings, especially to the annual Aldermaston March at Easter. However as the Committee of 100 had a non-

hierarchical structure and no formal membership, many local groups sprang up calling themselves Committee of 100. This helped in the promulgation of civil disobedience but it produced policy confusion and, as the decade progressed, the Committee of 1200 groups engaged in actions on many social issues not directly related to war and peace. The Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC), led by Tariq Ali, mounted several large and violent demonstrations against the Vietnam War in 1967-68 but the first anti-Vietnam demonstration was at the US Embassy at London that took place in 1965. The peace movement was later associated with the Peace Camp Movement as Labour moved more to the centre under Prime Minister Tony Blair. By early 2003, the peace and anti-war movement, mostly grouped together under the banner of Stop the War Coalition, was powerful enough to cause several of Blair's cabinet to resign, and hundreds of Labour Members of Parliament to vote against their government. Blair's motion to support militarily the US plan to invade Iraq continued only due to support from the UK Conservative Party. Protests against the invasion of Iraq were particularly vocal in UK. Polls suggested that without the UN Security Council approval, the UK public was very much opposed to involvement, and over two million people protested in Hyde Park, London.

4.6 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)

Although there was a substantial organised resistance to foreign wars in the US since the nation's origins, this was often simply an outgrowth of non-interventionism or religious pacifism and not in general a coherent mass movement with unified goals until after World War II. These movements were dismissed by most in the US Foreign Policy establishments as impractical as the country entered the Cold War era (1948-1990). Some peace groups viz as the United World Federalists, hoped to secure world peace through integrated world government.

4.6.1 The Peace Movement in World War II

Opposition to World War II was limited in the US but included the War Resisters League, the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Catholic Worker Movement.

4.6.2 The Cold War: The Forties and Fifties

With the Cold War tensions rising, the Progressive Party became a home for the peace movement. Like the American Peace Mobilization before the war, they were accused of harbouring communist sympathies. In the election campaign of 1948, the Progressive Party supported appeasement of the Soviet Union and a ban on Nuclear weapons. They opposed the Berlin airlift and the Marshal Plan. They received over one million popular votes but no electoral votes. There was a relatively small amount of domestic protest relevant to the Cold War in the 1950s, which witnessed a large build up of both nuclear and conventional weapons both in the US and the Soviet Union. The lack of protest was in part due to McCarthyism (General MacArthur raised the ante of anti-communism through his rabid stance on the military front and in the field against the Communists and Communism as an ideology per-se) and the general disdain for those who did not view communist expansion as a threat. It was at this time that the Eisenhower administration developed the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). According to this notion, the two super-powers' possession of nuclear weapons was viewed as a deterrent that would prevent any such war from taking place. MAD became a central doctrine to the US Foreign Policy to contain communism. One may reasonably date the open and public resistance to this process to the departing comments of Eisenhower (1960), who warned that the US was in peril of being politically dominated by a militaryindustrial complex. During the Kennedy era, it was a white knuckled nuclear brinkmanship with the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962). However, the signing of the Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Arms Control talks of the 1960s was a shot in the arm for the pacifists.

4.6.3 The Anti Vietnam War Movement 1962-1975

The peace movement in the 1960's in the US succeeded in bringing an end to the Vietnam War. Lyndon Johnson, not running for re-election as

President, was the direct result of the anti-war protests across the US. Some advocates in this movement advocated unilateral withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam to avoid further bloodshed and ease tension in the region. The opposition to the Vietnam War tended to unite groups opposed to US's anticommunism, imperialism and colonialism and for those involved in the New Left, capitalism itself, such as the Catholic Worker Movement. Others, as Stephen Spiro opposed the war based on the theory of Just War. Advocates of the US withdrawal were known as doves and they called their opponents hawks. High profile opposition to the Vietnam War turned to street protests in an effort to turn the US political opinion against the war. The protests gained momentum from the Civil Rights Movement that had organised to oppose segregation laws, which had laid a foundation of theory and infrastructure, on which the anti-war movement grew. Protests were fueled by a growing network of independently published newspapers (known as under-ground papers) and the timely advent of large venue musical festivals as Woodstock and Grateful Dead Shows, attracting younger people in search of generational togetherness. The Anti-war protests ended with the final withdrawal of troops after the Paris Peace Accord was signed in 1973. Momentum from the protest organisations became a main force for the growth of an environmental movement in the US.

4.6.4 The Eighties and Nineties

During the 1980s, the US peace activists largely concentrated on slowing the super-power arms race in the hope that it would reduce the possibility of nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union. As the Reagan administration accelerated military spending and adopted a tough stance vis-s vis the Russians, the peace groups via Nuclear Freeze and Beyond War sought to educate the public on what they believed was the inherent risk and cost of such a policy. Outreach to individual citizens in the Soviet Union and mass meetings, using then-new satellite link technology, were part of peace making activities in the 1980s. The US peace-makers' priorities during the Nineties included seeking a solution to the IsraeliPalestinian impasse, belated efforts at humanitarian assistance to war-torn regions such as Bosnia and Rwanda and mitigating

the harm caused by the UN sanction on Iraq. These sanctions upto 2003, led to the deaths of about 500,000 children from fully preventable causes including common infections and malnutrition. The American peace activists brought medicine into Iraq in defiance of US law, in some cases enduring heavy fines and imprisonment in retaliation. Some of the principal groups involved were Voices in the Wilderness and Fellowship of Reconciliation.

4.6.5 The Iraq War

Before, during, and after the War in Iraq began, a concerted protest effort existed in the US. In March 2003, just before the US and British military invasion of Iraq, a protest mobilisation called, The World Says No to War led to as many as 5,00,000 protestors in cities across the US. Since the occupation of Iraq, several protest organisations have persisted in the US against the US policies in Iraq. US activist groups including United for Peace and Justice, Women Say No To War (CODE PINK), Military Families For Peace, (MFFP), Military Families Speak Out (MFSO), Not in Our Name, Answer Veterans for Peace and The World Can't Wait, continue to protest against the Iraq War. Methods of protest include rallies and marches, impeachment petitions, the staging of a War Crimes Tribunal in New York (to investigate crimes and alleged abuses of power of the Bush administration), bringing Iraqi women to tour the US and tell their side of the story, street theatre and independent filmmaking, high profile appearances by anti-war activists as Scott Ritter, Dahr Jamail, resisting military recruiting on college campuses, withholding tax payment, letter-writing to legislators and newspapers, blogging, music and guerilla theatre. Independent media producers continue to broadcast pod cast and web host programmes about the movement against the Iraq war

4.6.6 The Threat of Military Action against Iran

Beginning in 2005, opposition to military action against Iran started in the US, the UK and elsewhere, including the creation of the Campaign against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran. By August 2007, fears of an imminent US and /or Israeli attack on Iran had increased to

level that several Nobel Prize winners, along with several anti-war groups including the Israeli Committee for a Middle East Free from Atomic and Biological and Chemical Weapons, Campaign For Nuclear Disarmament, CASMII, CODE PINK and many others, warned about what they believed was the imminent risk of a war of an unprecedented scale, this time against Iran, especially expressing concern that an attack on Iran using nuclear weapons had not been ruled out. They called for the dispute about Iran's nuclear programme to be resolved through peaceful means, and a call for Israel, as the only Middle Eastern State suspected of possessing Nuclear Weapons, to join the –Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.

4.6.7 Domestic Peace Movement in the USA

The Peace Movement in the US is perhaps less popular in the media but supported by vast numerous professionals in several areas, viz Gang Violence Prevention, Domestic Abuse Counseling, Violence against Children Awareness, and Character Education in Primary Schools. Gang violence prevention is primarily a regional effort led by Local Law Enforcement and Special Programmes within Schools. Domestic Abuse Counselling is supported by several non-profit organisations. Violence against Children Awareness, Character Education is a growing programme in American primary school education, recognised as a pillar of strength in the foundation of US society along with strong family support. Character education resources are used broadly to shape young minds.

4.6.8 Day of Silence for Peace

Also known as the Peace Movement the Day of Silence for Peace follows the tradition of rallies that use silence to be noticed. Participants wear a piece of white cloth across their mouths with Peace written on it to symbolise their unity and readiness to change their world. It means they are tired of the status-quo and are willing to challenge it. It hopes to achieve unity and a sense of empowerment for its participants- including the knowledge that they can have an impact without traveling to the far

corners of the earth. The first Day of silence was observed on 23rd October, 2003.

4.7 INDIA

The greatest Peace Movement in the World was led by the apostle of Peace M.K. Gandhi to rid India of British Colonial Rule. India attained independence from British rule by a peaceful and non-violent movement of the people. Gandhi's technique of Ahimsa and Satyagraha caught the imagination of mankind and has been and is replicated in several protest movements across the world. Infact the mighty British were forced to grant independence in 1947, due to the power of peaceful protests of the people of India transcending region, caste and religion. Though there were a few aberrations, the non-cooperation and civil disobedience methods adopted by Gandhi were basically peaceful techniques. The British did leave India but left it divided by partitioning it and creating Pakistan. Over the past decades there has been conflict and a trust deficit between the two countries. However, for peace to prevail in the region it is important that the people, civil society and champions for peace compel the governments of both the countries to work out a peaceful solution to all outstanding problems, in the interest of stable peace in the South Asian Region.

In the domestic milieu, the two regions Kashmir and the North-East have witnessed violent conflict leading to death and destruction over decades. The people of Kashmir and the NorthEast seem to be hapless victims of history and are caught between the violence of the insurgent/separatist tendencies, as also the counter action by the men in uniform. Several groups and members of the civil society have been yearning and urging both the sides to end the saga of confrontation and work towards a peaceful resolution of all the issues in contention, politically and through dialogue. In this regard, the efforts of groups in the North-East viz the Naga Mothers Association, Naga HoHo Church Organisations and other Civil Society groups have been responsible for the holding of cease-fire in the state, since 1997. However, a permanent solution to the problem in the North-East is still elusive. Both the insurgent groups-operating in different parts of the North-East- and the government have to seek a

peaceful solution to the problems facing them. It is imperative to state that no problem can ever be solved by the recourse to force/arms. The need of the hour today in Kashmir and the North-East is to ensure stable peace and secure the confidence of the people living there. In this direction, it is important for the government to end/ re-orient its policy of using excessive force to suppress dissent. In this direction a re-look at the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958, operative in these two regions is merited. It is time that the concerned heed to the call of all right thinking people to do away with the draconian provisions of this Act that has led to several innocent people being subjected to pain and suffering. The peaceful protest/fast in Manipur by Irom Sharmila, since 2001(almost a decade), for lifting of this Act has now become the focal point of the peace movement against all kinds of violence and atrocities being perpetuated in the region.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Define Peace Movement and elucidate its characteristics.

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2. Write about the duality of the peace concept.

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3. Detail the ideals underlying peace movements.

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4. Write in brief the history of the peace movement in:

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(a) Germany

(b) Israel

(c) Canada

(d) United Kingdom (UK)

(e) United States of America (US)

(f) India

4.8 LET US SUM UP

If peace movements do end wars, does that mean protests are futile? Definitely not. Indeed peace movements have shaped history. The list begins with setting limits on war makers. In raising the cry Never Again peace organisations played an important role in bringing about the Geneva conventions against the kind of chemical weapons used in the First World War, just as the campaign for nuclear disarmament helped insure there would be no repeat of the slaughter at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Peace activists helped create climate that led to a series of Nuclear Arms Limitation Treaties, beginning with the Atmospheric Test Ban of 1963 and running through the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties of the 1970s. Peace movements are also important in laying down demands for a just peace. They were especially powerful at the end of the two World Wars, when diplomats were under strong pressure to create a world worthy of wartime sacrifice. Peace movements took seriously the extravagant promises of a World Safe for Democracy and Deal for a New World and they demanded redemption of these pledges in industrial democracy, Full employment and racial equality. They pressured framers of the UN to prevent future wars by creating international machinery to resolve disputes and by removing the social and economic grievances believed to be the root cause of war. Peace movements are also important players in the struggle over the distribution of resources. The struggle over resources leads peace movements towards social justice. As Martin Luther King observed Peace is not the absence of conflict, it is the presence of Justice. Of course, peace and justice movements are no more effective in ending social injustice than in ending wars, but they can be important weights in the social balance of power.

What are the lessons for today? It seems unlikely that peace movement will stop the Iraq War any time soon, let alone the permanent war on terror that started in Afghanistan and Iraq a few years ago and will expand to who knows where? Linkage between peace and economic justice would expand the ranks. At the very least, today's movement can do what peace movements have always done- claim the moral high ground by affirming life over death.

4.9 KEY WORDS

Peace Movement: A peace movement is a social movement that seeks to achieve ideals such as the ending of a particular war, minimize inter-human violence in a particular place or type of situation, and is often linked to the goal of achieving world peace.

4.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Define Peace Movement and elucidate its characteristics.
2. Write about the duality of the peace concept.
3. Detail the ideals underlying peace movements.
4. Assess the relevance and importance of peace movements today.

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4.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 4.2
2. See Section 4.3
3. See Section 4.4
4. See Section
   a) 4.5.1
   b) 4.5.2
   c) 4.5.3
   d) 4.5.4
   e) 4.6
   f) 4.7

UNIT 5: THEORIES OF PEACE AND CONFLICT

STRUCTURE

5.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this Unit, you will be to understand:

- the major theories and the theorists' contributions to the development of the discipline of conflict transformation; and
- the theoretical underpinnings of conflict transformation.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The discipline of conflict transformation became an established field in the late 1980s and 1990s, having a distinctive theory, concepts, tools and models. However, the roots of the field go much beyond the 1990s and draw on the concepts of conflict management and conflict resolution. The conflict transformation school asserts that conflicts are always in a flux, in a constant state of change and the aim is to transform them into

something socially useful and non-destructive. Conflict, therefore is a dynamic and changeable process and the process which seeks to alter conflict must be equally dynamic and changeable. Conflict transformation also asserts that some conflicts are better off being transformed, rather than being resolved.

5.2 THEORIES OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

The theorists of conflict transformation draw on a wide variety of conceptual building blocks, some of which are borrowed from other schools, some are old and yet some others are recent. The theories of conflict transformation reflect both differing paradigms and different types of intervenors (state and non-state, internal and external). The functionalist school of thought represented by Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser are one intellectual source that informs the field of conflict transformation. Both these thinkers had stressed on the positive social function of conflict. Simmel (in his extended essay, Conflict, published in 1955) articulated that conflict has an integrative nature as it brings together disparate and contending influences. He saw it as a source of social cohesion and creativity. Coser (The Functions of Social Conflict, 1956) too believed that conflict served specific and useful social functions. In 1968, he wrote: Conflict is not always dysfunctional for the relationship within which it occurs; often conflict is necessary to maintain such a relationship. Without ways to vent hostility toward each other, and to express dissent, group members might feel completely crushed and might react by withdrawal. By setting free pent-up feelings of hostility, conflicts serve to maintain a relationship. Conflict thus served the function of maintaining established social relationships. Besides, it had another purpose as well: Conflict not only generates new norms, new institutions … it may be said to stimulating directly in the economic and technological realm. Economic historians often have pointed out that much technological improvement has resulted from the conflict activity of trade unions through the raising of wage levels. (1957) Coser, therefore, focused on both the functional and dysfunctional role of conflict. He contended that conflict breaks people out of old and

dysfunctional habits, serving a positive social function. Yet another school of thought that enlightens the field of conflict transformation is that of structural theory, which entails the idea of conflict formation and its analysis. The most influential work in this school of thought was that of Johan Galtung's. Another significant contribution to the discipline of conflict transformation has come from the theorists on non-violence such as Gene Sharp. Nonviolent resistance is seen as an integral part of conflict transformation that offers one possible approach to achieving peace and justice. Edward W. Azar's work on protracted social conflicts has also had an important influence on conflict transformation theory, wherein he offered an explanation for the protracted quality of contemporary conflicts. However, one of the most comprehensive works on the application of the field of conflict transformation is that of John Paul Lederach's.

5.2.1 Gene Sharp

Sharp recognises that conflict in society and politics is inevitable, and in many cases, desirable. Some conflicts can be resolved by 'mild methods' such as negotiation, dialogue and conciliation – methods that basically involve compromise. However, these methods are feasible only when the issues at stake are not fundamental. In "acute conflicts", the fundamental issues are or are believed to be, at stake; such conflicts are not suitable for resolution by compromise because hostile violence may be applied to impose oppression, injustice, dictatorship or even to threaten survival. In these circumstances, it is unreasonable to aim for a "win-win" resolution. In fact in 2003 Sharp said, "Brutal dictators and perpetrators of genocide do not deserve to win anything." The usage of violence in conflicts cannot be eliminated by protests against such violence. If violence is not an option in acute conflicts, Sharp says, "There has to be a substitute means of conducting the conflict powerfully with the chance of success equivalent to or greater than the violent option." He further elaborates: A very important clue that such an alternative is possible lies in the fact that the strength of even dictatorships is dependent on sources of power, in the society, which in turn depend on the cooperation of a multitude of institutions and people……..Such a substitute for violent conflict is a

realistic option..……This technique is called nonviolent action or nonviolent struggle. This is 'the other ultimate sanction'. In acute conflicts it potentially can serve as an alternative to war and other violence. Sharp categorises non-violent action into three methods: protest and persuasion, noncooperation and non-violent intervention. Protest and persuasion are actions that highlight the issue in contention and/or a desired strategy for responding to the situation. Specific methods include petitions, leafleting, picketing, vigils, marches, and teach-ins. Non-cooperation is an action in which protestors refuse to participate in the behaviour to which they object socially, economically and/or politically. Sanctuary, boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience are some of the specific non-cooperation methods. Non-violent intervention is a technique in which protestors actively interfere with the activity to which they are objecting such as sit-ins, fasts, overloading of facilities, and parallel government. The usage of nonviolent methods is not a guarantee of success; there are requirements for achieving success with this technique. Two crucial special processes that may be present in some nonviolent conflicts, but not in everyone are: "(1) an ability to defy and at times reverse the effects of repression, and (2) an ability to undermine and sever the sources of power of the opponents." Gene Sharp's "mechanisms of change" (1973) is a process by which change is achieved in successful cases of nonviolent struggle. The four mechanisms of change are conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion and disintegration. Changes of attitude lead the opponent to make concessions voluntarily because it is right to do so – this process is known as conversion. However, Sharp feels that conversion happens rarely as a result of non-violent struggle. Accommodation takes place more often, wherein the opponent is forced to agree to a compromise because of the withdrawal of political and economic cooperation. Non-violent coercion takes place when the defiance and noncooperation is strong and skillfully targeted and the sources of the opponent's power are sufficiently weakened; the opponent is thus left with no option but to capitulate. In some rare cases, the defiance and non-cooperation is massive and the severance of the sources of opponents' power is so complete that the regime falls apart – this is known as disintegration.

Proponents of principled non-violence favour the process of nonviolent conversion. But the strategic school of non-violence opines that it is unrealistic to apply the process of conversion to acute political conflicts, such as inter-ethnic rivalries, that are likely to have high levels of polarisation and antagonism. Conversion can most likely occur in conflicts arising out of misperceptions but when human needs are involved, rulers are unlikely to yield to persuasion. Moreover, conversion is an inter-individual mechanism; it would be difficult to translate conversion to large-scale conflicts as that would require the conversion of all the opponent's troops, supporters and elites (Sharp 1973). Planning a nonviolent uprising is almost similar to devising a military campaign: it starts by identifying an opponent's "pillars of support" and areas of vulnerability. Here the political and psychological factors of power are emphasized, such as undermining the opponent's sources of authority, and increasing division in its base of support. A special process that may operate during a nonviolent struggle to change power relationships is referred to as "political jiu-jitsu" by Sharp. Here the opponent's violent repression against nonviolent resisters is turned to operate politically against the opponents, weakening their power position and strengthening that of the nonviolent resisters. This can only operate when violent repression is met with continued nonviolent defiance. This may result in shifting of opinion among third parties, the general grievance group and even the opponent's usual supporters. These shifts may produce withdrawal of support for the opponents as well as increased support for the nonviolent resisters leading to widespread condemnation of the opponents, internal opposition among the opponents and increased resistance. These changes can produce major shifts in power relationships in favour of the nonviolent resistance group. However, political jiu-jitsu does not operate in all cases of violent struggle and when it is absent; the shift of power relationships depends highly on the extent of non-cooperation. Thus Sharp's strategic approach is helpful in establishing a link between non-violence theory and the transformation of conflicts.

5.2.2 Adam Curle

The Conflict Progression Model conceptualised by Adam Curle (1971) facilitates an analysis of the dynamics and progression of conflict. Curle's model is based on the premise that conflict is never static or linear but moves along a continuum from an unpeaceful to a peaceful relationship (see Figure 1). The progression is charted out in a matrix that compares two key elements: the level of power between the parties in conflict and the level of awareness about the conflict. The matrix helps intermediaries and stakeholders to locate, at any given point, where the conflict is situated and consequently, what might be the appropriate approaches to peacebuilding.



The Progression of Conflict
Source: Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock Press, 1971).

Figure 1: The Conflict Progression Model

The first quadrant represents a situation of latent conflict. Here people are unaware of the power imbalance and the injustice prevalent in relationships/institutions/structures. Educators and activists, who work to "conscientize" the masses, play an important role. As people become aware of the denial of their legitimate needs and rights, and begin to assert these, the conflict moves into the second quadrant – the stage of confrontation and becomes "overt". As the parties begin to realise that they can neither impose their will on, nor eliminate, the other side, they agree to negotiate and the groups reach a stage of "strategic power balance". However, this balance of power is often shaky. Moreover, the progression is seldom linear (in reality moving back and forth between the negotiation and confrontation stages). But this is a very simplistic interpretation and conflicts might never follow this progression. Some

might never reach the negotiation stage and get caught in a cycle where negotiations consistently break down and violence resumes. Negotiations often fail because the parties in conflict lock themselves into position making, seldom articulating their "needs and values", at least in the initial stages. People's "core values and needs" cannot be negotiated and the challenge therefore lies in helping the conflictants to accept the other's needs and to try to move to a place where these can be respected. Consequently, the challenge for those working to transform conflict lies in how best to prevent the negotiations from lapsing into open confrontation, and how to support the process so that it reaches the stage of "sustainable peace".

5.2.3 Terrell A. Northrup

According to Northrup, conflict resolution is based on four assumptions: parties to conflict are rational; misperception constitutes a central cause of conflict; conflict resolution principles apply across social settings (such as interpersonal, organisational, national, international); and high value is placed on peaceful resolution. Northrup centres the evolution of the school of conflict transformation on the rejection of these assumptions. She contends that the parties to conflict may be rational but they are rational in different cultural contexts. Therefore, for Northrup, rationality is a culturally specific phenomenon. Secondly, the idea of misperception "does not seem powerful enough or a deep enough notion to deal with drastic differences in world views." Additionally, simple misperception fails to explain long-festering and deeply entrenched conflicts. Thirdly, she points out that conflicts may go through various stages and each stage may demand a different treatment at different points of time. Finally, she observes that many parties may be interested in continuing the fight rather than switching to peace; in such a case peaceful resolution may not be an alternative at all.

5.2.4 Edward Azar

The concept of protracted social conflict developed by Azar has had an important influence on conflict transformation theory. Protracted social conflicts are on-going, deep-rooted and seemingly unresolvable. Azar

has concentrated on the genesis and maintenance of protracted quality of contemporary conflicts. The concept of protracted social conflict can be used as a theory of conflict transformation to show the formation as well as transformation (or deformation) of protracted conflicts (Hugh Miall). The formation of a protracted conflict can be traced to the historical context, to the denial of basic human needs of access, identity and security, as well as to the roles played by the state, international political and economic linkages and the military in politics. If the state and communal groups choose suppression and violent rebellion as their strategies, the conflict may become destructive. Destructive conflict further results in a dependent and exploitative pattern of development, a distorted pattern of governance and a militarised form of politics. This leads to an added denial of basic needs. The result is a protracted cycle of institutional deformation and destructive conflict. On the other hand, if there is sufficient capacity in governance and society, if politics is not too militarised, and if the international environment is supportive, states may instead choose accommodation, and communal groups may choose political forms of confrontation. This can lead to a pattern of constructive conflict that in turn will promote legitimate decision-making capacity, strengthen autonomous development and sustain civil rather than military politics. All these are conducive to the meeting of basic needs. Azar has thus contributed to conflict transformation theory by suggesting how patterns of conflict interact with the satisfaction of human needs, the adequacy of political and economic institutions, the choices made by political actors and how different options can lead to benign or malignant spirals of conflict.

5.2.5 Raimo Vayrynen

In 1991, Vayrynen argued for an analytical conflict theory based on the idea of transformation, stressing that it is important to understand how conflicts are transformed in dynamic terms: The bulk of conflict theory regards the issues, actors and interests as given and on that basis makes efforts to find a solution to mitigate or eliminate contradictions between them. Yet the issues, actors and interests change over time as a

consequence of the social, economic and political dynamics of societies. He suggested four types of transformation:

- Actor transformations – internal changes in parties, or the appearance of new parties;
- Issue transformations – altering the agenda of conflict issues;
- Rule transformations – changes in the norms or rules governing a conflict;
- Structural transformations – the entire structure of relationships and power distribution in the conflict is transformed.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. What is Gene Sharp's strategic non-violence? How can his strategic non-violence transform power relations in a violent conflict situation?

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2. What is Adam Curle's Progression of Conflict? How is it related to conflict transformation?

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3. What is Azar's protracted social conflict?

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4. What is the impact of Raimo Vayrynen's conflict?

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5.2.6 David W. Augsburger

All cultures and societies have created pathways for channeling conflict. Augsburger therefore looks at different cultures to see what they can teach concerning conflict transformation, for the objective in most non-western cultures is to manage differences and resolve disputes in a way that will restore friendly relations and maintain harmony in interpersonal relations. In several traditional societies, conflict avoidance is a basic orientation and in some of them conflicts are dealt with based on face-saving (e.g. Chinese society where harmony is seen as the goal of human society). In such situations, confrontation is avoided but there is no genuine resolution of conflicts. In 1992, Augsburger pointed out: The more harmony-oriented that a group is, the more conflict-sensitive the group will be; the more committed the group to practicing the cultural value of harmony, the more intensely conflict will be internalized. Augsburger defines conflict transformation as the task "to reopen the future for the parties to the dispute in ways that empower them to move back into responsible relationships." Conflict transformation requires a metamorphosis in each of the three elements: transforming attitudes ("by changing and redirecting negative perceptions"), transforming behaviour ("by limiting all action to collaborative behaviour"), and transforming the way the conflict is structured ("by seeking to discover, define, and remove incompatibilities by creative design"). Augsburger further cautions that an understanding of the forms which conflict takes in each culture does not necessarily ensure the transformation of conflicts without violence, but no real conflict transformation can take place without an understanding of the cultural roots of the ways in which conflict is expressed.

5.2.7 Johan Galtung

Conflicts have life-affirming as well as life-destroying aspects and they are formed from contradictions in the structure of society. They then become manifest in attitudes and behaviour. Galtung suggested that

conflict could be viewed as a triangle (see Figure 2), with attitude (A), behaviour (B) and contradiction (C) at its vertices.



Figure 2: Conflict Triangle

Contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived 'incompatibility of goals' between the conflict parties. In a symmetric conflict, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between them. In an asymmetric conflict, it is defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship. Attitude includes the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and themselves and can be either positive or negative. However, in violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of each other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Attitude includes these three elements: emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (will). Behaviour can include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying hostility or conciliation.

Violent conflict behaviour is characterised by threats, coercion and destructive attacks. All the three components have to be present together in a conflict. Conflict is a dynamic process wherein structure, attitudes and behaviours are constantly changing and influencing each other. A conflict formation takes place with the emergence of a conflict as the parties' interests come into conflict or the relationship they are in become oppressive. Parties then organise around this structure to pursue their interests and develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour. This leads to the growth and development of conflict formation, drawing in other parties and deepening and spreading, resulting in secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders who get pulled in.

This complicates the task of addressing the original, core conflict. Finally, the resolution of the conflict must involve a set of dynamic changes that involve a de-escalation of conflict behaviour, a change in attitudes and transforming the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure. The transformational processes therefore include several things: articulation or disarticulation, conscientisation or de-conscientisation, complexification or simplification, polarisation or depolarisation, escalation or de-escalation. The incompatibility which arises between parties may be eliminated by transcending the contradiction, by compromise, by deepening or widening the conflict structure, and by associating or dissociating the actors. Another concept that was the brainchild of Galtung was the notion of cultural violence.

Galtung distinguished between direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence depending on how it operated. Direct or overt violence involves direct strikes (verbal or non-verbal) against others and it intends to do actual harm. It emerges as a response to the experience of structural violence. Structural violence emerges out of the creation of social structures and institutions that deprive some people of their rights and the ability to satisfy their basic human needs. In this case, systems discriminate between groups, communities and nations to the point of threatening lives and livelihoods. Galtung categorised structural violence into two: vertical and horizontal. When people are repressed politically, exploited economically and alienated culturally by structures, systems or institutions, it is vertical structural violence. The needs that are violated in this case are freedom, well-being and identity. On the other hand, horizontal structural violence denies the need of identity by keeping people who want to live together apart and people who want to live apart together. In cultural violence the intention is to harm, even kill directly but through words and images. Cultural violence is used to justify direct or structural violence. Direct violence can be ended by changing conflict behaviours, structural violence can be brought to an end by removing structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence can be ended by changing attitudes. Galtung therefore contributed substantially

to the discipline of conflict transformation specifically by devising and defining several key concepts and developing the conflict triangle model.

5.2.8 John Paul Lederach

Lederach is of the view that conflict is experienced as a disruption in the natural flow of relationships, in which we most often tend to focus on the immediate "presenting" problems and look for a solution to the presenting problems without seeing the underlying causes and forces (the bigger map) of the conflict. He thus suggests that we must look at conflict with a different lens. Three lenses can help create a bigger map:

- A lens to see the immediate situation (the content);
- A lens to see beyond the presenting problems toward the deeper patterns of relationship (the context); and
- A conceptual framework that connects the immediate situation with the deeper relational patters (the structure of relationships). Conflict transformation thus seeks to create a framework to address the content, the context and the structure of relationships.

Lederach defines conflict transformation thus: Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships. Lederach's definition touches upon several key aspects and notions of conflict and conflict transformation. First of all conflict is envisioned as a natural, normal and continuous dynamic within human relationships; it brings with it the potential for constructive growth. For positive change, engagement with this opportunity is necessary. Secondly, conflict has a rhythm and pattern; there is escalation and de-escalation. Next, conflict flows from and returns to relationships, making relationships the centre of conflict transformation. Relationships have visible and invisible dimensions, immediate and long-term issues and transformation must

pay heed to all of them. Additionally, conflict creates life because it is the motor of change that keeps relationships and social structures honest, alive and dynamically responsive to human needs. Furthermore, conflict transformation pursues the development of change processes that explicitly focus on creating positives from the negative and improving relationships. Lederach sees peace-building as a long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system. The key dimensions of this process are changes in the personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of conflict. For John Paul conflict and change both are a reality and conflict impacts situations and changes things in these four broad categories:

· Personal: Minimise destructive effects of social conflict and maximise the potential for growth and well-being in the individual at the physical, emotional, intellectual and spiritual levels;

· Relational: Minimise poor communication, maximise understanding and work with fears and hopes related to emotions and interdependence in the relationship;

· Structural: Understand and address root causes and social conditions that give rise to violent and other harmful expressions of conflict and promote non-violent mechanisms; and

· Cultural: Identify and understand the cultural patterns that contribute to the rise of violent expressions of conflict and build upon resources for constructively responding to and handling conflict. John Paul envisions peacebuilding as a process – one that incorporates different functions, roles and strategies employed by different people at different stages of conflict progression. He articulates this in the form of a pyramid (see Figure 3) on the basis of where individuals (the conflicting parties and peacebuilders) are located in a system and the approaches that work best in a particular sector/level of society.



Figure 3: The Pyramid

The pyramid captures the overview of how an entire affected population in a setting of internal armed conflict is represented by leaders and other actors, as well as the roles they play in dealing with the situation. The pinnacle, or top-level leadership, represents the fewest people, in some instances perhaps only a handful of key actors. The grassroots base of the pyramid encompasses the largest number of people, those who represent the population at large. On the left-hand side of the pyramid are the types of leaders and the sectors from which they come at each level. On the right-hand side are the conflict transformation activities that the leaders at each level may undertake. The pyramid lays out the leadership base in three major categories: top level, middle range and the grassroots. The pinnacle represents the top-level leadership or track one (policy makers, politicians, military people, diplomats) and the base represents grassroots workers (members of indigenous NGOs, psychologists working with trauma victims etc.) The middle-range leadership comprises of individuals representing NGOs, educational institutions, humanitarian

and relief organisations, the academia and the media. The grassroots-level leadership represents the voices of people who are directly affected by the conflict and for whom issues of livelihood are crucial. Individuals/groups at each level of this pyramid use different and unique methodologies to contribute to the processes of transformation. Top-level peace-building is characterised by high profile peace missions led by diplomats, negotiations between government representatives etc. At the middle-level, peace-building (also known as the "middle-out" approach) comprises of problem solving workshops, conflict resolution training etc. It is difficult for the top-level to arrive at creative solutions because it often gets locked in position-making and is under tremendous pressure to maintain a "position of strength" vis-a-vis adversaries and its own constituencies. The middle-level leadership is connected to both the grassroots and the top-level leadership and this is its biggest strength. Leadership at this level is not necessarily based on political or military power and this gives intermediaries greater flexibility and room to maneuver. Thus the middle range, if integrated properly, might provide the key to creating an 'infrastructure' for achieving and sustaining peace. The pyramid was one of the first models that dealt with middle range peace-building and was thus seen as an important contribution by John Paul to the field of conflict transformation.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Discuss the David W. Augsburger's thought.

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2. What is Galtung's conflict triangle?

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3. What are the lenses of conflict transformation according to Lederach? In what areas does conflict impact change?

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5.3 LET US SUM UP

The theories of conflict transformation are either analytical and interpretative (Azar and Vayrynen as they attempt to explain the formation and transformation of contemporary conflicts), or they are prescriptive (Curle and Lederach as they offer peacebuilders a means to conceptualise the path from conflict towards desired outcomes). Galtung's approach is an attempt to synthesise the two. Sharp was not explicitly talking in terms of conflict transformation but he was necessarily concerned with achieving success and bringing change in violent conflict situations where fundamental issues are at stake, through the usage of nonviolent means. The field of conflict transformation is relevant to most contemporary violent conflicts as they are asymmetric, protracted and complex. Therefore, conflict transformation theorists argue that contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes. The very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships. Conflict transformation is the process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, and if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict. It sees constructive conflict as a catalyst for change. It also recognises that conflicts should be transformed gradually and should include a variety of actors.

Peace Movement (1950s/60s)

The Peace Movement of the post-World War Two period was the first of the modern social movements in Europe and America. The peace movment did not grow up over night, in the most famous example of Vietnam, the movement had a very small and unmentioned following for the first 5 years or more; it took time to become a mass movement of

millions capable of temporarily halting the U.S. war machine. The impact and significance of the peace movement can be seen into the 21st century, when peace movements start, small and as yet marginalised, *before the war itself*! Before the peace movements of the 1950s-60s, anything but patriotism in times of war was called treason and people would be imprisoned, exiled, or murdered (even in so-called "democracies"), today, a peace movement is *expected* to spring up with the onset of any new battle ground in the never ending war of capitalist exploitation.

Historical Development: Anti-war movements have arisen in modern times around many failing military adventures; during the First World War, Anti-War and Anti-Conscription Campaigns built to a considerable size in almost all of the countries affected. However, the U.S. dropping of the Atom Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 (killing 150,000 civilians instantly, and countless millions of Japanese civilians in the past 50 years; continuing through the generations in a silent genocide), and the testing of bombs by the Soviet Union in 1949 and Britain in 1952 set off huge protest movements, chiefly in Britain and the U.S., whose governments *wielded* and proved their willingness to use these weapons of mass destruction. Thus, although the Peace Movement of the 1950s and early 1960s in most respects resembled the Anti-War Movements of earlier times, it was unique in being a response to a *danger* rather than actual human suffering. It is further distinguished in the conscious and systematic development of tactics of **non-violent action** and in the role it played in the initiation of a whole series of social movements which unfolded in to two decades following.

In 1954, the British pacifist, philosopher and mathematician, Bertrand Russell, made a broadcast on the BBC condemning the US A-Bomb test on Bikini Island. Later, he joined with longstanding anti-war camapigner Albert Einstein to organise a conference of Nobel Prize winners (including scientists from both sides of the "Iron Curtain") at Pugwash in 1957 which called for the destruction of Nuclear Weapons. This led to the founding of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (C.N.D.), which became a by-word for mass, non-violent protest marches. Russell himself resigned form CND in 1960 to found the more

militant Committee of 100 whose aim was to incite **civil disobedience**, and this campaign passed over into **Anti-Vietnam War Movement**.

Although, historically, it is far from unusual for broad social movements to be initiated by prestigious individuals, this feature of the Peace Movement of the 1950/60s is marked. The Mainau Declaration of July 15 1955 was signed by fifty-two Nobel Prize winners, and addressed itself to the governments of the world. This was a very conservative period of time: the Cold War was at its height, the McCarthyite witchhunts in full swing and with living standards recovered from the War and unemployment at an all-time low, labour militancy was at a low level. Activists in the Peace Movement included Marxists, Communist Party members, trade unionists, Quakers, admirers of Mahatma Gandhi and other pacifists and young professional people and students. While for some, the one and only issue was the cycle of mass destruction which had blighted the world since 1914, for others, the issues were much wider, but in the political conditions of the time (including jailing and execution of Communist Party members in the U.S.), the Peace Movement provided an opportunity to break through the conservative stanglehold.

In the U.S., Albert Einstein and Linus Pauling were among the first to speak out, and the Movement reached its peak as it merged with the Civil Rights Movement. When students returned to their studies after the summer of 1964, the Universities exploded in student protests against the University administrations which were concerned with educational and "free speech" issues; but it was the methods and the passions of the Peace Movement and the Civil Rights Movement which brought about this explosion. These student protests were to spread to almost every country in the world throughout the late 1960s, merging with the **Anti-Vietnam War Movement**.

Peaceful Coexistence

Peaceful Coexistence was the foreign policy of the Soviet Union started after WWII towards Imperialism, which wanted peace with the capitalists by abandoning the work of leading revolutions in the imperialist countries.

Since Lenin's first day in office, the Soviet government made every effort to establish peace with capitalist nations, *while at the same time* encouraging the workers of these countries, primarily through organisations like the Communist International, to overthrow their capitalist governments. The ideology of Peaceful Coexistence stipulated that helping workers to revolt would hamper the peace process with capitalism.

Historical Development: After WWII the Soviet Union was utterly devastated by the strength of the capitalist German war machine. Over 40 million Soviet citizens were slaughtered, hundreds of cities utterly decimated, tens of thousands sq. km. of the nation's most fertile land burned and pillaged. The U.S. and it's allies built a military organization called NATO, to fight against the Soviet Union, facing the nation with an overwhelming superiority of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union could not afford war.

The actually implementation of Peaceful Co-existence began around 1943, when the Comintern was dissolved in order to secure a war-time pact with the Allies.

The ideology of "peaceful coexistence" was first fully enunciated following the Twentieth Congress at which Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin's crimes. Khrushchev explained the doctrine of 'peaceful co-existence' to a reception at the Albanian Embassy in April 1957, in this way:

'In our relations with the capitalist countries we steadfastly adhere to Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence. ...

'We shall never take up arms to force the ideas of communism upon anybody. We do not need to do that, for the ideas of communism express the vital interests of the popular masses. Our ideas, the ideas of communism have such great vitality that no weapon can destroy them, that not even the nuclear weapon can hold up the development of these progressive ideas. Our ideas will capture the minds of mankind. The attempts of the imperialist to arrest the spread of the ideas of communism by force of arms are doomed to failure. ...

'The countries of our socialist camp, united by a single aim, by unshakeable fraternal friendship, are strong both ideologically and

materially. We have the armed forces necessary to defend our socialist gains and protect the peaceful labour of our peoples. But we frequently declared and again repeat that we are ready on mutually reasonable principles to disarm on a still larger scale. ...

'for forty years now Messrs the capitalists have been reiterating that ... private ownership is omnipotent. We affirm that the ideas of communism are incomparably stronger, that these ideas will ultimately prevail. Therefore, we repeat again and again: let us compete, let us coexist peacefully'.

The reasoning behind the policy was Khrushchev's aim to "catch up and overtake" the West in economic development, and thereby prove the superiority of the soviet system, as he explained in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1959:

'The Soviet Union and all the socialist countries have opened up for humanity the road for a socialist development without war on the basis of peaceful collaboration. The conflict between the two systems must and can be resolved by peaceful means ... Coexistence is something real, flowing from the existing world situation of human society ... Several well-known personalities, and in the first place President Eisenhower, want to find ways of reinforcing peace'

The elements of the strategy of "peaceful coexistence" were as follows:

1. 'Socialism in one country': Up to certain point, the achievements of the economy of the USSR and the deformed workers' states were astounding. The whole world saw the Sputnik in the sky above them on 4th October 1957, while US rockets were still exploding or falling over on prime time television. Yuri Gagarin circled the Earth in April 1961. The Soviet military arsenal was formidable, and output of steel, oil, natural gas and basic heavy industries approached that of the capitalist powers. But cut off from the world economy, the Soviet economy could never reach the level of a developed capitalist economy which exists within a world market and world-wide division of labour. Moreover, the bureaucratic planning of international exchange of commodities with the other countries in the

Soviet bloc was quite inadequate. The Soviet Union needed to get involved in the world market, and for that it needed US collaboration.

2. The Communist Parties in the capitalist world had to subordinate the needs of the workers they represented to those of Soviet diplomacy and found themselves to the right of the peace movement in advocating bilateral disarmament. They touch with the younger generation and Stalinist trade union officials became the policemen of the unions.
3. The "Iron Curtain": Isolated and blockaded by imperialism, peaceful co-existence meant socially and politically sealing off from each other the people of the workers' states and the people of the capitalist world. The erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 divided Germany for decades. This isolation added to economic stagnation and political and cultural backwardness.
4. The National Liberation Movements were supported against imperialism, but at the price of becoming bargaining chips in Soviet diplomacy. The sell-out of the victorious Vietnamese Revolution at Geneva in 1954 was the most tragic example. While the US provided troops and the most modern weapons to their clients, the USSR supplied the national liberation movements with only sufficient weaponry to serve the purpose of tying down the imperialists.
5. The Arms Race: Military might was a substitute for political struggle. The USSR had to compete in nuclear weaponry with the most powerful economy in the world, imposing a crippling burden upon the Planned Economy, which has no need of the 'stimulus' of war production.
6. It meant continued bureaucratic political suppression of the working class within the Soviet bloc.

The policy failed to dissuade the US from its policy of Cold War, and triggered the Sino-Soviet dispute. Far from "catching up and overtaking" the West, the Soviet economy went into decline.

5.4 KEY WORDS

Conflict: A conflict is a clash of interest. The basis of conflict may vary but, it is always a part of society. Basis of conflict may be personal,

racial, class, caste, political and international. Conflict in groups often follows a specific course.

Progression: Progression may refer to: In mathematics: Arithmetic progression, sequence of numbers such that the difference of any two successive members of the sequence is a constant Geometric progression, sequence

5.5 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Briefly discuss the main strands/schools of thought that have directly contributed to the development of the theory of conflict transformation.
2. What is Adam Curle's Progression of Conflict? How is it related to conflict transformation?
3. What is Gene Sharp's strategic non-violence? How can his strategic non-violence transform power relations in a violent conflict situation?
4. What is Azar's protracted social conflict?
5. What is Galtung's conflict triangle?
6. Discuss the notion of direct, structural and cultural violence as laid out by Galtung.
7. What are the lenses of conflict transformation according to Lederach? In what areas does conflict impact change?
8. In Lederach's pyramid, who are the actors and what are the corresponding approaches?

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5.7 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Sub Section 5.2.1
2. See Sub Section 5.2.2
3. See Sub Section 5.2.3
4. See Sub Section 5.2.4

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Sub Section 5.2.5
2. See Sub Section 5.2.6
3. See Sub Section 5.2.7

UNIT 6: CONFLICT ANALYSIS: STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES

STRUCTURE

6.0 OBJECTIVES

After studying this Unit, you should be able to:

- Understand and examine the various methods of Conflict Analysis
- Identify the key elements in conflict Analysis

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of 'Conflict' continues to be an elusive one in spite of efforts by peaceresearchers and social scientists to clarify it. The common preoccupation with the phenomena of conflict necessitates theoretical work on basic concepts of analysis so that different perspectives and different observations can be brought together. Much work still remains to be done; but an increasing number of insights have been gained in modes of conflict analysis races, though little has been achieved in the field of conflict resolution. The different modes of analysis are brought together under three headings. There are approaches which emphasize (1) conflict dynamics, (2) needs-based conflict origins, and (3) rational, strategic calculations. These constitute distinct forms of

analysis. However, they do intersect and many writers use them interchangeably.

What is conflict analysis?

Conflict analysis is the systematic study of the profile, causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict (see Section 2). It helps development, humanitarian and peacebuilding organisations to gain a better understanding of the context in which they work and their role in that context. Conflict analysis is not an "objective" art. It is influenced by different world-views. The Harvard Approach, the Human Needs Theory and the Conflict Transformation approach are frequently used: 1. The Harvard Approach emphases the difference between positions (what people say they want) and interests (why people want what they say they want). It argues that conflicts can be resolved when actors focus on interests instead of positions, and when they develop jointly accepted criteria to deal with these differences. 2. The Human Needs Theory argues that conflicts are caused by basic "universal" human needs that are not satisfied. The needs should to be analyzed, communicated and satisfied for the conflict to be resolved. 3. The Conflict Transformation approach sees conflicts as destructive or constructive interactions, depending on how conflicts are dealt with or "transformed". Conflicts are viewed as an interaction of energies. Emphasis is given on the different perceptions, and the social and cultural context in which reality is constructed. Constructive conflict transformation seeks to empower actors and support recognition between them. Summary of conflict analysis tools 1. Conflict Wheel: Introduces six important dimensions of conflict analysis (dynamics, actors, causation, structures, issues and options/strategies). It organizes the other conflict analysis tools and is a "meta" tool. 2. Conflict Tree: The conflict tree deals with the difference between structural and dynamic factors, visualizing how conflict issues link these two aspects. 3. Conflict Mapping: The conflict mapping focuses on actors and their interrelationships. It is a good tool to start analyzing a conflict. Power asymmetry can be represented by the relative size of the actors circles. Animosity and alliances are symbolized with lines. 4. Glasl's Escalation Model: The model aims to fit our conflict intervention strategy to the conflict parties' escalation level. The message is that it

may be pointless to talk to a suicide bomber, or shoot people who are shouting at each other. Conflict analysis can be carried out at various levels (eg local, regional, national, etc) and seeks to establish the linkages between these levels (see Fig 1). Identifying the appropriate focus for the conflict analysis is crucial: the issues and dynamics at the national level may be different from those at the grassroots. But while linking the level of conflict analysis (eg community, district, region or national) with the level of intervention (eg project, sector, policy), it is also important to establish systematic linkages with other interrelated levels of conflict dynamics. These linkages are important, as all of these different levels impact on each other. 5. INMEDIO's Conflict Perspective Analysis (CPA): The Conflict Perspective Analysis (CPA) focuses on the different perspectives of the various parties. By putting them side by side, one can see where there are differences and things in common. CPA follows the phases of a mediation. It is a good preparation for a mediation, can also be used to coach one conflict party. CPA does not look explicitly at structures or context. 6. Needs-Fears Mapping: Similar to the CPA, this method focuses on actors and their issues, interests, needs, fears, means and options. It allows for a clear comparison of actors similarities and differences in the form of a table. 7. Multi-Causal Role Model: This model focuses on causation, on the different quality of reasons, triggers, channels, catalysts, and targets. Content and actors, dynamics and structures are also considered.



In order to understand a given context it is fundamental to identify potential and existing conflict causes, as well as possible factors

contributing to peace. Conflict causes can be defined as those factors which contribute to people's grievances; and can be further described as: • structural causes – pervasive factors that have become built into the policies, structures and fabric of a society and may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict • proximate causes – factors contributing to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, sometimes apparently symptomatic of a deeper problem • triggers – single key acts, events, or their anticipation that will set off or escalate violent conflict

What is the political, economic, and socio-cultural context? eg physical geography, population make-up, recent history, political and economic structure, social composition, environment, geo-strategic position. What are emergent political, economic, ecological, and social issues? eg elections, reform processes, decentralisation, new infrastructure, disruption of social networks, mistrust, return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), military and civilian deaths, presence of armed forces, mined areas, HIV/AIDS. What specific conflict prone/affected areas can be situated within this context? eg, areas of influence of specific actors, frontlines around the location of natural resources, important infrastructure and lines of communication, pockets of socially marginalised or excluded populations. Is there a history of conflict? eg critical events, mediation efforts, external intervention. Note: this list is not exhaustive and the examples may differ according to the context

6.2 FOCUSING ON CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Most of the analysis in this section has already been discussed in Unit 1. Nevertheless, it is important to rewind some of them for understanding the conflict dynamics. The classic understanding of conflict sees it as a dynamic phenomenon; one actor is reacting to what another actor is doing, which leads to further action. Quickly, the stakes in the conflict escalate. One sequence of events follows another, and it is difficult to decipher which party is more responsible for what happens. In popular understanding it is expressed as 'it takes two to conflict'. There are many observations which evoke this theme, notably the prevalence of mirror

images, that parties and issues are seeing the conflict in the same way, only reversing the picture. There are also dynamics pushing the actors in conflicts into two camps (polarisation), creating commanding leadership (centralisation), and forming institutions with particular responsibilities and little insight (secrecy and protection). The conflict takes on a life of its own, engulfing the actors and, seemingly irresistibly, pushing them into an ever-increasing conflict. The idea of conflict as a social phenomenon moving by itself is powerful. It is invoked when parties say that they have no alternatives. The dynamics of the conflict have removed all other possible actions, and are said to give a party no choice but to continue to react at increasing levels of threat and violence. For the analysis of such dynamics some tools have been developed. Game theory has already been discussed. Such an analysis was developed in the 1960s for the polarized East-West conflict, suggesting credible de-escalating steps that could lead to positive responses. The idea was that if one actor begins to act on its own, the other(s) may follow, and thus the dynamics change direction. Some of these ideas were used for the US-Soviet relations in early period of détente. The dynamic approach to conflict analysis points to the significance of establishing dialogue between the parties. Here, a conference format is important and requires that the parties can participate, with practical go-betweens and add issues which may unlock positions. Confidence-building measures are important not only in the military field but also in social, cultural, economic and other areas. Conferences and confidence-building are mostly multilateral, and the role of mediators, facilitators and third parties take a particular role in such settings. Conflict resolution mechanism refers to the creation of independent procedures in which the parties can have confidence. These are formal or informal arrangements to which they can agree to hand over their conflict, whose solution they can accept and which can define the termination of a conflict (Coser 1967; Galtung 1965; Schelling 1960). Such mechanisms exist in internal affairs, for instance, courts, democratic procedures, and elections called to solve a parliamentary stalemate. They are to be found in history as duels, oracles and ordeals. They are scarce in international relations, where court systems are weak and political fora easily become arenas of dispute, rather than

frameworks for handling conflicts. In internal affairs, the possibilities of appeal are important, creating opportunities to review what has been done on lower levels. As part of a future conflict resolution mechanism this can also be a useful device in the international system. Finally, parties with non-violent methods are potentially efficient in changing the dynamics. This gives a role to peace movements but also to other groups and nongovernmental organization (NGOs) that work for conciliation and understanding across divides. Such pursue the goals with peaceful means, not with violence. They constitute an alternative approach for a community wishing to achieve change, but not convinced that violence is an appropriate action. Nevertheless, this perspective is weak in its understanding of why conflicts start. Do conflicts really begin with conflict attitudes? Or, are they result of previous behaviour and pre-existing incompatibilities? Can there be a more complex background? These are critical challenges to conflict theory and require alternative approaches.

6.3 FOCUSING ON BASIC NEEDS

A Classical writer in social conflict theory Lewis A. Coser argued in 1965 that the conflicts as well as the violent actions stem from not being accepted in society, a matter of dignity, political access and power. The riots were not random burning and looting, but struck against those who had treated members of another ethnic community in a condescending way. Coser points to a remedy: access to the political system. He writes that ‘only where there exist open channels of political communication through which all groups can articulate their demands, are the chances high that the political exercise of violence can be successfully minimized’ (1967, p.106). This means that violent conflict can be terminated by satisfying needs for access. This, furthermore, has to be maintained over time. The solution is likely to be fond in building new institutions, whether formal or informal. In his work on ‘protracted social conflict’ twenty years later, Edward Azar outlined ideas for explaining the duration of conflicts and the repeated failure of conflict resolution. He was concerned, for instance, with the civil war in Lebanon which, by the time of writing, had raged for more than a decade. This and other

protracted conflicts dealt with such needs as security, identity, recognition and participation, factors which are identical to those that Coser singled out (Azar and Burton, 1986, p.29). These contributions by Coser and Azar result in a different approach to conflict resolution. If the basis of a conflict is the denial of particular needs, then the resolution process must identify those needs and include ways of answering them. Negotiations have a tendency to give advantages to elite, and if agreements 'do not touch upon the underlying issues in the conflict (agreements) do not last'. Instead, Azar finds, conflict resolution requires decentralized structures and ways in which psychological, economic and relational needs can be satisfied (Azar and Burton, 1986, pp.30-39). This thinking is part of a materialist theoretical tradition and constitutes a significant element in class analysis. But Marxist theorists seldom have come to an understanding of conflict resolution. On the contrary, much Marxist thinking is based on the idea of continuous conflict, ending only with the defeat of the oppressive system, at this time, Capitalism. Negotiation and compromise were not part of the political formula, or of the academic study. Only in the reformist, Social Democratic version was conflict within Capitalism manageable. When Soviet leaders argued in the late 1950s that peaceful coexistence with Capitalism was possible, it resulted in a rupture with more orthodox Communism, for instance, the People's Republic of China under Mao Tse-tung. Another root of the idea of conflict stemming from frustration is the approach of analyzing revolution as emerging from unsatisfied needs. Theories of deprivation have been given thoughtful consideration in a number of works and been exposed to empirical tests (Davies, 1971; Gurr, 1970). The results are mixed. In his elaborate treatment of relative deprivation, Ted R. Gurr found support for 'relative deprivation' as a systematic way for conflicts to become violent. In his later work on ethnic groups, Gurr reports factors that were associated with escalation into violent conflict, most notably the negative effects of the removal of autonomy for a particular group. It often becomes an important reason for the group to revolt (Gurr, 1993). The observation is linked to Coser's reflections on dignity and political access. The removal of channels of influence may spark violence. Thus, the creation of such channels can be important in

terminating violence and making non-armed conflict a constructive part of the political process. These theorists refer to concepts such as frustration and deprivation. What they provide is an analysis of social frustration. Basic needs are not met in a particular society; instead they are out of reach for a group, which thus becomes frustrated. The conflict originates in or feeds on this frustration. It comes close to classical studies on frustration as resulting in aggression, and aggression as stemming from frustration (Dollard et al. 1939), which has given rise to considerable debate and revision. For instance, it has been asked if aggression is the only way to direct frustration, and whether there are other possible explanations for frustration and conflict behaviour (Fry and Bjorkqvist, 1997, pp.26-32). Coser restricts the argument to the denial of dignity and access, not necessarily to other frustrated objectives. The sequence is captured in James C. Davis' figure on revolution, drawn in figure 1. It shows pointedly how a gap emerges and when the difference between expectations and frustration becomes obvious. As the Figure 1 is

Figure 1



constructed, expectations are always higher than what is accomplished. A certain difference is, therefore, manageable. The achievements are seen as the lower line in the figure. When the gap becomes too large, however, it is likely to be unacceptable. This may happen, for instance, if the economy ceases to grow after a period of sustained growth. The actual achievement becomes considerably lower than was expected and thus discontent rises. This leads to a revolution of rising expectations, it

has been argued. Interestingly, Davis finds in his study that this pattern fits with the economic performance of several countries before a revolution breaks out. This does not settle the issue, however. For instance, a question is whether or not the same experience has occurred in a number of other countries, but without revolution. Frustration, as described by Davies, may be theoretically interesting, but does it hold up empirically? Gurr's initial study did not result in strong correlations (1970), but his work focusing on what we may call political frustration suggests intriguing relationship (1993). The model in Figure 1 is confined to internal, or intrastate, situations. Revolutions are directed at the leaders in the same society. How can frustration result in international conflict? John W. Burton, who has written extensively on conflict resolution, suggests there is a 'spillover' effect. Conflicts, 'especially at the international level', he says, 'are a spillover of some internal institutional or personal problem'. These are ways in which leaders 'divert attention' (Burton, 1996, p.41). Thus, internal conflict may arise from a group's reaction to discrimination, and the resulting disturbances are diverted by the government into international conflict. This is a popular theory. Theoretically there are, however, a number of other ways in which frustration can be diverted covered (???), for instance, in the Roman slogan of 'Bread and Circus' meaning that basic economic necessities were met and that spectacular shows were arranged to give the populations interests other than politics. As we saw in the conflict dynamic perspective, ending of conflict is not necessarily part of the approach; conflicts are transformed, not eliminated. Similarly, we may ask, is it at all possible to meet all the needs that humans and human groups may have? If not, then conflict resolution becomes but a way of managing conflict, possibly channeling it, but not ending it. Alternatively, we may ask if there are some needs that are possible to meet, and if so, are these the ones which are important to handle in order to reduce the amount of violent conflict in the world? The researchers using this approach still owe us answers to such questions. There are distinct conflict resolution techniques that follow from this, no matter what the origins of the conflict. One is the problem-solving workshop, which, according to Burton, was first used in the middle of the 1960s for

the Confrontation Crisis and involved representatives from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (Azar and Burton, 1986, pp.46- 47; Burton, 1987). The three governments nominated participants and the workshop was held in London College at the Centre for the Analysis of conflict. The meeting lasted for ten days, and was controlled by a group of scholars. With this, a tradition of workshops was initiated. There is now a broad array of different approaches (Broome 1997; Doob 1970; Fisher 1983; Kelman and Cohen, 1976). Increasingly there is also learning, for instance, of cultural difference in problem-solving approaches (Strohschneider and Guss, 1999). The original purpose of the workshop was to go beyond the parties' stated positions and reach the underlying needs (Rouhana, 1995). Theoretically, such an analysis should not necessarily assume that all parties are equally responsible for a conflict. In practice, the workshops have included the opposing sides, trying to make them understand each other's needs. Thus, the approach becomes quite symmetric (Rouhana, 1995). If one side were defined as the more aggressive, as the causal analysis may suggest, workshops would actually be designed to work with only one side. However, the problem-solving workshops cannot, by themselves, lead to the solutions. It is more likely that they set an agenda and thus, inform the parties on the needs of the other side. They will be able to act on a more complete understanding of each other's preferences. Still, needs may not be met in a society, due to a lack of resources or the way scarce resources are managed. Thus, equitable economic policies become central, as a way of preventing future conflicts as well as handling acute crises within a society. Although this is easily said, there may be unexpected effects. It may, for instance, result in serious conflict with other actors that can lead to fears and frustrations of others. There are also arguments against economic equality. Discrepancies are said to be the way in which economics develop. Certain differences in income and wealth are important as they give incentives to work hard (Olson, 1971). However, with the same logic, too large and growing differences would create a revolutionary potential and that is, of course, the starting point for Marxist analysis. It is expressed in the figure above. It is reasonable to assume that a society, in order to sustain itself, needs to distribute economic resources relatively

equitably to all citizens. This may be equally true whether the economy as a whole is growing or declining. This, then, relates to conflict inside one society. Does it also translate into an international community, where a few countries are very wealthy and many are very poor? Certainly, resentment exists, and forms of terrorism build on this fact. The logic of the argument would not halt at the border of states. It does not require spillover arguments either, as frustration emerges once the differences and injustices are seen. In today's world they are apparent. But, a sceptic could ask, is this manageable through a problem-solving workshop? Also, is a global policy for a fair economy feasible? A final point: aggression has victims and perpetrators. When needs and grievances are seen by actors to coincide with ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural or historical lines, they add elements which make a situation even more explosive. In many riots, it is not the distant leaders who feel the direct impact of rage, but those who are closest to the mobs, be they shop owners, weak, poor, women or children. They have to face the destruction, in Indonesia in 1998 (targeting property of the Chinese population, but also the Suharto family). Other examples are Kosovo 1999 (first targeting Albanians, then Serbs, Romas) and East Timor (first pro-independence groups, later leaving proIndonesia groups in fear). The aggressive group, the perpetrators, needs a closer analysis, not only the societal relationship. One may ask: why did this group think that atrocities against another group would improve their lot? Were there alternative thoughts? Are there outside incentives for pursuing these actions? Who is actually participating in actions? There are many and legitimate questions asked about this form of mobilisation of popular energy and why it takes a particular direction. Such questions, furthermore, lead to ideas about the possibility of non-aggressive reactions for more constructive uses of accumulated energy. In most revolutionary situations, there are groups that share the sentiments of the militants, but find other courses of action to be more effective. Internal debates on the appropriate course of action within a particular group are important. The outside world can impact on this debate in ways which may favour conflict resolution.

Limitations

With the needs-based approach it is the difficulty of meeting an individual party's need that is the origin of the conflict and the key to its solution. The analysis aims at locating unmet needs. It may then be more important to work with one particular actor than another, although different sides are represented. In an asymmetric situation it is a matter of conveying to the dominant group the perspective of the dominated, but also to clarify to the dominated constraints on the dominating side. In the conflict dynamics approach it is basic that the actors are treated in a similar, symmetric fashion, as all have some responsibility for the conflict and, thus, also for the solution of the conflict. The two perspectives contrast with each other, but they do not necessarily exclude each other. Let us see if this is also true for the third perspective on conflict resolution.

6.4 FOCUSING ON RATIONAL CALCULATIONS

Actors' incompatibilities and actions as stemming from the circumstances are the ones in which actors find themselves. The actors individually or as a system of actors have to handle conditions that drive them apart. The third perspective assumes that actors have their own rationality, form their own judgments, make decisions, purse strategies and, thus, initiate the chain of events that lead to war. The reversal of this, that is, ending wars and reaching agreements, has to be seen in the same light. There is a need for actors to make calculations that can terminate a conflict, but at the same time ending war is not the actor's only interest. A good presentation of this thinking is found in the publications of I. William Zartman, but many have worked in similar directions (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Stedman 1991). The idea that wars rise from a rational calculation is, of course, not novel. It is part of an established realist and neorealist thinking about the origins of wars. The new twist is to see the ending of wars in such terms. Paul Pillar did pioneering work (1983) in this field. The ideas of Zartman have brought the approach further, without leading to the construction of formal models and illustrative diagrams. Zartman outlined such ideas before the

end of the Cold War, and continues to adhere to them (Zartman 1989a; Zartman and Berman 1982; Zartman and Rasmussen 1997). The literature of the type presented in Getting to Yes (Fisher and Ury, 1981) rests less on explicit calculation, but still applies a rationalist perspective. The purpose is to understand the real interests of the parties, and thus look beyond their stated positions. Roger Fisher and William Ury introduced a set of notions which were primarily geared to negotiations in general, although the authors were clearly thinking of their utility for armed conflicts and war. In later work, Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond state that such calculations have to include moral arguments, to provide a basis for justice in ending war and increase the chances of durable settlements (Kegley and Raymond, 1999). The rational approach, which focuses on the ending of war, appears fruitful and politically relevant. Its main assertions need a closer inspection. The parties, which may be states, groups or movements, initiate war to win them, it is assumed. This means that the parties, or at least the initiator, make internal calculations showing that the benefits outweigh the losses when escalating a conflict to a violent confrontation. Such calculations may look different for the opposing sides, but in principle the variables and their values are the same. One side makes a calculation for starting the violence, the other for defending itself against the attack. As time passes and nobody wins, the initial calculations are affected and have to be revised. The potential benefits from victory are reduced as the costs increase. At the same time the fact that so much time, energy, resources and human life has been invested-destroyed –makes it difficult not to continue, until the final moment of victory is reached. Otherwise the investment would be lost and the suffering meaningless. The parties, in Zartman's analysis, look towards the future. If that does not include a reasonably early chance of victory, but instead suggests a continued stalemate, perhaps even a catastrophe for the fighting sides, then there are elements of a 'ripe moment' for resolution. In Zartman's words, the conflict offers nothing but a 'flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future' (Zartman, 1989, p.268). If the parties find this stalemate to be painful, what Zartman calls a 'hurting stalemate', it may lead them to strategic rethinking. There may be a chance for peace. Not necessarily,

however. If none of the sides is comfortable with the present and can see no way forward to win the dispute-perhaps only fearing more destruction, without breakthrough-this is likely to be a moment requiring a change of action. At this point the parties might agree on a ceasefire, to reduce the pain, have a chance of recuperation, even getting an opportunity for buying new weapons. It could be time for a pause, perhaps calculated on what is needed before a new offensive. It is a limited strategic rethinking, where the goals are maintained. A cease-fire, in other words, many slow down the move towards a settlement, and instead prolong the fighting. This is an important dilemma in conflict termination. Many have strong opinions on this, but there is little empirical study on the conflict resolution merits of cease-fires. However, the hurting stalemate can also be turned into an 'enticing opportunity', as Zartman has termed it. It can be used for a move forward to settlement, not simply freezing the present situation, the status quo. Here enters another of Zartman's concepts, the need for 'finding the formula'. There must be a way out for the parties, the weaker as well as the stronger. This line of argument gives an important role to outside powers. They can point out that there is a stalemate, and a danger of catastrophe in the near future, 'precipice' in Zartman's words, and they can suggest alternatives for settling the conflict (Zartman, 1989). The calculations that go into the decision making of the warring parties are, by necessity, complex. Let us attempt to project the situation for two sides at different times in a conflict. In the first stage, the dominant side, A, expects to be able to prevail by defeating the other side, B, and keep control over the resources in dispute, be it governmental power, territory, or something else. Actor B at this time expects considerable sacrifice, as B knows it is challenging a dominant actor, threatening to change the status quo, to achieve an improved standing in the long run. Thus, the expectations are different. Side A may be less psychologically prepared to manage a sustained battle than is B, for whom this has been a plan for a longer period of time. In terms of casualties, for instance, B may be prepared to accept more pain than A. At a certain moment in time, however, the equations change. The war has become longer than planned. A has had to invest more and all of A's other policies are affected. The gains from the

conflict are decreasing, the costs are mounting. For B, the expectation of victory in a reasonably short period of time was not fulfilled. The status quo, the challenger learns, is more entrenched than expected. Victory and associated gains are postponed into the future. The balance between benefits and costs of war may not break even. This is one of the appropriate moments for ending the war, a ripe moment. Neither side is winning within the time framework it had expected nor with the resources it had, at its disposal. The prognoses are gloomy for both sides. A stalemate exists in the minds of the leaders. If it is reflected on the battlefield, in the form of trenches and unbreakable defensive lines, there is a stalemate in the war, and it might be the right opportunity for interjecting ideas of conflict resolution. It may come right after one side has tried and failed to break the military stalemate with an offensive, for instance. However, the same calculations can pull the equation in a different direction. It may be argued that one side, be it A or B, has now used so much of its resources that the effect of making a 'final' offensive is only a marginal additional cost, and the gains from such an offensive could be so much greater. Some of the losses could be regained. Failed negotiations, Zartman observes, means that at least one party 'saw the cost of concessions as being greater than the cost of continuing conflict (Zartman, 1995a; p.33). The calculations become increasingly geared to marginal utilities. With a particular, measured, military or political move, A might be able to strengthen its position, so that A will not have to make this particular concession. In a negotiation, in other words, a party may have alternative actions that rest outside the realm of the talks. The term used by Fisher and Ury for this is BATNA, the 'best alternative to negotiated agreement'. In the same way, there might be a 'best alternative' to continued warfare, of course. There are always choices. Each of them carries different costs and benefits. At a certain point, however, terminating the war becomes rational to the warring parties, and an agreed ending can be reached. The rational calculations are difficult to see from the outside. At a certain moment in time, it may be possible to argue rationally for a continuation of war as well as a search for peace. This makes it difficult at a particular time to determine, with some certainty, that there is a ripe moment. In fact, two different

calculations can confront each other inside the parties. The rational model may appear parsimonious and simple; in fact, it may be less operational. However, this approach attempts to specify something that goes further than we have seen in either the dynamic or the needs-based approaches. It tries to specify when a conflict can be brought to an agreed ending. Neither dynamic approaches nor needs-based analysis can readily point to shifts in the conflict that would signify when and how it can be ended or transformed. The rational calculations are also closer to the practical policy-makers, who are themselves as capable of forming policies and moulding the future.

In the previous approaches such actors are more likely to be regarded as objects of circumstance rather than subjects of will and power. The policy prescriptions that follow from the rational approach are many. More than the other two approaches, the outside world has an active role, particularly when we are concerned with conflicts in smaller countries. It seems legitimate to influence the parties in the direction of conflict management and resolution. Outsiders may be influencing the calculation rather than the dynamics or the needs. The calculus for conflict and conflict resolution can be affected, for instance, by rewards and punishment. Assistance to one or both sides may be a credible promise made by the outside world. This can be done on condition that the primary parties end the war. It is likely that reconstruction programmes interest the fighting sides. There can also be sanctions for not going into negotiations or for not compromising. This can come in the form of reductions in aid, loss of preferential treatment in trade, a ban on investments, etc. These are measures contributing to the economic constraints for parties already burdened by the war effort. Such steps are generally seen to be legitimate for achieving conflict resolution. Their effects on the parties may be counter-productive, however, and the success record of explicit uses of sanctions is not impressive. Even more controversial is whether rewards and punishment can or should be administered by military means, in the form of direct military attacks on one party, aiming at tipping the military balance in favour of the other. NATO’s bombing in Bosnia in 1995 and in Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 is in this category. Did they achieve what had been

planned? What is the balance of pain inflicted and pain relieved, for instance? Such actions raise legal issues and ethical questions, not only instrumental ones. Also, the decisions to use military arsenals are not taken lightly by the outsiders. They are likely to be available only for some few conflicts, of particular interest to particular outsiders. The fact that the outside world can have a strong impact on conflicts involving smaller countries raises an increasingly important question: who are the parties that should settle a particular conflict? In line with the dynamic perspective, as many actors as possible should be involved. There is a preference for a broad agenda and liberal rules of invitation. In the needs-based approach, the opposite is favoured. The workshops should be held far from the scene, have little media access, and concentrate on a limited number of parties, who act as representatives, not as individuals. For an approach building on rational calculations, however, the answer is simply that those who count should be in. There is, in Zartman's writing, a repeated observation that not all parties need to be involved in a peace deal. It may be desirable to have as many as possible included, but it is not always necessary. Another calculation can be made: which parties are needed to make an agreement durable? Some parties may create difficulties, and their interests may be better left for later. In the dynamic approach, the incorporation of as many actors as possible is important. It is not only seen to be more democratic, it is said also to be more fruitful, as there are more issues and there is a larger potential for trade-offs. The outcomes, too, will be more innovative

Limitations

From a rational calculation perspective, larger meetings and intensive dialogue can appear as a waste of resources and time. The urgency of solving a conflict, using the ripe moment, may be lost. In the rational calculation perspective, timing is very important. Opportunities should be seized, particularly in a situation where a war is ongoing. This requires swift action, often by a few, determined actors. The dynamic and needs-based approaches see conflict resolution as a process and, thus, do not advocate rapid action and political manoeuvering. Ripe moments may come and go. This is not the way conflicts will ever be solved, they would argue.

6.5 IDENTIFYING KEY ELEMENTS IN CONFLICT ANALYSIS

Living with or dissolving the incompatibility is a central element in the conflict analysis. This is learned from the dynamic approach to conflict for instance, in differentiating between position and interests and getting into the calculations of the parties. The focus on the needs of parties brings with it a close look at the parties themselves, their needs perceptions and the history behind the conflict. These are elements which also are important for an analysis of rational calculations. There is a relationship between conflict behaviour and changing positions, as indicated in terms such as action-reaction, but so are carefully, rationally calibrated moves. In all, the three approaches have many shared features. They are, as a consequence, all useful. They illustrate different elements in the conflict process and how it can be turned into a peace process. Figure 2 describes this and suggests a shared framework for the analysis.

Figure 2



(Recheck on the diagram. Arrows are not delineated ???) The dynamics of conflict are illustrated by the arrow in Figure.2. There are no convincing arguments for assuming that a conflict always starts in one corner. It is more fruitful to assume that connections exist and are more fluid. The different boxed require some closer description. First, in the box on conflict formation is located the creation of parties, which we have stipulated to be an integral part of conflict analysis. Some parties are formed deliberately to make conflicts; other may be there for other purposes. When a party is formed, it begins by making itself known,

developing its identity and giving itself a role in the conflict to which it adheres. The history, recruitment and financing of a party are important to understand, as well as its internal decision-making.

If there are needs in the society on which its actions purport to be based, then, of course, those needs have to be focused. To this also belongs whether a party really represents the needs of a larger share of the population. Second, obviously, an analysis of the incompatibility is necessary. What are the conflicting interests, what is the relationship between interests, positions and needs of the actor or of the population it claims to represent? The actors are likely to have an internal priority in terms of issues. Some are more basic than others. It is important for the analyst to have an idea of such hierarchies; third, there are the actions. Conflicts are fuelled by destructive actions, actions aimed at reducing the influence of the other side, and enhancing the influence of its own side. Thus, this box in Figure 2 not only involves actual warfare but also the making of alliances, finding friends, and locating of financiers, as well as preventing the opponent from doing the same. These are seen, by the parties, as integral elements of their struggle. The conflict strategies are important elements in the analysis. In figure 2 however, a statement of great consequence is made. It is argued, in line with the dynamic approach, that behaviour can be changed, and that such a change is strategic in making a conflict take a different direction. That is described as constructive action. These are actions that aim at bridging the gap to the other side. Included are measures such as confidence–building, but also unilateral actions. The now classical example is the visit by Egypt's President Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977. It was an unexpected action. It was not clear how the Israeli government would receive it. With the support of the US administration, it helped to change the dynamics in the Middle East conflict. Such measures are rare, and risky ways; but many recent wars have contained unilateral and constructive moves.

Thus, the behaviour of the opposing sides is the element in the conflict that the parties themselves watch most closely, they will ask, for instance, if a positive announcement is followed by positive steps. If not, the former is regarded as propaganda and the latter as the reality. The proof of 'good intentions' is 'good actions'. Once there is a shift in

behaviour, the parties in a cease-fire, may build compatibility through traditional peacekeeping; the lower half of Figure 2 comes into operation. A dynamic development may follow and build momentum. The parties may start searching for compatible positions (shared needs or a formula meeting interests of the primary parties) and, when they find them, there will also be attempts to create new structures through which these can be expressed. This can be simple negotiation for a (multilateral conferences) but also transitory forms of government or even entirely new permanent bodies (the European Union (EU) could be regarded as a way of ending the earlier Franco-German conflict, although it is more often described as a measure to prevent a future one). The detection of compatibilities and the formation of new organisations mean that dynamics are created which may generate more constructive action. Thus, Figure 2 describes two processes, a process of conflict formation and escalation in the upper half of the figure, and one of peace-building and shared interests in the lower half. The utility of figure 2 can be demonstrated with the phenomenon of spoilers and spoiler management introduced by Stedman. It can now be located theoretically. Spoilers are those actors who have no interest in the conflict process shifting from the higher to the lower level in figure 2. If there is a peace agreement, as postulated by Stedman, then a spoiler aims to prevent the dynamics in the lower level from spinning further. This runs counter to interests held by particular groups. Thus, violent action can be used to attempt to shift the conflict back into the higher level. If successful, peace moves are spoiled, for the time being. When a conflict is locked in the upper part of figure 2, most actors are spoilers as long as they all pursue destructive action. Thus, it makes sense, as Stedman does, to link the spoiler phenomenon to a peace agreement or at least a fairly entrenched peace process. In a way, a spoiler is a party still living in the dynamics of the upper level, preferring to be there at least as long as its interests are not met. This illustrates also the importance for the custodians to make clear that the situation has changed and decisively moved into the lower level of Figure 2. The custodians have to show in action that they are committed to preventing the conflict from sliding back to the dynamics of the upper level.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Discuss the Conflict Dynamics.

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2. Discuss the Basic Needs.

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3. How do you focus on Rational Calculations?

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4. What are the Identifying Key Elements in Conflict Analysis?

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6.6 LET US SUM UP

The fact that behaviour is the point combining the two dynamics makes clear its dual nature. It may promote one or the other development, but it is also the juncture at which conflict dynamics can change from one loop to the other and back again. It means that conflicts are not unilinear, for instance, moving from frustration to conflict in behaviour, positions and parties, new frustrations and new calculations all affecting the dynamics. It means that conflicts are not simply escalating and de-escalating, or that they are easily predicted and calculated. They are all of these simultaneously and that is the reality with which the analysts have to cope.

6.7 KEY WORDS

Conflict Analysis: Conflict analysis or conflict assessment is an initial stage of conflict resolution in which parties seek to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics in their relationship.

6.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Critically examine the various methods of Conflict Analysis
2. Identify the key elements in Conflict Analysis.

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6.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 6.2
2. See Section 6.3
3. See Section 6.4
4. See Section 6.5

UNIT 7: CONFLICT CYCLES AND MAPPING

STRUCTURE

7.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this Unit, you would be able to:

- Understand the purposes, usage and limitations of a conflict map;
- Become aware about the basic elements of a conflict map;
- Get familiar with the different ways in which conflict can be mapped; and
- Graphically map a conflict by using signs and conventions.

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Conflict creates confusion, unpredictability and uncertainty. Intervention in this situation requires a clear understanding and analysis. This understanding is necessary not only for the conflict resolution practitioner but also the authorities, the stakeholders and even students of peace and conflict studies. All of them need to know – what is going on? Conflict is a complex process having multiple elements, more so if it has multiple parties and stakeholders. Conflict can thus be analysed from various perspectives. Some scholars analyse conflict from a general or

macro perspective while others take a micro approach and yet some others combine the macro and the micro perspectives. The basic or primary elements of a conflict can be helpful in creating a map which will enable one to negotiate their way through it.

Conflict Cycle

The matrix describes the conflict cycle as having a trigger that escalates to a crisis, resulting in an

eventual recovery phase characterized by the person(s) gradually returning to baseline behavior.

The components in bold describe the tasks for organizations and staff which include: Preventing incidents by controlling the environment and procedures. De-escalating conflict by bringing down their emotional content, and coping with the aftermath of conflict including further dealings with the person(s) involved.



CONFLICT CYCLE – YOU MAY BE THERE NOW

Even though the past is OVER, the conflict cycle remains active. In fact, it often helps you resurrect the past dragging the past into your life right now.

Once you go through the basic elements of the conflict cycle, you become aware of the pain you create for yourself and others. Time to wake up and get out of the cycle.



Where do wars and fights come from among you? Do they not come from your desires for pleasure that war in your members? - James 4:1

Conflict cycle

It all starts with something that creates "**Tension**" between you and another person. What is most often true, that tension is linked to other unresolved tensions.

"Tension" leads to **"Role Dilemma"** or blaming the other person for the tension and the problem. Then both of you start **"Gathering Injustices"** to use as ammunition for the inescapable showdown.

You fire your best shots during the "Confronting" phase of the conflict cycle, because it's about winning, not resolution. The confrontation may be shortly after the tension is felt or maybe weeks or months later.

All of those elements lead us to the critical "Adjusting" phase which has at least 4 options.

1. The injustices gathered aren't good enough, so you resurrect old unresolved complaints - "I've got more issues!".
2. There is a break in the confrontation so it is now time to "gather more stuff".
3. The "I'm out of here!" option can be confusing, because it may look like resolution to some - "agreeing to disagree". The fighting may even stop - at least for a while. But all this option does is allow the tension to become dormant - there is no resolution. This happens in divorces and especially separations, but don't be fooled - it is only the calm between the storms until you RESOLVE the issue.
4. RESOLUTION!

Most important, the only escape from the Conflict Cycle is option number 4 - Resolution! That means you pull the power plug to the tension which truly allows the past to be OVER.

Get more information about this course, one of our BEST!

Forgiveness - The Path to Resolution

Forgiveness and the grace of God are the only reasons Louie and I are together today in a great marriage - not suffering the multiple pains and problems of divorce. God energized us to forgive each other, close the door on the past, and set our sights on healing our relationship through His power. Click here to see our video testimony. As a result of watching, we hope that you also experience the power of forgiveness and the marvelous grace of God.

Especially relevant, **forgiveness is the only remedy to get over the past and the pain that someone creates in your life.** As stated in the blog Forgiveness Frees You from Pain, there are severe consequences to unforgiveness and it leaves you in the conflict cycle - so, as we say, "enjoy the pain".

But, when you decide to ***"never abuse them for the wrong they did to you - not in thought, word or action"*** - you unchain yourself from the wrong they did to you. Those words in red are the GR8 Relationships definition of forgiveness. Take the time to go through the forgiveness course we created. Click here for more information about it - Freedom from Resentments, Bitterness and Grudges.

Additionally, your understanding and application of forgiveness helps you remove the pain of the past, just like throwing away trash - you don't need it and will not use it anymore.

Forgiveness - When Linked Prevents Use and Resolution

Finally, you can miss the benefits of forgiveness, because other actions get tacked onto it. For example, the common phrase, "forgive and forget", combines forgiving and forgetting together. That is harmful, because you think you have not forgiven if you remember the event.

Or, some believe that when you forgive, you reconcile or restore the relationship with the person that harmed you. On the other side, some believe that forgiveness means condoning bad behavior or that forgiveness is the same as pardoning.

None of that is true, because forgiveness stands alone as a separate action. There is no link to any of those other items. You do not need to forget, reconcile, condone or pardon someone as an additional component of forgiveness.

Consider the truth table to the right. When you mistakenly link forgive and forget together - **you believe only 50% of reality** or you DO NOT believe the 4 boxes on the RIGHT side of the table are real - part of reality.

Forgive	+	-	+	-
Forget	+	-	-	+

Actually, 100% of reality says there are two other options:

- I CAN forgive (+) and NOT forget (-)
- I CAN forget (+) and NOT forgive (-)

The table is useful to prove that forgiveness and forgetting are not linked together. Forgiveness stands alone. It is separate from and has no causal links to forgetting or any other issues like reconciliation, restoration, pardoning, etc.

Robinson (1978) identified the now widely recognized Conflict Cycle – the stages that most community conflicts go through. While it is worth noting that real life is not as discrete or as linear as the this graph might suggest, and that different stakeholders may reach each point at different times, the value of this cycle lies in using it as a diagnostic tool for determining what's going on and how you might best intervene.



Tension development

Parties begin taking sides. Tension development may appear immediately or over time**.**

Intervention opportunity: gathering and providing objective information, listening to all sides, reframing the issue or problem.

Role dilemma

People involved start asking questions: what is happening, who is right, what should be done? Based on this information they may try to take sides. This may happen at the same time as tension development.

Intervention opportunity: gathering and providing objective information, listening to all sides, reframing the challenge, leading a discussion to help all sides see the complexity, values, and perceptions around the issue. Building trust, emphasizing recognition of common ground, identify appropriate jurisdiction issues.

Injustice collecting

Each side seeks to gather support. Each itemizes the problem, justifies their position, and thinks of either revenge or strategies to 'win'.

Intervention opportunity: similar to above, gathering and providing objective information, listening to all sides, reframing the challenge, leading a discussion to help all sides see the complexity, values, and perceptions around the issue, brainstorming causes, alternatives and consequences. This stage of the conflict cycle may be the last chance to build trust and establish sense of common ground with respect to either the issue, a solution, or desired outcome.

Confrontation

The parties meet head-on. If each party holds fast to its side the showdown may cause permanent barriers.

Intervention opportunity: effective facilitation, gathering and providing objective information, listening to all sides, reframing the challenge, highlighting all sides and the complexity, values, and perceptions around the issue. Brainstorm causes, alternatives, consequences, seek win-wins, outline how decisions will be made and steps forward.

Adjustments

Confrontation may be lessened or avoided by one or both parties making adjustments.

Intervention opportunity: emphasizing the win-win while applauding the insights and perspectives of everyone even those who may not be completely satisfied. Providing follow-up information. Consider highlighting lessons learned, etc.

Managing difficult community issues often requires using many of facilitation techniques and strategies discussed elsewhere in this toolbox. In addition, a range of negotiation and collaboration tools may be appropriate. See our resource page for additional examples. A useful framework is provided by the Harvard Negotiating Project 'Getting to Yes' (2011). They outline four key strategies for negotiating solutions to difficult public issues:

- Separate people and their perspectives from the problem. Both are worth considering, but the problem or challenge should be your primary focus
- Focus on eliciting common interests, not positions
- Invent options for mutual gain – seeking to accomplish X while also accomplishing Y, employing 'soft' negotiating tactics
- Insist on using objective criteria for evaluating all your alternatives and consequences

7.2 CONFLICT MAP: PURPOSE, USAGE AND LIMITATIONS

A conflict map is a visual technique that presents a conflict graphically and shows the parties in relation to the conflict as well as to each other. It can be used to analyse both micro and macro level conflicts – international, national, social, organisational and interpersonal conflicts. Being a visual tool, it can be used for group processes as well as with people who are not formally educated. It can be drawn on a sheet of page or a chart paper or a flip chart or even on the mud floor. The technique of conflict mapping was developed first by Paul Wehr in 1979. It is possible to use the conflict map for various purposes in different contexts. It can guide parties, third party interveners, conflict resolution workshop participants as well as students to collect information about the conflict, reconstruct the chain of events and help in understanding the situation better. This understanding can form the basis on which strategies can be

developed and actions planned. Each party can draw a map with the aim of clarifying and understanding the conflict from their own perspective or it can be done jointly by two or more parties to understand each other's perspective. Parties to a conflict mostly have different perspectives and viewpoints about the conflict. In such a situation, when the parties draw their own conflict map, it can show differences in perception. Also it helps them to move a step back and make sense out of the complex and confusing process of conflict. A third party can draw a conflict map to use it as a point of starting a discussion among the parties to which things can be added or deleted as per the inputs of the parties. The conflict map thus is a flexible tool that can be modified depending on the conflict parties, the task at hand and the intervention goal. Conflict maps help in the overall analysis of a conflict. It clearly shows the relationship between the parties and also clarifies the distribution of power among the parties. It aids in seeing where allies or potential allies are. Conflict mapping facilitates the identification of openings for intervention and entry points for action. Mapping can also help in making an informed decision about whether the intervention should continue. It also helps in evaluating what has already been done in the conflict. Conflict maps can thus be used either early in the process to just understand and analyse the conflict or later to identify possible entry points for intervention or to build strategies. Conflicts change over time. Therefore, conflict analysis cannot be a one-time exercise; it must be an ongoing process, representative of the changing situation. A conflict map is limited to the time period and is representative of the time in which it is made—it only gives a snapshot of the current situation—and cannot possibly make all the aspects of the conflict visible. The map will show things differently if it is drawn either before or later during the conflict process. Besides, it depicts the relationship between the parties but is unable to analyse the causes of conflict. Moreover, the map is always drawn from some perspective, so it is critical to remember who is drawing the map and not just what elements and how they have been placed on the map. Thus a map drawn by a student of peace and conflict studies may be very different from the one done by a party to the conflict, depending on the amount of information the students have at

any given point of time. Thus, Mapping on its own cannot provide all the answers; it only gives partial insight into the nature of a conflict.

7.3 BASIC ELEMENTS OF A CONFLICT MAP

Conflicts have multiple elements. Each conflict is unique having its own distinguishing features. However, some elements are common to all conflicts. Understanding these common or basic elements of a conflict is essential for constructing a conflict map.

Each conflict has a history—how the conflict started, what was its origin, how the conflict evolved, what were the major events in the course of its evolution—these need to be understood. Secondly, conflicts do not emerge in a vacuum. They take place in a context or a setting. It is essential to know and be aware of the physical and organisational settings of a conflict. Thirdly, conflict takes place between groups or individuals, i.e. the parties. The primary or main parties are those who are directly opposed to one another, are directly involved in the conflict and are indulging in conflict aggravating behaviour. On the other hand, there might be groups and individuals who have a stake in the conflict—whose lives would be impacted by the outcome of the conflict but who have no direct stake in its outcome— are referred to as secondary parties. Besides, there can be third parties as well. These are conciliators, mediators or conflict resolution professionals who intervene in the conflict with the aim of facilitating resolution. Fourthly, conflicts take place in a relationship.

The main and secondary parties and the stakeholders in a conflict can have different kinds of relationships between them – alliances, close contacts, broken relationships, confrontation, intermittent links etc. The relationship between the parties must be represented in a conflict map. Fifthly, a conflict cannot take place without issues or factors and points of disagreement. It is thus essential to answer the question as to why does a particular conflict exist? Although, there may be several issues in a given conflict, the key ones need to be pointed out. Contrasting values can be one such issue. It must however be noted that these values can be different for different parties either in reality or it might just be a belief

or a perception. Next, each conflict arises because of some root causes and as the conflict progresses, depending on what action is taken, it leads to certain consequences. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish between the causes and the consequences. So in a given conflict, there are likely to be some issues which can be seen as both the causes and the effects of the conflict e.g. scarcity of food can be a cause of conflict between two groups but that scarcity may itself be a consequence of normal agricultural activities getting disrupted by the ongoing violence.

Additionally, goals are an important aspect of conflict. A goal is an objective of a conflict, which is acknowledged as such by the parties. This may be a position that the parties take publicly to make others see and hear. Besides, there are interests involved in conflicts as well. Interests are something we really want; these are the motivating factors for the parties. However, satisfaction of needs is at the core of resolution of conflicts. Interests and positions can be negotiated but needs are non-negotiable, something we must have e.g. water. In the process of analysing a conflict, it is important to distinguish between what the parties 'say' they want (positions or goals), what they 'really' want (interests) and what they 'must' have (needs). Also, different parties may have different goals and interests. Further, each conflict has its own dynamics. Things constantly change and move in a conflict and thus conflict is a dynamic process. It might seem that there is a deadlock between the parties but the aspects of the context of the conflict keep changing. Mapping too is a dynamic process as it reflects a particular point in a changing context and points towards action. Finally, conflicts have some purpose or positive consequences for those who are involved in it – these are the functions of a conflict. The purpose could be to direct attention to social injustices that need to be addressed or to promote much needed change in social systems and organisations or at a micro level just to release tension or pent up feelings.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Discuss the Conflict Map: Purpose, Usage and Limitations.

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2. What are the Basic Elements of a Conflict Map?

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7.4 WAYS OF CONFLICT MAPPING

There is no standard way of mapping a conflict; it can be done in various ways depending on the purpose of the analysis. Here two ways of mapping a conflict have been presented. These have been devised by Paul Wehr and William W. Wilmot and Joyce L. Hocker. Certain elements are common to both these maps but they also have some distinguishing features. They can be used either in combination or can be altered to take care of specific situations.

7.4.1 Paul Wehr

Paul Wehr provided the technique of conflict mapping in his book Conflict Regulation written in 1979. According to Wehr, conflict mapping is the "first step in intervening to manage a particular conflict. It gives both the intervener and the conflict parties a clearer understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics, and possibilities for resolution of the conflict." The main elements of his conflict map are as follows: Summary Description: This is a maximum one-page description of the conflict. Conflict history: It describes the origins and major events in the process of evolution of the conflict and its context. It is necessary to distinguish between the context and the relationship among the parties which led to the conflict. Conflict context: It relates to the scope and character of setting in which the conflict takes place such as geographical boundaries, political structure, etc. Conflict parties: It includes the units who are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict and have some

stake in its outcome. Wehr divides the conflict parties into three kinds – primary, secondary and interested third parties. Primary parties are those whose goals are or they perceive them to be incompatible. These parties interact directly in pursuit of their respective goals. Secondary parties are those who are not directly involved in the conflict but who have an indirect stake in the outcome of the conflict. As the conflict moves forward, there is a likelihood that primary parties may become secondary and vice-versa. Interested third parties are those who have an interest in successfully resolving the conflict. In addition, it is essential to know the nature of power relations between or among the parties i.e. whether it is symmetrical or asymmetrical, the leadership of the parties, the main goals of the parties, and what is the potential for forming coalitions among them. Issues: Conflicts develop around one or more issues. These are points of disagreement that emerge from or lead to a decision. They need to be resolved. Issues can be classified into the following on the basis of how they were generated: facts-based, valuesbased, interests-based and non-realistic. One or a combination of the above issues may be the source of a conflict. Facts-based issues are concerned with disagreements over 'what is'. This happens because parties either perceive it like that or it is their judgment.

Values-based issues relate to disagreements over 'what should be' as a determinant of a policy decision or a relationship or other sources of conflict. Interests-based issues are disagreements over 'who will get what' when distribution of scarce resources such as economic benefits or power take place. The origin of non-realistic issues does not lie in incompatible perceptions, interests or values. It is rather concerned with the style of interaction of the parties, the quality of their communication or physical discomfort in their immediate physical setting. Dynamics: The dynamics of a conflict may not always be predictable because there are constant changes taking place in it but they need to be reversed for either regulating a conflict or resolving it. Some of the dynamics are: precipitating events; issue emergence, transformation, proliferation; polarisation; spiralling; and stereotyping and mirror-imaging. Precipitating events are those that signal the surfacing of the dispute. Issue emergence, transformation, proliferation are indicative of how

issues can change with the progress of the conflict. It is likely that specific issues will become generalised or single issues may multiply into many or impersonal disagreements can turn into interpersonal conflicts. Polarization occurs when parties seek internal consistency, try to collate with allies and their leaders make an effort to consolidate their positions. This can either lead to greater intensity or to simplification and thus resolution of the conflict. Spiralling refers to the patterns of escalation or de-escalation of a conflict. There is a likelihood that each party will try to increase or escalate the level of hostility and damage to the other side, which in turn will result in a corresponding increase from the opponent. In the case of de-escalatory spirals, opposing sides may make reciprocal efforts to incrementally reduce the levels of hostility in their interaction. The process of stereotyping and mirror-imaging refers to parties perceiving themselves (self) as 'good', having superior qualities while at the same time perceiving or seeing the other party (not-self or mirror-opposite) as 'bad' or even 'evil', someone who is greedy, aggressive and less than human. This leads to rigid positioning, miscommunication and misinterpretation, which results in the 'Us versus Them' syndrome. Alternative routes to solution(s) of the problem(s): In a given conflict situation, depending on the context, there can be several different ways of resolving a conflict – structural changes, policy changes, behavioural changes, etc. These and other options should be made visible, not just to the parties but also to those who are interested in intervening in the conflict, so that they can suggest new alternatives or a combination of those already identified. Conflict regulation potential: These refer to the resources, which may be used for limiting, managing or resolving a conflict. Each conflict contains such resources. These resources can be noted on the conflict map. Some of the resources are internal limiting factors, external limiting factors, interested or neutral third parties, and techniques of conflict management. Internal limiting factors refer to the values and interests that the conflicting parties have in common. It could also include the cross-pressures of multiple commitments of parties.

External limiting factors could mean either a higher authority who can intervene in the conflict or force the parties to agree to a settlement or an

intermediary who is from outside the conflict. Interested or neutral third parties are people who are trusted by all the parties to the conflict and who are in a position to either facilitate communication or do mediation or locate financial resource to take care of problems of scarcity. The techniques of conflict management could range from negotiation to conciliation to facilitation to mediation to breaking down a large conflict into several small manageable conflicts (referred to as 'fractionating') so that they can be easily resolved. Using the map: The map is best used as the initial step in conflict intervention. It helps in forming an informed judgment especially about whether the intervention should continue. If the intervener decides to continue with the intervention, the map can make the conflict seem less complex, making resolution possible. It also helps the parties to take a step back and reflect on the whole conflict process. Finally, the map works for the lay man as well for it simplifies the complex, mysterious and cumbersome process of conflict, making it comprehensible.

7.4.2 William W. Wilmot and Joyce L. Hocker

Wilmot and Hocker devised a guide to focus on several components of conflicts. It comprises of a series of questions. Although Wilmot and Hocker's device is more of a guide rather than a map, the aim is similar to that of the map: to analyse and understand the nature and dynamics of a conflict. The guide helps to bring into focus specific aspects of the conflict: the orientation to the conflict, the nature of conflict, interests and goals, power, styles of conflict, assessment, personal intervention, and attempted solutions. This guide is best used in its entirety as then the interplay of conflict elements gets highlighted. For intractable and long-term conflicts, this guide can be of help in assessing the situation. In some other scenario, users might just pick relevant questions from each section of the guide and leave the rest. This can be done either in a facilitated or guided discussion, or as a reflective exercise or in writing. The guide can also be used to construct interviews or a questionnaire that will reveal the dynamics of the conflict. It can thus be used in a variety of contexts but it should be modified as per the task at hand.

Orientation to the conflict

What attitudes toward conflict do participants seem to hold?

Do they perceive conflict as positive, negative, or neutral? How can you tell?

What metaphoric images do conflict participants use? What metaphors might you use to describe the conflict?

What is the cultural background of the participants? What is the cultural context in which the conflict takes place?

How might gender roles, limitations, and expectation be operating in this conflict?

Nature of the conflict:

What are the "triggering events" (immediate causes) that brought the conflict to everyone's attention?

What is the historical context (underlying causes) of the conflict with regard to 1) the ongoing relationship between the parties and 2) other, external events within which the conflict is embedded?

Do parties have assumptions about conflict that are distinguishable by their choices of conflict metaphors, patterns of behaviour, or clear expressions of their attitudes about conflict?

Conflict elements:

How is the struggle being expressed by each party?

What are the perceived incompatible goals?

What are the perceived scarce resources?

In what ways are the parties interdependent? How are they interfering with one another?

How are they cooperating to keep the conflict in motion?

Has the conflict fluctuated between productive and destructive phases? If so, which elements were transformed during the productive cycles? Which elements might be transformed by creative solutions to the conflict?

Interests and goals:

How do the parties clarify their goals?

Do they phrase them in individualistic or system terms?

What does each party think the other's goals are?

Are they similar or dissimilar to the perceptions of self-goals?

How have the goals been altered from the beginning of the conflict to the present? In what ways are the prospective (these are identified beforehand), transactive (these are expressed during the conflict), and retrospective (these are expressed after the conflict episodes have occurred) goals similar or dissimilar?

What are the content, relational, identity, and process goals? (Content goals relate to the question "What does each person want?" These are verifiable, objective issues that people talk about. Relational goals relate to the question "Who are we in relationship to each other during our interaction?" These are about parties' influences on each other and define "how each party wants to be treated by the other and the amount of interdependence they desire." Identity or face-saving goals relate to the question "Who am I in this interaction?" These have "to do with the needs of people to present themselves positively in interactions and to be treated with approval and respect." Process goals relate to the question "What communication process will be used?" They "refer to parties' interests in how the interaction is conducted." The content, relational, identity, and process goals are altogether referred to as CRIP goals.)

How do the CRIP goals overlap with one another? Which goals seem to be primary at different stages of the conflict? Are the conflict parties

"specializing" in one type or the other? (Parties tend to highlight or "specialize" in only one type of goal and limit themselves to it.)
Are the identity and relational issues the "drivers" of the conflict? (Identity and relational issues is the core but they lie beneath the content and process issues.) Are any of the goals emerging in different forms? (Goals are likely to emerge in a different form e.g. content goals can surface as relational, identity or procedural goals.)
Is there "shape shifting" of the goals over time in the conflict? (Goals do not stay static; they shift and undergo changes before, during and after the conflict.) How do they change during the prospective, transactive, and retrospective phases?

Power:
What attitudes about their own and the other's power does each party have?

Do they talk openly about power, or is it not discussed?

What do the parties see as their dependency and the other's dependencies on one another?

As an external observer, can you classify some dependencies that they do not list?

What power currencies (particular resources that are valued or needed by others) do the parties see themselves and the other possessing?

From an external perspective, what power currencies of which the participants are not aware seem to be operating?

In what ways do the parties disagree on the balance of power between them? Do they underestimate their own or the other's influence?

What impact does each party's assessment of power have on subsequent choices in the conflict? What evidence of destructive "power balancing"

occurs? (When individuals or groups block the exercise of power by another it is destructive while when they exercise appropriate power and let others do the same, it is constructive.) In what ways do observers of the conflict agree and disagree with the parties' assessments of their power? What are some unused sources of power that are present?

Styles of conflict ("Conflict styles are patterned responses, or clusters of behaviour, that people use in conflict."): What individual styles (avoidance, accommodation, competition, collaboration, and compromise) did each party use? How did the individual styles change during the course of the conflict? How did the parties perceive the other's style? In what way did a party's style reinforce the choices the other party made as the conflict progressed?

Were the style choices primarily symmetrical or complementary?

From an external perspective, what were the advantages and disadvantages of each style within the particular conflict?

Can the overall system be characterised as having a predominant style? What do the participants say about the relationship as a whole? Do the participants appear to strategise about their conflict choices or remain spontaneous? How does each party view the other's strategising? What are the tactical options used by both parties? ("Tactics are individual moves people make to carry out their general approach", such as threat.) Do the tactical options classify primarily into avoidance, competition, or collaborative tactics? How are the participant's tactics mutually impacting on the other's choices? How are the tactics interlocking to push the conflict through phases of escalation, maintenance, and reduction?

Assessment:

What rules of repetitive patterns characterise the conflict? ("All conflicts follow patterns, predictable actions of communication and response." Mostly these are circular as it is difficult to pinpoint where the pattern started.) What triangles and microevents best characterize the conflict? ("When people perceive that they are the lower-power party in a two-

person conflict, their typical response is to try to form a coalition with another person who can bolster their power." The third person becomes part of the conflict and thus the triangle. "Microevents are observable, recurring patterns of behaviour that can be analyzed for underlying conflict structure.") How destructive is the tone of the conflict?

Personal Intervention: What options for change do the parties perceive? What philosophy of conflict characterises the system? What techniques for self-regulation or system-regulation have been used thus far? Which might be used productively by the system? How might anger be managed more productively?

Attempted solutions: What options have been explored for managing the conflict? Have attempted solutions become part of the problem? Have third parties been brought into the conflict? If so, what roles did they play and what was the impact of their involvement? Is this conflict a repetitive one, with attempted solutions providing temporary change, but with the overall pattern remaining unchanged? If so, what is that overall pattern? Can you identify categories of attempted solutions that have not been tried?

7.5 HOW TO MAP A CONFLICT SITUATION?

In order to map a conflict situation, one needs to decide what one wants to map, when and from what point of view. If one tries to map the whole conflict in detail, it will be a time-consuming exercise. Moreover, the result will be large and complex, which will not be helpful. One thus needs to choose a particular moment in a specific situation so that the scope of the mapping exercise is not too wide. It is also advisable to do several maps of the same situation from different viewpoints, especially for students of peace and conflict studies. While doing so, one can ask the question, how different parties could see the same situation differently

One can be guided by the following questions while doing the mapping: What are the main parties of this conflict? What other parties (should include marginalised groups and external parties as well) are involved or connected in some way to the conflict? What are the relationships

between the main and other parties? Are there alliances, close contacts, broken relationship or confrontation between them? Why does the conflict exist? What is the incompatibility? (These relate to the issues between the parties in the conflict.) What are the views of the parties in the conflict? (This can indicate the position of the conflicting parties.) Mapping should be geared towards creating new vistas and possibilities as it is a dynamic exercise. These questions can be helpful in doing so: What can be done? Who can best do it? When is the best moment? What is needed before and what should be done after? If the map is being done by an intervening organisation or agency (say a NonGovernmental Organisation (NGO) or an international organisation), then it is necessary that they put themselves on the map as they are now part of the situation. Moreover, how the intervening organisation is perceived by others can have either positive effect, in that it can open up opportunities and possibilities for working with the parties, or lead to negative consequences, in that the parties can refrain from cooperating with it. In mapping, certain signs or conventions are used. However, one need not stick to them but can invent their own signs. Given below are some ideas for signs that can be used in mapping:



Figure 1: Mapping Conventions

Source: Simon Fisher et al, Working with Conflict: Skills & Strategies for Conflict (New York: Zed Books & Responding to Conflict, 2000).

An imaginary conflict situation is described below and a conflict map drawn by using the conventions given above so as to illustrate how to go about mapping a conflict situation. 'A' and 'B' communities have been in conflict for the past twenty-five years in the country 'XYZ'. 'B' is in a

minority but enjoys good terms with the neighbouring country ‘SFT’ as they both belong to the same ethnic group. ‘A’ belongs to a different ethnic group from ‘B’, but is dominant in terms of numbers and also occupies power at the centre. ‘B’ wants to create an independent country by splitting country XYZ. Their contention is that ‘A’ does not give them the liberty and freedom to practice their language, religion, customs and traditions. ‘A’ dreads the day when ‘B’ will be successful in breaking the country and taking away their holy land and resources. This feeling makes ‘A’ insecure. They thus try to strike back at ‘B’ with all the resources they have; in fact they invest a lot of money in buying arms and ammunitions from country ‘DMI’ with which it has a military and strategic alliance. ‘B’ fears a complete annihilation of their community in genocide like situation and thus built an armed cadre and indulges in guerrilla warfare against ‘A’, striking at will and killing several people. Country ‘GHJ’ is ready to invest a lot of money in country ‘XYZ’ if ‘A’ and ‘B’ manage to resolve the conflict amicably. In fact, it is the major donor partner of country ‘XYZ’ and thus exercises a lot of influence on it. Country ‘LMK’ tried to mediate between ‘A’ and ‘B’ as it enjoyed the goodwill of both the parties for it did not have any selfish stakes in the conflict but burnt its finger in the process and is really displeased with ‘A’. ‘A’ has nothing personal against its neighbour ‘SFT’ but because of the history of its conflict with ‘B’, ‘A’ only has informal links with ‘SFT’.



Check Your Progress 1

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. What are the Ways of Conflict Mapping?

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2. How to map a conflict situation?

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7.6 LET US SUM UP

Conflicts are complex and confusing both to the participants as well as outsiders. There are multiple elements operating in any given conflict situation. Understanding the dynamics and being able to analyse the elements of the conflict is the first step towards resolution. For this purpose, a conflict map which presents the conflict graphically and shows its main elements can be created. It gives a structured analysis of the conflict at a given point of time. The conflict map provides a snapshot or a quick picture of the conflict and is thus indicative rather than comprehensive. Some of the main elements which must be represented on the conflict map are the parties – major, minor as well as third and external parties, the relationships between them, their relative power, the issues between them, and their interests and goals. There is no standard way of mapping a conflict. Depending on the context and the elements present, one can creatively use signs and conventions to map a conflict. Mapping is a dynamic process which must point towards possibilities, opportunities and action.

7.7 KEY WORDS

Conflict Map: Conflict Mapping. Mapping is an approach to analysing a conflict situation. You represent the conflict graphically, placing the

parties in relation to the problem, and conveying graphically the relations between them.

Conflict Cycle: The matrix describes the conflict cycle as having a trigger that escalates to a crisis, resulting in an eventual recovery phase characterized by the person(s) gradually returning to baseline behavior.

7.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Discuss the Conflict Map: Purpose, Usage and Limitations.
2. What are the Basic Elements of a Conflict Map?
3. What are the Ways of Conflict Mapping?
4. How to map a conflict situation?

7.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

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7.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 7.2
2. See Section 7.3

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 7.4
2. See Section 7.5